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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyses the subject of energy security within the
context of the European Community. Energy security as a
concept may be seen as the threats facing a state, measurable, 
in this instance, by the level of oil imports, and the
measures taken to ensure the continued security of supply and
the reduction of dependence. It is also a concept which has a
further two dimensions that of vulnerability and of 
sensitivity, both of which are components of interdependence.
The European Community is reliant on a high degree of oil
imports to meet its consumption requirements and it is thus
vulnerable to an interruption in its supply. This
vulnerability has implications for all sectors of a state’s 
economy parti cularly transport.
The European Community’s energy policies, evolved as a 
response to not only its high degree of dependence, but also
to the two oil crises of the 1970s and as such are reflective
of a reactive stance to past events. On the whole, it is
doubtful whether its present energy policies, with their
continuing aims of securing adequate energy supplies; reducing
dependence; developing secure and competitive alternatives to
oil; containing energy consumption and restricting oil’s share
in total energy consumption, will prove effective in the event
of another oil crisis.
However, EC energy policies also have to be seen within the
wider context of the European Community and whether they are
indicative of a common energy policy. The Canmunity energy
policies do not fulfill the requirements of a common policy
mainly because of the divergencies apparent airong the various
member states and, more importantly, because of the lack of a
mandate in any of the Treaties to adequately cover all aspects
of energy.
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Arabian Light 341 /^I :
API(American Petroleum Institute) density : scale used to
express density of oil, formula for converting API density 
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API density degrees = 141.5
 --------------  131.5
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Conference on International Economic Co-operation
Four Commissions (1975-1977) dealt with energy, raw materials, 
development and financial matters. Participants included
industrialised, developing, and OPEC states.
Crude Oil :
Mineral Oil consisting of a mixture of hydrocarbons of natural 
origin.
VI
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European 
France, 
Netherlands,
Community ; Established 1958 
West Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal, Spain and the United
: Belgium, Denmark, 
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Kingdom
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European Atomic Energy Community : Established 1957 by the
Treaty of Rome. Members are the same as for the ECSC and the 
EC. It co-ordinates atomic research and development, provides 
for joint power projects and encourages the pooling of 
scientific and technical information.
lEA :
International Energy Agency : working body of the OECD
21 participating members : Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, West Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United ^States
Mtoe/mtoe :
Millions Tonnes Oil Equivalent 
MjW :
Non-Commun ist World
Natural Gas Li quids (NGL) :
Liquid of liquified hydrocarbons produced in the manufacture, 
purification and stabilization of natural gas. Their
characteristics range from those of butane and propane to 
heavy oils. NGL are either distilled with crude oil in
refineries, blended with refined petroleum products or used
di rectiy dependi ng on thei r characteri sti cs.(INTERNATIONAL
ENERGY AGENCY : Quarterly Oil Statistics..and Energy.Balances :
1st Quarter .1,989. : OËCD/ÎÉÀ, Paris, 1989 : pviii)
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Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (Paris)
: Established 1961 : Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany, Greece, Iceland, 
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Portugal, spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United
Ireland, 
Norway, 
Kingdom, 
status)
United States of America, and Yugoslavia(special
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Organisation for European Economi c 
1948 : predecessor of the OECD
Co-operation Establi shed
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Organisation of 
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Petroleum Exporting Countries : Arab
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members: Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran,
Petroleum Products :
Any oil based products which can be obtained from primary 
distillation and are normally used outside the refinery
i ndustry.
Refinery Feedstocks
A product of combination of products derived from crude oil
destined for further 
than blending.
processing in the refining industry other
INTRODUCTION
"Oil matters. When the twenty-first century dawns it will 
still meet more than a third of the world’s total energy
needs."(1 )
Today’s advanced industrialised economies run on energy. It 
is a prerequisite for sophisticated industrial production; for
a complex infrastructure and for high standards of living. 
Oil plays a crucial role in this. But, it is a role which 
carries with it particular political risks and factors - ones 
which stem from the dependence of a state on imports from
abroad. Inherent in such dependence are security risks. At a 
time of such abundant availability of oil it is all too easy 
to adopt a relaxed attitude towards energy security. But it 
is an attitude that belies the innate dangers to be found in 
the present situation.
The purpose of this thesis is two-fold. Firstly, it is to 
look at and analyse the concept of energy security in relation 
to oil. Since energy security, for the purposes of this 
thesis, consists of both the extent of the vulnerability or
sensitivity of a state to an interruption in its supplies of 
(imported) oil and to the measures needed to ensure against
and reduce the probability of a supply interruption,
therefore, these two aspects of the energy security equation
or relationship will be examined, using the European Community
as a case example.
The first section will assess the level of vulnerability
facing the European Community member states. Since
vulnerability is primarily calculated by the level of
imports, this will be used as the main measure along with a
further two other indicators : the sources of imports and the
domestic consumption patterns of oil. Having established the
level of vulnerability, the second section will analyse the
effectiveness of the European Community’s energy policies,
particularly those of its 10 year objectives in reducing
vulnerability and ensuring security of supply.
In this thesis it will also be ascertained whether energy 
security, as a concept, still retains its relevance in view of 
recent developments on the international energy markete. These 
are currently experiencing an oil oversupply or 'glut’ 
situation as OPEC members consistently exceed their quota 
levels of production. This does not mean it is a period for 
complacency on the part of the oil consumers and that, hence, 
energy security may be consigned to an academic dustheap. It
is precisely because of the present situation and in view of 
previous experiences, that energy security is still relevant 
and pertinent. As Hogan and Mossavar-Rahmani have observed ; 
"...the current glut provides the interlude and the 
opportunity to prepare for the next famine."(2) However, it 
must be realised, at the same time, that the results of such
an attitude, on the part of a state, are determined by a whole 
range of current political and economic considerations.
The second purpose of this thesis is to suggest that despite 
the policy options currently available to member states and
despite moves towards fulfilling them, be they limited in 
impact, the whole future orientation of the EC’s energy
policies, particularly those affecting oil, should be to move
away from the current reactionary stance they incorporate
towards an anticipatory one. EC energy policies are, thus, 
the result of past events and have failed to take cognisance 
of current and future perceptions. The challenge which faces
the oil consumers is ".... to anticipate the scope of the 
problems of tomorrow, and to put in motion those policies that 
will bear fruit later when the market tightens."(3) This
view, of course, brings into question the whole validity
behind a 'common’ energy policy for the European member
states.
The energy sector covers not only oil but coal, natural gas, 
nuclear energy and a host of 'alternative’ energies (the main
ones being hydro-electric, geothermal, solar and wind). All
are, in their own way, vital to the industrial, agricultural, 
commercial and domestic sectors of an economy - but none more
so than oil. Thus, the main focus of this thesis will be on 
oil which will be taken to rrean, principally, crude oil and 
petroleum or finished products unless otherwise specified. It 
is, therefore, a generalisation of the term without keeping to 
strict technical definitions.
The reason oil has been chosen over the other main energy
sources is because of its pervasive and major role in
industrialised economies. It continues to constitute a major
source of energy consumption in OECD economies - in 1988 it
provided nearly 43 percent of their total consumption 
requirements, 45 percent of Western Europe’s and 46 percent of
the European Community’s.(4) Within an economy, oil also has
a pivitol role, providing all of the transportation sector
with its fuel requirements, among others. Furthermore,
because of its importance, oil is the only energy source (and
possibly the only commodity) whose sudden cut-off would have a
decisive and drastic effect on the economic activity of a
state and on a state’s welfare both political and social. The
smaller the proportion of domestic production to consumption,
the greater disruption a cut-off would be to an industrialised
economy. Finally, it would appear that no adequate substitute
to oil is likely to be developed in the coming years in
quantities sufficient enough to replace oil as a primary 
commercial fuel.
The European Community(5) has been taken as the case example
because out of the three advanced industrialised blocs in the
world - the other two being the United States of America and
Japan - it constitutes a formidable trading and economic bloc
and, although to a lesser extent, a powerful political entity.
This position will be strengthened economically, it is hoped,
in 1992 with the implementation of the single European market.
It is also a particularly vulnerable entity in not only oil
%but also in the other energy fields. In 1988 oil imports 
accounted for nearly 34 percent of EC energy consumption and
75 percent of oil consumption. This is compared to a
comparable figure for the United States 16 percent and 40 
percent respecti vely.
It has been decided to choose as the time period that from
1945 to the present(6) with particular emphasis on the 1970s 
and 1980s.
It should also be borne in mind that the field of energy, in
general, and oil, specifically, is too vast and too complex to
cover in adequate detail in this thesis. It impinges on a
whole feast of different areas of study from economics through 
to the sciences both physical and technical. In keeping with 
the study of international relations, emphasis is placed in 
this thesis on the politics of oil. The economics of oil have 
been dealt with elsewhere. It is hoped that where economics 
has intruded, as it surely will, that justice has been done to
it, albeit in a limited way and at the expense of explaining
the international political context of oil.
Chapter 1 will examine energy security as a concept and define 
it more precisely for the purposes of this thesis. The two
dimensions of interdependence, namely vulnerability and
sensitivity will also be analysed as will that of threats
versus vulnerability and the issue of oil imports. Emphasis 
will be placed on the relevance of it, as a concept, in
today’s current energy situation.
The second Chapter will establish how sensitive or vulnerable 
the EC states are to an interruption in their supply of oil; 
how dependent they are on oil imports and the origin of their 
imports and whether this heightens or lessens their 
vulnerability.
Having established the extent of the EC member states’ 
vulnerability and dependence, the next three Chapters will 
examine the other side of the energy security equation - that 
of the policies of the European Community and how successful 
they have been in moving towards the EC’s main goals, namely 
security of supply; lessened dependence on imported oil and 
the diversification of supplies. These three chapters will 
focus, firstly, primarily on the historical perspective of the 
EC’s energy policies from the 1950s onwards, and secondly, on 
the formulation and implementation of the three sets of policy 
objectives of the European Community. Chapter 5 will provide
a brief update on the latest developments in EC energy policy,
namely the establishment of the Internal Energy Market for 
1992.
Chapters 6 and 7 will then examine the effectiveness of the 
EC’s policy objectives and whether they have attained their 
goals as originally planned. In other words, whether oil as a
percentage of total energy consumption has declined; whether
imports have fallen and whether sources of supply have been 
diversified - thereby ensuring security of supply and reducing
vulnerability.
REFERENCES
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5. Hereafter referred to as the EC.
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SECTION I
CHAPTER 1
ENERGY AND SECURITY
For the member states of the European Community(EC) access to
and continued use of energy has a bearing on the security and 
economic well being. The degree to which this is the case, 
however, varies from state to state. No uniform 'EC’ oil need 
exists. Bearing this in mind, it is necessary to analyse 
energy security as a concept by first defining security p e r  se
and then energy security more specifically. The two ma,jor
dimensions of energy security, arising out of the 
interdependence between consumers and producers, vulnerability 
and sensitivity, will be analysed, before moving on to import 
security as a sub-category of energy security. Without a
clear definition of the nature of energy security concepts, it 
would be difficult, if not impossible, to analyse coherent 
strategies for dealing with problems and crises when they 
arise.
Security
According to Span1er, the most common and basic objective that 
a state seeks is “security". This can riean the following(l) :
firstly, at the very minimum it can imply simple physical
9survival; secondly, a more common meaning of security refers 
to the preservation of a state’s territorial integrity;
finally, it can entail political independence for a state. 
This, negatively, means freedom from foreign control and, 
positively, the preservation of a state’s domestic political 
and economic system or way of life. To quote Spanier :
"Security, then, refers not rærely to the 
maintenance of a state’s physical survival and 
territorial security but also to the perpetuation of 
the values, patterns of social relations, life 
styles and varied other elements that characterise 
its way of life. "(2)
In other words, one is speaking of a state of being (a degree 
of security) which allows a state to feel relatively safe, not
forgetting, however, that all states have to endure a degree 
of insecurity since no such concept as absolute security 
exists in the state system.(3)
Goldstein(4), in line with Spanier, defines (national)
security as comprising of three basic components : territorial 
integrity, political independence and physical well-being or
the continued prosperity of a state in all areas.
(a) Territorial Integrity
The first determinant of security is identified as territorial
integrity which, under classic military strategy, involves the
protection of borders. As Goldstein demonstrates, this
dimension is of minor relevance in the context of energy,
since "[n]o major energy producer seems to be in a position to
10
use its energy resources to acquire the territory of [other] 
major consumers. "(5) It is unclear as to what Goldstein is
attempting to imply here, but he seems to suggest that, to
date, no major oil producer, for example Saudi Arabia, has
used the power or wealth derived from oil to acquire the
territory of a major oil consumer. However, the example of a
unified Arab desire to see Israel out of the "occupied
territories" could be posited as a counter argument to 
Goldstein. Another example is the Iran-Iraq war, which has
shown that territorial ambition can be aided by military 
might, financed by the production and export of oil.(6) On
the other hand, one cannot discount the possibility of oil- 
short states being tempted to seize what they cannot buy - a 
situation, at present, which appears highly unlikely due to
the surplus capacity now available on world oil markets.
However, leaving aside the present oil oversupply on the world
markets, would oil-short states seize what they could not buy?
The oil producing states are no longer militarily weak, a
situation which previously would have provided an incentive
for intervention. Hence, to provoke a military conflict
between a consumer and producer state would appear to be
highly risky. A further related factor is that world oil 
markets are now so i nterconnected that an oi 1 shortfal 1 can be 
easily made up elsewhere, as happened during 1980 at the 
beginning of the Iran-Iraq war.
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(b) Pol 11i cal Independence.
Political independence constitutes the second determinant of 
security. This is an aspect of national security in which
energy does appear to insinuate itself more directly, 
according to Goldstein. "The need to import energy implies
dependence. ■ This dependence arises when energy imports are 
not merely matters of economic convenience, but irreplaceable 
supplies critical to sustaining a nation’s economy."(7)
Energy dependence, therefore, can compromise political 
independence in a number of ways : firstly, one of the
suppliers could try to condition the energy trade concessions
in a non-energy area, for example, crude oil sales could be 
linked to attempts to isolate politically out-of-favour 
states, or, alternatively, to demands for technological 
transfer or, more simply, as an instrument to attain 
diplomatic ends. With reference to the former, this has not
proved to be, on the whole, a particularly effective measure 
as witnessed by Arab attempts to isolate Israel. Finally, an 
outside party to the producer-consumer relationship could try 
to extract an advantage by threatening to disrupt energy flows 
if certain political demands are not met. This has remained,
for the most part, a hypothetical example.
(c) Prosperity
12
The final determinant, identified by Goldstein, is that of 
physical well-being or more appropriately, the continued 
prosperity, be it economic, political or social, of a state.
This is the area where energy probably has the most obvious
security dimension. The safety of a people, national security 
and the very justification for the modern state are closely
bound up with one another. Prosperity, therefore, is
primarily linked with economic security and survival. The
economic aspect is reflected in energy prices and the
consequences thereof, not only for the economy of a state but 
also for the effect higher oil prices and other factors can
have on the military field; and also in the supply and demand 
of energy. Goldstein appears to omit this aspect of energy
but it is particularly pertinent in oil’s case, as witnessed
by events in the 1970s and early 1980s.(8) Thus, in relation
to the security dilemmas posed by energy it appears to be
generally the case that energy is primarily an economic 
problem. The economic effects of rising oil prices, as
experienced in the 1970s, affected domestic economies, trading 
partners and the entire global economic system because of the
economic interlinkage of the world economy(9). In the 1970s
the supply of oil had economic repercussions as well.
This makes Cooper’s definition of prosperity, which he states 
is the capability of a society to enjoy and cultivate its
culture and values, very pertinent. This implies security
from external as well as internal threats and involves the
maintenance of a standard of living consistent with a 
society’s cultural values.(10) Cooper further argues "that
13
the needs of national security have not been met if, to
protect itself from physical harm, the nation must abandon its
values for those of a garrison state."(11)
Ullman states that national security may be defined not merely
as a goal but as a consequence i.e. "we may not realise what
it is or how important it is until we are threatened with
losing it. In sotTB sense, therefore, security is defined and
valorized by the threats which challenge it.“(12)
This view calls for a redefinition of the threats undermining
security, since they ultimately define security. National
security, as propounded by Goldstein, Cooper and Spanier, is
traditionally seen as the military threats arising against a
state’s sovereignty. However, according to Ullman, this
definition is doubly misleading in that non-military threats
are just as likely to undermine the stability of a state and
moreover, it presupposes that external threats are more
dangerous (to a state’s security) than internal ones.
Ullman suggests, therefore, in the light of the
aforementioned, that a more useful definition of threats might
be :
"an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens
drastically and over a relatively brief span of time
to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants
of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow
the range of policy choices available to the
government of a state or to private, non­
governmental enti ties...within the state."(13)
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The first category could cover all types of disturbances and
disruptions, ranging from external wars to internal
rebellions, blockades and boycotts of raw materials, and 
natural disasters. All of these categories would impair the 
well being of a society.
An example of the second category, given by Ullman, could be
the threat that the Soviet Union posed to the West at the
height of the Cold War in the 1960s and early 1970s. However,
threats (to the availability of policy choices) are not
confined solely to major powers and may originate from a
number of sources : interruptions in the flow of vital
resources; terrorist organisations; environmental factors; and
violence originating from a developing state. All can,
equally, reduce the range of available policy options.
However, because such threats are less apparent than military
ones, it is easier (for a government) to partially reject or
ignore the idea that they do pose a threat to a society or
state. Nevertheless, it does not mean that the consequences 
(of such threats) are not as significant as those arising from
military threats. Increasingly, as military threats recede,
they are assuming greater importance.
Wolfers(14), in line with Ullman, offers yet another 
conceptual view of security. He characterises security as an 
ambiguous concept in that it can be used to cover a range of
goals so wide and divergent that it may be interpreted as
rather a series of policies of security, than simply a policy
of security.(15) In this sense, security becomes a negative
15
goal involving a total lack of threats or danger. Nye takes
this point further and suggests that "how much insurance one
needs in order to feel secure is a function of the probability 
of the threatening event and the magnitude of the potential 
damage. "(16) Nye goes on to add that damage can be defined
narrowly in terms of survival or broadly in terms of a whole 
range of values including welfare, independence, status and
power. Therefore, under Nye’s definition security implies the
absence of a threat to survival. However, survival is rarely
what is at stake. For the majority of people, survival does
not represent enough. "They wish to feel secure in their 
continued or future enjoyment of a number of other basic 
values."(17) In other words, security implies a wider
dimension.
Security, therefore, has a broader application than the 
traditional military aspect. Since 1945 it has had to be 
pursued in a vastly more complex field than was previously the 
case. It must now encompass economic, social and internal 
dimensions. These are the new dimensions of security but they 
complement rather than replace the earlier and more 
traditional concerns. With regard to economic security, the 
uninterrupted flow of critical resources is vital to the
continued existence of values in a state. Interruptions in
this flow either through market forces or unintended/intended 
restrictions on supplies can pose an important threat.(18)
Despite the foregoing, security has not yet been given an 
agreed general definition. It is essentially a subjective
16
concept, to be defined by decision-makers and dependent on the 
circumstances and threats (or lack thereof) facing a state or 
entity at any given period in time.
In this regard, Ullman’s definition of security : as not only
a goal but as a consequence, which is defined and valorised by 
the threats which challenge it, provides an acceptable 
framework in which to look at energy, in general, and oil,
specifically. Since the threats arising from oil dependence
(as will be discussed below) are mainly not of a military
nature but are rather economic and political. However, it
should be borne in mind that complete security, in other
words, the total absence of any threats is a chimera. It is 
simply not possible in  p r a c t ic e  for a state to attain such a 
state of being which in  th e o ry is what a state is ultimately
aiming for. Instead a state has to aim for a managed
situation of continued insecurity. This is true of security
in general and of energy security specifically.
Energy and National Security
How are energy and national security related? Ebinger(19)
argues that there are several links between energy and
national security. Firstly, international competition for
oil, particularly in a time of crisis, can strain political 
and diplomatic alliances. This occurs as states tmove to
protect their own interests rather than co-operating to ensure
secure access to vital energy supplies. Secondly, reliance on
insecure oil supplies can impinge on military security in
17
several areas : the safeguarding of oil producers against
internal subversion or external attack requires difficult 
strategic choices; and the security of oil importers can be 
threatened by raising oil import bills. This is no longer a
threat in the short term, but one which remains for the longer 
term should oil prices rise substantially.
Energy and national security are linked in a third way: 
through political, economic and environmental conflicts over 
energy development, conservation, and end use which engender 
uncertainties over future economic conditions and the supply 
and cost of energy. This can constrain investirent and the
prospect for enhancing industrial productivity.
Therefore, energy security can be seen as one part of national 
security, under Ullman’s definition. It is valorised and
defined by the threats which challenge it.
Energy Security a s a  concept
Given the foregoing, it is clear that energy security may be 
seen as one aspect of the widening notion of national
security. Energy security is the condition in which
governments and consumers believe, and have reason to believe,
that adequate reserves, and production and distribution 
facilities, will be available to meet their requirements for
the future and present - either from sources at home or abroad
- and at costs which do not place them at a disadvantage or
threaten their well-being, be it economic, political, social
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or military.(20) Insecurity of energy supply arises,
according to Ebinger e t a7, when "the welfare of citizens or
the ability of governments to pursue their other normal
objectives is threatened, either as a result of physical 
failure of supplies or as a result of sudden and major price
changes."(21)
Energy security also embraces a number of other factors.
According to Smart(22), for example, energy security is not
only about oil but also encompasses natural gas imports and 
nuclear security, among others. Secondly, energy security is 
concerned not only with fuel but the equipment and technology
needed to exploit energy and the goods in which energy is
embodied, for example the by-products of crude oil and
petroleum products such as chemicals, and the processes such
as are found in manufacturing, which are reliant on fuel.
In addition to oil imports, energy security is also concerned 
with the problems arising from indigenous production, 
conversion or distribution of energy. Indigenous energy
resources are not necessarily more secure than those that are
imported. An obvious example of this is the 1973-74 British 
coal strike, the cost of which to the British economy was 
substantially more than the restrictions simultaneously 
imposed on oil exports by the Arab members of OPEC. (23) In 
addition, similar costs could, and have been, incurred when
supplies of electricity have been interrupted, by industrial
action, accident, plant failure or deficiencies of generating 
capacity. Finally, a negligible or even negative cost is often
<i
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involved in relying on indigenous energy sources. However,
not all indigenous sources are insecure. It is preferable, in 
certain circumstances, to be reliant on indigenous resources
rather than on external ones because of the greater degree of
control governments have over production and supply. However,
the price implications of such a move can have negative
connotations for an economy.
The fourth proposition is that energy security involves not
only physical supply but the economic costs which have to be
borne in meeting energy demand. Thus both security of supply 
and price since both have an effect on overall security.
Both are distinct issues in that security of physical supply
does not necessarily imply security or stability of price.
The real price of energy can be increased by either relying on
a policy of substituting more expensive indigenous fuel 
sources for cheaper imported fuels; by relying on large
investments to curtail current demand for imported fuel
sources or by competition for supplies, in a time of crisis,
among consumers. The same result can also occur should a
state decide - to continue importing expensive fuel while 
withholding cheaper indigenous substitutes as an insurance 
policy against a future interruption in supply.(24) In both 
cases the only real benefit to the state concerned will be to
insulate it against future price increases should one be
imposed by a supplier or if an international energy crisis
arises. In the meantime the real costs will be borne by the
consumers affected, either through higher price or through
subsidies from fiscal revenue.
1
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However, energy is more than an economic issue. It is also
a political issue, involving not only the formulation, 
organisation and implementation of policy, but also the 
handling of politically induced energy problems which have 
repercussions in the other sectors of a state. Since it is
also a political issue this means that greater resources can
be brought to bear than exist in the economic area alone.
"The massive amounts of capital that must be generated for
energy investment may be easier to raise if governments can
intervene in the process with a national security
justification."(25)
Finally, energy security as a concept has a narrow 
perspective. "Energy is a means to some further end of
economic or social value, as fuel is a means to the
intermediate provision of energy. To act in ways intended to
enhance fuel or energy security without any regard to other
insecurities thus created is a prescription for disaster."(26)
In other words, energy security is only important when viewed
in the context of the value it conveys in terms of the
economic and social welfare benefits to a state.
Therefore, one may conclude that energy security in Western
Europe, and elsewhere, is ultimately about paying a reasonable 
price for the freedom to pursue chosen economic and social
objectives without being unreasonably constrained by threats
to the physical supply or real price of energy.(27) In
keeping with the general definition of security, energy
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security is also a matter of degree i.e. "what constitutes 
security is relative in concept depending on countries and 
times."(28)
For the purposes of this thesis, it will be suggested that 
energy security, is determined by two factors : firstly, the 
anticipated danger (the degree of which depends on its scale,
how often it occurs and how long it lasts) and secondly on the
countermeasures set up or taken to deal with this, of which
there are two types ; one before and one after the danger
takes place.(29)
Inte rdependence and Energy
Energy security is by its very nature transnational in that 
the energy problem is a global one. The energy system is 
characterised by high levels of interdependence and, to some 
extent, centralization. Energy may be placed in a framework
of interdependence since, as Choucri suggests, it is the 
result of many linkages emanating from asymmetries in 
production and exchanges; vulnerabilities and sensitivities; 
shared interests between consumers and producers; the costs of
pursuing national objectives; and the efforts to increase 
control over international transactions.(30) In the context
of this thesis however, one particular aspect of the 
interdependence relationship is concentrated upon namely the 
oil consumers or importers. Furthermore, one set of linkages 
emanating from the asymmetries of the structure of energy
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interdependence will be analysed, that of the potential 
vulnerabilities and sensitivities.
The asymmetries of energy, particularly oil, are the product
of structural and behavioural differences among states which 
provides a basis for interdependence in energy transfers. As 
Choucri states:
"By themselves asymmetries indicate only the 
initial transactions generated by energy needs but
with institutionalized flows they become the basis
for defining potential vulnerabilities [and
sensitivities]. It is these vulnerabilities that
assign political meaning to structural asymmetries 
in petroleum related transactions and create the
initial motivation for the search for policy 
al te mat i ves" ,(31) or responses.
Thus, one has to distinguish between the two components of
interdependence : sensitivity and vulnerability.
Sens i t i V i ty
Sensitivity (or dependency) as conventionally used and as 
originally defined by Waltz, Keohane and Nye and further 
refined by Baldwin (32) has two basic meanings : on the one
hand, it is used in a causal sense to refer to situations in 
which an effect is contingent on or conditioned by something
else i.e. implying dependence on an uncertain issue or 
situation. Keohane and Nye refer to this when they state that 
"dependence means a state of being determined or significantly 
affected by external forces."(33) On the other hand
sensitivity can be used to refer to a relationship of
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subordination in which one actor or object is supported by 
another or has to rely on something else for the fulfillment
of a need which could be costly to forego.(34)
Sensitivity thus implies mutual but not equal effects on the
states involved, Keohane and Nye argue that sensitivity
involves a degree of responsiveness within a framework - how
quickly do changes in one state bring costly changes in 
another? How great are these costly effects? Sensitivity is,
therefore, created by interactions within a framework of 
policies which remain unaltered.(35) The fact that the
policies remain unaltered, may reflect the problems of 
reformulating new policies within a short space of time, or it 
could reflect a commitment to certain patterns of domestic
and international rules. Furthermore, sensitivity, according
to Keohane and Nye, can be social, political or economic. It 
may also mean that the impact of altered circumstances is not
too severe.
Baldwin, however, rejects Keohane and Nye’s notion of 
sensitivity.(36) He argues instead that it should be
relabelled "mutual sensitivity", in that the concept as 
formulated by Keohane and Nye, blurs the distinction between
"sensitive" and "dependent" or "dependence". Moreover, Waltz
suggests that sensitivity as a concept is given more meaning 
by economists when seen in market terms. To quote Waltz :
"The more automatically, the more quickly and the more 
smoothly factor costs adjust, the slighter the political 
consequences become."(37) This, however, remains subject to
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argument since the market differs quite markedly from 
sensitivity, as a dimension of interdependence.
Therefore, sensitivity(dependency) may be defined, according
to Nye’s definition, as being measurable in terms of flows 
across borders, their responsiveness and their magnitude.(38) 
With regard to oil, dependency is measured by the level of 
imports.(39)
Vulnerabi1ity..
Vulnerability may be defined, according to Nye, as the 
incursion of "high costs that cannot be escaped without 
incurring further high costs."(40) For Nye vulnerability is 
distinct from sensitivity in that it is usually measured not 
by the level of imports, but by "the costs of interruptions 
a f t e r considering the effectiveness and costs of constructing
measures to escape the situation."(41) In other words Keohane
and Nye argue that it is the cost of disengaging from a 
specific relationship which constitutes the appropriate 
requirement and measure of dependence.
If Keohane and Nye’s argument is accepted, then one is left 
with a clear distinction between the two terms ; 'sensitivity’ 
and 'vulnerability’. What distinguishes the two terms is the
degree of costs incurred a f t e r  a crisis or shock situation
occurs or after the severing of a relationship. In
'vulnerability’s’ instance the costs (mainly to an economy)
will be potentially much greater because of the higher level
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of reliance on imports for a larger section of the economy,
whereas the costs incurred in a 'sensitivity’ dependent
situation will be relatively less. Both 'sensitivity’ and 
'vulnerability’ are to a degree also reliant on the policy
instruments and measures available.(42)
With regard to oil, (and equally also to other raw materials),
some sensitivity dependence on world prices is inevitable and
is a condition which a state accepts. At the same time, a
state will insure itself against the effects of an unexpected 
interruption in supplies by keeping open the availability of
multiple sources and stockpiles. In line with the former,
and as suggested by Nye :
"[t]he degree of vulnerability depends not only on
the level of imports, but also on the other
instruments and policies available. At a given
level of oil imports, the State is vulnerable to the
extent that the level is too high to be handled by
remedial measures (such as stockpiles, additional
production and, in an emergency, demand restraint)
at modest levels of cost."(43)
In this sense a state does not need to aim for zero oil import
levels. Instead it should concentrate on a level of oil 
imports combined with appropriate levels of stockpiles (and
possibly other measures) to overcome possible interruptions
and to manage a situation of energy insecurity.
Opportunity Costs
Vulnerability as a concept is both simple and at the same time 
deceptive. It is simple in that it can be further defined in
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terms of the opportunity costs of severing a relationship.(44)
A good indication of this is given by Baldwin - if state B
must forego wann homes, full employment, adequate
transportation systems and high living standards when state A
stops exporting oil to it then, it follows that state B is
dependent on state A for oil. If, on the other hand, state B 
can easily get its oil elsewhere or if it is indifferent to
warm homes etc, it is not very dependent on state A with
regard to oil.(45) The concept of opportunity costs also 
allows one to view policy alternatives more sensibly. Often
in discussions on dependency the dependent actor is portrayed
as having no alternatives or as having its alternatives closed
off. This however, belies the fact that alternatives are
always available. When, for example, it is argued that the
United States has no alternative to importing oil what is
really meant is that the costs involved in securing
alternatives are regarded as unacceptable or unaffordable to
the parties involved. From this, it may follow that part of
the difference between vulnerability and sensitivity is the 
aval 1abi1i ty of alternati ves.
It is a deceptive concept in that the opportunity costs and 
their implications may be easily misunderstood. For example,
it is not a phenomenon which exists independently of the value
structure of the dependent actor. In this context states are
at least partly responsible for their own dependence(46), for
example, Western Europe is dependent on Arab oil imports in
the sense that forgoing them would involve unacceptable costs 
to the states concerned. The European states could, for
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example, free themselves from this dependence by simply
lowering the value they place on operating private vehicles. 
As such vulnerability is also a function of the amount of
trade and of the availability of alternatives.
Sensitivity and vulnerability may also be seen as variables of 
energy security. Import sensitivity or vulnerability may be 
regarded as factual terms, which can be measured with 
statistical tools. For the purposes of this thesis they
will be defined as "the volume or percent of domestic
consumption supplied from foreign sources, particularly
'unstable’(sic) ones."(47) A state is dependent on imports
of items for which it does not have the capacity to produce 
100 percent of its own needs. Import sensitivity is,
therefore, reflective of the level of imports and the
alternatives available. By comparison, import vulnerability 
represents a greater degree of liability - both economic and
political - to change in the availability or price of a 
commodity upon which a state is reliant.(48) This carries
with it far greater implications for a state.
I mpo r t Secu r i ty
The distinction between import sensitivity and vulnerability 
is a matter of degree. Interdependence in the world economy
for goods and services characterises economic life and is 
generally a healthy situation since the costs involved in 
self-sufficiency and isolation are too great to be born by any 
one state. Before 1945 Europe, the United States and Japan
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had relied on imported oil to meet their consumption 
requirements. This, in i'tself, was not a precarious situation 
to be in. Nowdays, for example, the United States imports its 
oil from a geographically diverse number of suppliers, so that
the chances of a disruption simultaneously affecting its top 
suppliers - Mexico, Canada and Venezuela - are minimalised.
As a consequence the United States is import sensitive in that
is has the availability of alternative sources of supply which 
will reduce the opportunity costs imposed by supply 
disruptions and price manipulations. This is, however,
dependent on the circumstances in which these occur. Hence 
the USA is not import vulnerable as its vulnerability is 
reduced by the diversification of suppliers over a wide
geographic area. Western Europe, generally, and the European 
Community, specifically, by comparison, may be characterised 
(as will be seen in next chapter) as import vulnerable because
their supplies are not spread over a wide geographic area and
are instead concentrated in a relatively narrow region - the 
Persian Gulf. This means that Western Europe has
substantially increased the opportunity costs to supply 
disruptions and price manipulations. A corollary of this is 
that a state which has a relatively low level of imported oil 
may, in fact, be more vulnerable than a state with a high 
level of oil imports, if it relies for most of its supplies on 
a small number of sources located in an unstable region. The 
present over-supply situation on world oil markets means that
a sizeable disruption in supplies for an import vulnerable
state could be made up from other sources. This, however, is
only a temporary situation.
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Import dependence, which is not dangerous in itself, may be 
further distinguished from vulnerability, which is, if one 
assumes that the present over-supply of oil were to be
eliminated, either by a rise in world demand or through a
decrease in supply availability.(49) A state like the United
States would increase its exposure to vulnerability (to 
outside supply disruptions) simply because the ensuing shock 
effects in other industrial states would be felt in the US as
well, thereby illustrating the interlinkage of world oil
markets. Only a small proportion of US oil imports originate
from the Persian Gulf compared to those of Western Europe and 
Japan, but a cut-off of these supplies could have serious
consequences for their economy. However, this remains open to 
debate.
From the above, one may conclude that oil security, as
distinct from energy security, comprises a two pronged 
approach. On the one hand, oil importing states are
vulnerable to disruptions in oil supply. Because oil is so 
vital to the running of industrialised economies,
interruptions in the supply of oil could result in disruptions
of economic activity and may, in extreme cases, lead to
economic strangulation. In other words, this first approach
involves protection against the denial of supplies.
It entails, therefore, the reduced reliance on foreign 
supplies of oil i.e. oil imports, both of which have economic
and political aspects to them. The political threat arises
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from the leverage suppliers of foreign oil can exert on a
state’s foreign policy. Two points can be made in this regard
: firstly, political leverage exists only because of potential
economic harm. For example, the political sensitivity of 
America’s imports is dominated by its economic sensitivity.
Secondly, the interruption of oil supplies is a problem which 
is basically distinct from the issue of cartel monopoly
exactions. Intentional interruption is a political act which 
is unlikely to gain support from all oil exporters.
Furthermore, it is a short term action - its effectiveness 
fades upon inception and finally, it is a threat which can be
countered in a number of ways, such as closer consumer-
producer relati ons.
Oil security also involves the avoidance of marked increases
in oil prices i.e. it involves protection against the economic
threat of unanticipated price changes plus reflows of funds 
that could destabilise donestic markets but may not 
necessarily. Marked increases in prices can result in
numerous economic problems, including structural adjustment 
and balance of payments difficulties; increasing inflation; 
unemployment and economic recession. This is because of oil’s 
pivotal role in economic production and use in industrialised
economies. All were seen after the two oil price increases in 
the 1970s. Such economic difficulties, in turn, can threaten
the social and political stability of an industrialised 
state.(50)
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Dependence on oil imports and vulnerability to oil supply 
disruptions are, thus, two of three energy problems - the
third being depletion of world oil resources. Carlsnaes
suggests that of these two issues dependence on oil imports is
one which, essentially, can only be tackled over a time span
of decades, because of its long term nature and the
difficulties, technical as well as political, which could 
arise in securing alternative(safer) supplies. The response
to vulnerability, on the other hand, both needs and as well as 
in practice is amenable to policies which relate to the
immediate future.(51) In other words, because of the impact
or threat posed by vulnerability it requires strategies and/or 
emergency regulations to be in place should a crisis occur.
Alternatively, the long term depletion of world oil resources 
requires the development of alternative energy technologies 
which require lengthy lead times, and whose impact will only
be felt over a much longer time span. These three aspects are
c1ose1y i nterre1ated.
Vulnerabi1ity a n d T hreats
Energy security thus reflects a combination of vulnerabilities 
and sensitivities. In looking at vulnerabilities it is
necessary to draw a further distinction between
'vulnerability’ p e r  se and 'threats’, thereby returning to 
Ullman’s definition of security. 'Threats’ is not a separate 
concept in the ordinary sense but one that is normally
associated with vulnerability. It also, under Ullman’s
definition of security, defines and valorises security.
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A distinction does exist, however, between threats and 
vulnerabilities in that, according to Buzan(52), states can 
reduce their insecurity either by reducing their vulnerability
or by preventing or lessening threats. The alternative to
this is that increased vulnerability can entail increased 
threats, depending on the situation and actors or states 
concerned. Lessened threats, therefore, imply increased
security for a state.
Vulnerabilities, as previously explained, can endanger Western 
economic growth rates and thereby the employment potentials, 
social stability and standards of living. Alternatively,
vulnerabilities may be viewed in military strategic terms, for
example, posing a threat to NATO’s defence capabilities v i s - à -
v i s  those of the Warsaw Pact or making it difficult to carry
on a limited war. Threats, on the other hand, are more
complex, alter in response to new developments, are more
ambiguous and vary in intensity depending on the 
situation.(53) Four types of threats exist to a state’s
security : economic, political, military and environmental.
Of these, the economic threat in relation to oil poses the
greatest risk to a state’s security because of the pivotal 
role of petroleum in an economy. (54) This is in line with
Ullman’s argument that the threats arising from oil dependence
are mainly not of a military nature, but tend to be political 
or economi c.
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Economie threats are difficult to relate to national security
because of the intertwining with economic factors such as
risks, competition and uncertainty, thereby making it 
difficult to distinguish the boundary between which economic 
issues pose a threat to a state’s security and those which are
a function of competition. "This means that economic threats
tend to be neither swift nor precise in their effect, and at 
lower levels may easily become indistinguishable from the 
normal rough-and-tumble of economic practice."(55)
Furthermore, in looking at economic threats it must be borne
in mind that it is often difficult to distinguish an economic
threat from normal economic activity. An economic threat is 
borne by a state if, as Buzan suggests, "conscious external
actions by others results in material loss" and places a
strain on the state’s institutions.(56) In comparison with a
military attack on a state, an economic attack does not cross
a clear boundary between peaceful and aggressive behaviour,
since aggressive behaviour is normal in economic conduct.
However, what Buzan fails to emphasise in oil’s case is that 
it is a pivotal commodity in an economy and that any attacks
on it, either though supply or production, will be seen as a
direct threat against the state. In this connection, oil 
moves from being a threat to being a possible vulnerability.
With regard to oil and threats, specifically, two cases can be 
identified (57) : the first one includes the linkage between
economic factors and military capability. Briefly, at a more
specific level, military capability is reliant on the
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continued supply of strategic materials and where these are
imported then any threats to security of supply can be
classified as a national military security concern. An
example of this is American military reliance on certain 
strategic materials such as chromium, manganese and nickel 
from political unstable regions, in this instance Southern 
Africa.
The second case is economic threats to domestic stability.
This situation occurs when a state pursues an economic policy
based on extensive trade in a particular product with the
concomitant increase in high levels of dependence. This is
necessary in order to sustain the social structure resulting
from such new found prosperity. In other words a state
becomes locked into a structure of trade thereby increasing
its potential vulnerabilities. The supply of oil is the most
obvious exanple. An interruption in the supply of oil could
cause economic chaos in states which are dependent on high
import levels of oil. Where economic manipulations occur for
political reasons, as happened in the early 1970s, then such
actions can be interpreted as threats to a state’s security.
But, to reiterate an earlier point, oil in most instances, is
more than just a threat because of its dominant role as a
source of primary energy for industrialised economies, 
particularly in the transport sectors where it is pre-eminent. 
This is, though, subject to variation among states.
J
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Conclusion
Security, in general, and energy security, specifically, are
complex concepts, dependent on circumstances and the threats
facing a state for their definitions. As such they are a
matter of perceived degree for states. Energy security, in
turn, reflects a combination of vulnerabilities and
sensitivities of which oil imports are a significant measure
of a state’s vulnerability. Both, however, are on-going
processes. Total energy security(of supply) will never be
attained precisely because of the dynamic nature of security.
What does have to be achieved by states is a managed 
environment of insecurity. This, in turn, is reliant on the
resiliency of energy markets and the effectiveness of energy 
secu r i ty measu res.
'Î
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CHAPTER 2
OIL IMPORT DEPENDENCE
Oil is the crucial factor in the energy supply of the
Western industrialised states. In 1973 it constituted 53 
percent of total energy consumption of the OECD states, in
1981 47 percent and in 1988 43 percent, of which
approximately 35 percent was imported by OECD members in 
1988. In line with this pattern of supply, the European 
CommunityC1), before 1974, imported nearly all its crude oil 
requirements. Since then, it has diversified its supplies 
considerably and now imports two thirds of its supplies, 
with oil imports standing in 1988 at 75 percent of oil
consumption and 34 percent of energy consumption. These
figures, however, are still substantial within an energy 
secu r i ty context.(2)
This chapter will attempt to establish the vulnerability or 
sensitivity of the European Community as a whole. To do 
this it will be necessary to look at the level of oil
imports as an indicator of vulnerability or sensitivity, in 
comparison to other energy imports and to over-all energy 
consumption. Furthermore, among other considerations will 
be that of where do the imports originate from and are these 
regions politically or militarily unstable. If so, does 
this necessarily heighten or lessen the threats or
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vulnerabilities facing the importing nations? The sectoral
use of oil will also be analysed as a variable in import
vulnerability. For comparative purposes, the United States,
Japan and Western Europe will be referred to. Within the
European Community, the United Kingdom, West Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands and France have been chosen as examples
because they are representative of the various groupings in
the EC.(3)
It can be argued that the oil import dependence situation of
a state may be assessed in a number of ways(4) : firstly, 
in relation to levels of total domestic energy consumption;
secondly in relation to levels of indigenous production and
availability of reserves on its territory; thirdly, in
relation to levels of imports from specific regions or a
specific state; or, finally, the refining capacity of a
state(5).
Nonetheless, no single indicator provides an adequate 
measure for assessing the oil security situation of a state.
This is because of the complexity of domestic and 
international markets. Rather, a number of indicators could
be used to monitor a given situation, ranging from oil
prices and excess production capacity through to fuel
substitution capability. However, for the purpose of this 
thesis, it has been decided to concentrate on the level of 
imports. To analyse this effectively the following four 
indicators propounded by Deese and Nye(6) will be used : the
degree of dependence on foreign sources of energy; the
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diversification of oil import sources; the distribution of 
primary energy resources and the sectoral distribution of 
oi 1 consumpti on.(7)
Although the oil importers, as importers, share common 
problems they differ in economic growth rates, industrial 
structures, and military strengths etc. In respect to 
energy security and import dependence, they differ 
significantly with regard to the four indicators outlined
above. These four indicators can be used to measure the 
extent of import dependence, but they remain only 
indicators, no single indicator in itself presenting a 
realistic picture. Nor do these indicators allow one to
generalise about Europe’s energy security, simply because of 
the diversity of the European states, their differences in 
resource endowment, the absence of any underlying consensus 
on economic philosophy, the existence of competing 
commercial interests, and differences in historical
relations with oil exporters. However, together the
indicators allow for comparison.
( a) Foreign Sources of Energy
The first indicator is the degree of dependence on foreign
sources of energy and in particular crude oil imports.(See 
Tables 1,2, and 6 in Appendix A) The EC as a whole imports
over 70 percent of its oil consumption requirements, with 
oil constituting 33 percent of its energy consumption in 
1987(See Table 6 - Appendix). Of this, OPEC, in 1988
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provided nearly 53 percent and the Gulf states 30 percent of
total imports and nearly 57 percent of total OPEC exports to
the EC.(See Tables 1 and 2 - Appendix) Western Europe, by
comparison, relies on oil imports for 63 percent of its oil
consumption and sorre 27 percent of its energy consumption.
Within Western Europe itself, West Germany has the highest
Total Primary Energy Requirement(TPER). It depends heavily
on imported energy - some 50 percent of its TPER. This
means that West Germany imports over 50 percent of its oil
consumed. Forty nine percent of its crude oil is derived
from OPEC and nearly 13 percent, in 1988, from the Gulf 
states(See Table 1 - Appendix). Italy, similarly, is highly 
dependent on oil. In 1987 oil constituted 59 percent of its
TPER and 44 percent of its electricity generation.(8) Along 
with this has gone an increase in Italy’s oil imports and
which now constitute 60 percent of its energy consumption
and nearly 100 percent of its oil consumpti on (see Table
6)(9). Because of its high level of oil imports, some 65
percent originate from OPEC states and nearly 36 percent
from the Gulf producers.
Other high degrees of oil dependence among EC member states
are evident in Denmark, Greece, Portugal and Spain, although 
the level of dependence varies from state to state. By 
comparison, oil imports for the United States comprise 40
percent of its total oil consumption, of which, 
approximately, 53 percent of crude oil imports originated in 
1988, from OPEC and 50 percent, of this figure, came from
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the Gulf producers. (See Tables 1,2 and 4 - Appendix) A much
greater degree of importation exists for Japan - it relies
on oil imports for nearly 100 percent of its oil 
consumption, with 72 percent of total imports derived from
OPEC and 58 percent from the Gulf, The Gulf producers 
provide nearly 81 percent of total OPEC exports to Japan.
With regard to the OECD states, net oil imports in 1987 
amounted to 55 percent of oil consumption, reflecting an
unchanging figure from 1986. Fifty-six percent of OECD oil
imports originated from OPEC states in both 1987 and 1988
and about 30 percent of OECD oil imports in 1987 cams from 
the Gulf region.(10) According to the International Energy
Agency, in its 1988 Review(ll), for the middle to long term
the prospects for growing dependence on imports, 
particularly from the Middle-East, are considerable and in 
line with a gradual decrease in OECD oil production. The 
share of oil in total energy demand (up to 2005) is, 
however, expected to decline slowly.
(b) Diyersification of pi] Inipprt Sources
A second measure of energy security is the diversification
of oil import sources (see Tables 1,2,4 and 5 - Appendix).
The importance attached to this measure depends on the 
International Energy Agency’s(12) effectiveness; on EC 
sharing plans which allocate oil supplies in the event of a 
crisis and on the market forces in raising prices and
equalizing supplies during an interruption. Nonetheless,
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despite this, the heavy reliance on single sources of oil 
increases a state’s vulnerability to not only cutoffs below 
7 percent of the previous years oil consuiinption( 13) but to 
foreign policy pressures and to price increases. Over 41
percent of Western Europe’s oil imports are derived from
OPEC with the Gulf contributing over 25 percent of this
figure. Western Europe, as a whole, has a heavy reliance on 
oil imports from a volatile region. As mentioned, the 
twelve EC members were reliant on OPEC to provide some 52 
percent of their crude oil supplies in 1988 and the GCC
states to contributed 30 percent. With specific reference 
to Table 1(See Appendix), Italy is fairly heavily reliant on
OPEC to provide a considerable percentage of its crude oil
imports. The UK is somewhat less reliant on OPEC and the
Gulf producers - indicative of its position as an oil 
exporter. By comparison, Japan has a high reliance on OPEC
and Gulf imports. The Gulf region, particularly Saudi 
Arabia, UAE and Iran, provide over 60 percent of Japan’s
oil. The US, on the other hand, relies on OPEC for around 
53 percent of its crude oil imports, of which the Gulf 
exporters comprise 26.9 percent for crude oil and 4.7
percent for total petroleum product imports.
Table 5(See Appendix) reflects an historical view of EC
crude oil imports from 1980 to the present. Although the 
figures differ somewhat from those given by the lEA, they do
show that the importance of OPEC imports in general and Gulf 
imports in particular have diminished significantly since
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the late 1970s. However, from 1987 imports from the Gulf
region have once again begun to rise.
( c ) Distribution of Primary Energy Resources
The distribution of primary energy resources on which a
state is reliant constitutes the third measure of energy
security. This indicator varies widely among the EC member
states and the US and Japan (see Table 7 in Appendix A).
The US, Japan, Italy and France, plus most of the smaller
European states, rely heavily on oil as their primary
commercial fuel, with oil consumption comprising over 40 per
cent of primary energy consumption, except in the case of
the UK where it was below 38 per cent for 1988. The
European Community members relied on oil for over 46 percent
(in 1988) of their total primary energy consumption. The
table thereby reflects the dominant position of oil in total 
primary energy consumption - in 1988 among the OECD states
it was 42 per cent. (14)
(d) Sectoral pistributi on of pi 1 .Consumpti on
The fourth and final measure of assessing energy security 
identified by Deese and Nye is that of the sectoral
distribution of oil consumption (See Table 3 - Appendix). 
Oil is required for four primary purposes : transport,
manufacturing, heating and, electricity generation. The
value of oil used by each of these sectors differs, with the
distinction only becoming apparent when supplies fail to
meet demand. Thus, those sectors which are deemed to have
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higher economic and social values will be granted more oil
in order to minimize economic losses. In this respect, 
transport, as seen below, will remain a priority sector. 
This trend is reflected in the ever increasing world wide 
demand for oil, especially for transportation, which will 
continue to remain the most dominant sector for oil. In
fact, the lEA views with concern this trend particularly as
there is, for the medium term no viable alternative to oil
available.
In view of the aforementioned, oil as a percentage of sector
consumption of energy is extremely high in the EC, Japan and
the US for transportation - averaging around 99 per cent. 
It is vital to modern industrialised economies, not only for
the efficient and smooth functioning of industry, but for
defence as well as corrmunications. Industry is the second
major sector which is heavily reliant on oil - varying from
23-47 percent of sector consumption of energy. With
reference to Table 3(See Appendix), the residential, 
commercial and agricultural sectors are fairly dependent on 
oil, particularly agricultural and residential and for
heating. The electricity sector(although no figures are
given) is the least reliant because of the use of coal and
nuclear power in the generation of electricity, coupled with
the availability of fuel-switching present in a number of
power stations.
Another factor which is relevant to the above, is that of
the adaptability of industry, especially in key sectors, to
à47
energy shortages. This is obviously a key to the overall
vulnerability of an economy in the event of a supply 
disruption. In the manufacturing sector, for example, some 
industries are more vulnerable than others. A company’s
reliance (and hence probable vulnerability) depends on 
whether it uses oil as a direct feed stock, as in chemicals; 
for process-heating, as in glass; or for space heating, as
seen in the engineering or assembly plants.(15)
A number of conclusions can, therefore, be drawn : firstly, 
that of oil’s predominate role. It has a near total 
monopoly in the transport sector, besides providing the
largest share of primary energy consumption. It also plays
a significant part in the residential, commercial and 
agricultural sectors, industry and electricity. In other
words, the EC member states in particular, and the OECD/IEA 
states, in general, are reliant on oil to provide a
substantial part of their energy requirements.
Secondly, the EC is a major consumer of oil - consuming some
29 percent of the OECD’s oil consumption in 1988 v i s - a - v i s  
46 percent for the US and 12 percent for Japan. EC inland 
consumption of crude petroleum in 1986 amounted to 476.7
mtoe compared to 687.2 mtoe for the USA and 180.5 mtoe for
Japan.(16)
Following on from this, it may be concluded that the EC is
reliant for a substantial level of its oil consumption on
imports. It has a relatively high level of imports in
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comparison to the US or Japan. This means that, as
discussed in the previous chapter, the EC is vulnerable to 
disruptions in its oil supply. Since 1973 its oil imports 
have fallen significantly which reveals a decline in the 
degree of dependence. But even though this decline has been 
marked, the EC member states are still dependent on a high 
level of oil imports from unstable sources i.e. the Middle-
East to meet their requirements. This is in comparison to 
the United States, in particular, and other OECD member
states. The Middle-East and the Gulf states continue to 
play a crucial role in supplying EC member states with oil.
This means that despite some progress made by EC states,
they remain tied to that region.
The aforementioned begs the question about how vulnerable
Western Europe, particularly the EC member states would be I
to a cut in supplies and the attendant price shocks? The Ij
answer to this would depend on three related factors which i
Hogan and Mossavar-Rahmani have put forward.(17) ]](a) Probability of Disruptions IIThe first factor is the probability of disruptions. The two iImain characteristics of this are the size and the duration j
!of a disruption. For the purpose of this discussion, :|
disruptions can be classified as minor (a disruption of jj
approximately 1 million bpd(net) lasting one month), or i
major (a disruption of approximately (or more than) 4 
million bpd(net) lasting six months)(7). In reality.
49
however, the size of a disruption will be determined by the
extent of an oil consumer’s economy and the percentage
consumption of oil thereof. The magnitude of the disruption 
will also depend on the availability of excess production in
the market. This will ultimately determine the final
outcome of the disruption and its possible impact. With the
international oil markets as they are at present, awash with
excess oil production availability, the impact of a large 
shortfall would be minimal. Supplies could easily be made 
up from elsewhere, without necessarily triggering off a 
price run. In a tight market(18), however, even a small 
shortfall could have considerable repercussions.
Thus, for the present and possibly next five years, the 
European Community is unlikely to experience a major 
disruption or even arguably a minor one. This is because of
the current situation on world oil markets which can be
attributed to three factors. Firstly in 1979 world excess 
production availability stood at only 3-4 million bpd, while 
in 1987 it stood at 10 million bpd(approximately)(19). 
Moreover, in 1979 Saudi Arabia’s output accounted for nearly
19 percent of the non-communist production versus over 11
percent in 1988.(20) In 1979 less than 1 million bpd of
Gulf oil moved via routes other than the Straits of Hormuz,
while today nearly 4 million bpd of capacity is available to
move Gulf oil via pipelines through Turkey to the
Mediterranean sea and through Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea. 
Once further pipelines have been completed the capacity of
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alternate routes will be raised by some 6 million to 7 
million bpd by 1990.(21)
Secondly, elsewhere other than the Gulf region, production
has also increased. In Mexico production has risen from
around 1.5 million bpd in 1979 to about 2.8 million bpd in
1988. North Sea production has risen from about 2.0 million 
bpd to about 3.5 million bpd and non-OPEC production has
also risen in certain areas, notably Latin America(Brazi 1, 
Colombia and Ecuador), Asia(India, Malaysia and Australia)
and China and the USSR. Overall production levels with the 
exception of OPEC members, show a continuing decline. 
Meanwhile, the levels of strategic stockpiles, both 
commercial and government for OECD members, have increased
substantially. They now stand at 3.2 billion barrels, their 
highest level since 1982, and are sufficient to cover 99
days consumption.(22) Japan has stocks for 150 days.(See
Table 10 - Appendix)
Finally, refineries in the United States and other
industrial countries have increased their sophistication to
the point whereby their ability to shift quickly to
alternative sources of supply in the advent of a crisis has 
been greatly enhanced. The net effect of these changes has 
been to reduce the current probability of a large supply
interruption. However, this is only a short term condition 
and one, which in all likelihood will alter in 5 years as 
markets tighten and demand catches up with, and possibly
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outstrips, supply. These three factors are, moreover, only
short to medium term ones.
( b ) Price Impact
The second related factor in assessing vulnerability is that 
of price impact and overall costs. "As worldwide demand
continues to climb faster than the rate of growth of
worldwide production capacity, the disruption margin or 
tolerance level falls off so that smaller and shorter-lived
disruptions create potentially larger price and
macroeconomic disturbances, all things being equal."(23)
This is what occurred in the 1970s with small supply
disruptions of a limited duration. The costs to the
industrialised economies of the two shortfalls in the 1970s
led to a loss of about 5 percent of OECD real inconre in 1980
and close to 8 percent in 1981.(24) These were, however,
delayed costs - the result of the small shortfall between 
1978-1979 in OPEC production, combined with stock movements
which procyclically accentuated pressure on supplies. This
combination of factors were sufficient to cause a second oil
price rise. These economic costs, moreover, do not take
into consideration the less evident political costs such as
the weakening of the fabric of international co-operation.
"Ultimately, the price impact is the key factor in assessing
the damage of supply interruptions."(25) Thus, the focus of
energy policies should be on mitigating the price change.
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(c) Poli cy Responses
The final factor identified by Hogan and Mossavar-Rahmani in 
assessing the vulnerability of industrialised states is that
of policy responses and instruments. They identify four
types of market conditions which would or would not require 
appropriate intervention by governments and companies.(26) 
The first type of condition can be labelled a "crisis". 
Ideally this entails a major supply disruption and 'a
concurrent price impact of some magnitude. Such a "crisis", 
to date, has not been inflicted on the oil markets. The
1973-74 and 1978-79 crises were in fact considerably less in
their magnitude than a "crisis", as defined by Hogan and 
Mossavar-Rahmani, would be, mainly because the actions by 
OPEC and the Iranians, respectively, did not result in the
sustained withdrawal of large volumes of oil from the
market. The reductions in supplies were offset by increased 
production from other sources. This does not imply that a 
major disruption cannot occur in the future.
The second type of condition is described as a "slump" which 
involves a smaller price shock, following on after a major
disruption. A "shock" constitutes the third condition. It 
usually involves a minor disruption, but with a consequent 
large price run-up. The two crises of the 1970s are good
examples of this. The final market condition can be 
identified as a "bump" and involves a minor disruption with 
a small price impact. The start of the Iran-Iraq war in
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1980 provides an exanple of this, in that it led to a minor
disruption in oil supplies and a resulting price run-up.
The relevancy of these four conditions for energy security, 
lies not in the magnitude of the disruption but in the 
resulting price shocks. The "bump" and "slump" conditions
are, thus, not as applicable, as the price changes
associated with these vary only between $2 to $3 per barrel,
and can be classified as part of the volatility of the oil 
markets and as responses to other market forces. These two 
types of conditions may be regulated by the markets 
themselves.
The "crisis" and "shock" conditions are the ones that 
matter, particularly for the European Community. Of the two 
conditions the “shock" is the most likely and the one which,
even though it is of a smaller magnitude, carries with it a
significant price impact. Hogan and Mossavar-Rahmani
suggest it is to "shocks" that the focus of a state’s energy
security policy planning should be directed.(27) However,
this attitude is possibly indicative of reactive rather than 
anticipatory planning when it comes to policy formulation, 
as it is based on past conditions which have influenced 
market and governmental decisions. That is not to rule out 
the probability of a "crisis" occurring despite the
actuality of this being significantly less than that of a 
"shock" occurring.(28)
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Despite this, the policy instruments required for a "shock" 
are also appropriate for a "crisis" and involve, briefly,
short term and longer term instruments. The short term
instruments are those designed to cope with disruptions once 
they occur and include share allocation schemes, fuel
switching, stockpiles etc. Possible military action can 
also be included as a short term option. The longer term 
measures are aimed at reducing vulnerability to price shocks
and to reducing dependence. They include such measures as 
constraining demand growth and the encouragement of greater
i nd i genous producti on.
In the case of the European Community, the present situation
on the oil markets rules out the possibility in the near
future of either a "crisis" or "shock" occurring. This does
not mean to say that the probability of such a condition 
occurring, in the medium term, is diminished. Any number of 
collusion of factors could result in either a "crisis" or
"shock" happening.
Growing Impprts
In view of the fact that the EC is vulnerable to disruptions 
in its supply, the question can be asked, as it is by
Yergin(29), of whether growing imports (i.e. an increase in 
net imports to consumption - as now being witnessed in the
EC) necessarily make a state more vulnerable? In the US
Department of Energy Report of March 1987 it is pointed out 
that the import level of oil can be used as a "shorthand
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indicator of oil vulnerabi1ity"(30). But the report also j
argues, that this can be an oversimplification of the |
situation. It argues that : I
"Certainly, the level of vulnerability depends on j
the likelihood of supply disruptions and on the j
ability to respond to such events as well as on i
the level of dependence on imports. In addition,
using import levels as the only criterion for a
successful energy policy overlooks the obvious
economic fact that the availability of lower cost
oil imports brings down the effective domestic i
price of oil - which benefits all consumers."(31) ;
With reference to the United States, one may further argue :
that oil is only part of the total US energy mix. A point i
which applies equally to Western Europe and the EC. At i
current rates of consumption, oil imports account for some '
16 percent of total energy demand in the US, explaining, in S
4part, why it is over 80 percent self-sufficient in energy. ;
;!Should oil imports rise to over 50 or 60 percent of total |
energy consumption, the US will still be close to 75 percent i
self-sufficient in meeting its total energy needs.(32) ■
However, this apparent security is undermined by one {Iimportant detail - there exists no quick and ready i
substitutes for oil in the transportation sector. A |
■isituation which carries with it equal implications for |
‘ IWestern Europe and Japan. |
Within the United States oil imports have been rising since
the 1986 price collapse and in the first half . of 1988
averaged 6 million bpd - the same level as in 1973 and, now,
are equivalent to 36 percent of total oil consumption.(33)
It appears, moreover, that US oil imports will continue to
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rise because of growing demand and falling US 
production.(34) But, as discussed, whether they will make
the US more vulnerable is a debatable point. One has to
consider oil imports in a larger economic context, in that
one of the reasons why they are rising in the US is because 
imported oil is cheaper than the cost of developing new
domestic oil production. Competitive and economic benefits 
exist for a state relying on less expensive foreign oil 
rather than on relatively costly domestic supplies.
Furthermore, the United State’s energy problem is a global 
one. Because the US consumes over one-quarter of the
world’s oil production, the consumption trends and 
fluctuations in the US market have a tremendous impact on 
the world oil market. "US domesti c policies can tip the
scale toward either stability or instability."(35) The
energy market’s volatility has, moreover, been increased by
the Reagan and Bush administrations’ reliance on the market 
to regulate itself. This has exacerbated fluctuations in 
production, consumption, imports and prices, resulting in 
instability on the markets, which has been further 
aggravated by a general international overreliance on 
unregulated market mechan i sms.
Alternatively, one may see rising imports as implying a
growing reliance on OPEC oil, particularly from the Persian 
Gulf. This is because of three factors(36) : firstly, if
the United States and other states continue to import more
oil between now and 1995, production is predicted to rise in
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OPEC and, in particular, in the Gulf states. This, it is 
argued, is because of the large oil resources and the low
oil costs encountered in this region. Added to this is the
fact that the Persian Gulf and other OPEC producers account
for nearly all of the world’s surplus oil production
capacity. Most non-OPEC producers produce as close to
capacity as possible, whereas the OPEC states have attempted
to restrain their production below capacity in order to
support higher prices. This is a policy which has not met
with much success in recent years. OPEC thus has about 10 
million bpd of surplus production capacity that can be
quickly brought into use as demand begins to pick up for
OPEC oil. Sixty percent of this capacity lies in the Gulf 
region.
Secondly, the OPEC share of the Non-Communist World’s oil 
production rose from 50 percent in 1960 to more than 60
percent in the 1970s before declining below 40 percent in
1985 and for 1988 stood at nearly 46 percent. (37) By 1995 
this figure is expected to have increased to between 50 and 
60 percent with the Gulf’s share projected to be between 30 
to 45 percent.(38)
Finally, although worldwide dependence on Persian Gulf and 
other OPEC suppliers may rise to levels similar to those 
experienced in the 1970s, this does not necessarily imply 
similar levels of vulnerability. The United States and
other OECD consumers now hold strategic stocks, which 
currently exceed those levels laid down in the lEA
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guidelines and which are expected to exceed 1 billion
barrels of drawdown capacity in the mid-1990s.(39)
In view of the above one may suggest that the answer to
whether increased oil imports, in the forseeable future,
will make a state more vulnerable will depend on a number of
factors : on the type of suppliers; the availability of
alternative sources of supply; the present state of oil
markets; and the rate of world demand for oil. It will also
depend upon the probability of a supply disruption (what
sort of magnitude and the ensuing effects); the ability to
absorb a supply shock and the quality of crisis management 
and instruments to hand. In other words, it will depend on
the situation prevailing at a given time.
But the crucial aspect about imports is how they fit into
the global context. Essentially there exists, according to 
Yergin, only one world market for oil and the disruptions 
and shocks in supplies from a given region or state will
reverberate throughout the market and affect all  ^consumers
equally.(40) Furthermore, as mentioned previously, a rising
level of US oil imports will increase the vulnerability of 
the overall market - in that it will help to tighten the 
market. Thus, rapidly rising American oil imports will not 
only erode the security margin, but will also destabilise 
the market.(41)
The above will apply equally to Western Europe and to Japan. 
However, unlike the United States, Western Europe has not
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yet shown such a consistent increase, overall, in its oil
imports since 1986 and thus is not, arguably, in danger of
eroding the security margin of the world oil market.
What threat, therefore, does a high level of oil imports 
pose to a nation? Does it necessarily heighten or lessen 
the threats or vulnerabilities facing an importing state? 
It appears from the aforementioned, and from looking at the 
sectoral distribution of oil consumption, that in the cases 
of Western Europe, Japan and the United States vulnerability
(to disruptions in foreign sources of supply), can endanger 
economic growth rates and thereby employment levels, social 
stability, standards of living and all other factors 
associated with Western economies i.e. national economic
security. In other words, in an economic sense a high level
of imports, will pose a grave danger to a state’s economy. 
However, as mentioned previously, the heightening or 
lessening of this threat will depend on a number of factors
including the ava ilability of a1 te mat i ve sou roes and of
alternative suppliers; the ability of an economy (and
industries) to adapt to altered circumstances in supply; the 
level of available stocks; the development of indigenous 
production etc.
One may take this argument further by suggesting that
economic growth in democratic societies plays a central role 
in providing a secure and stable environment. Russett(42), 
for example, argues the case that industrial development, as
experienced since 1945 (an unprecedented era of sustained
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economic growth, high levels of material well-being and 
substantial equality of economic benefits both between and
within OECD states), is essential to the survival of a
state, particularly so in a world where military power is 
dependent far less on a large population than on the base of
modern industrial capacity and sophistication. As a result, 
all industrial powers have to maintain growing economies,
and continued access to raw materials is vital for this. 
Failure implies lagging in the industrial and technological 
base necessary to sustain military power. Without the
evolution of the technology needed for sophisticated 
weaponry and an expanding economic surplus to support a
1 arge mi 1i tary establi shment, a state’s posi ti on wi thi n the
international sphere of influence declines and even
atrophies. However, is this relevant in today's world? For
certain aspects of this argument, a strong economy is
essential for maintaining military power. But, military 
power is not the only aspect of a state’s influence in the
international sphere. Economic power is just as important 
if not more so - than perceived military power and
influence.
Furthermore, in another aspect to this argument, denial of
access to oil and other raw materials may also bring with it
the risk of overthrow from within. Advanced industrial 
democratic governments are based on rising growth rates and
incomes. Prolonged economic stagnation and a decline in
growth (and hence in a population’s income) may bring with
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it political dissent for the government in power. Arguably
"If continued stagnation or economic decline is
politically intolerable, then every threat of 
denial of access to essential supplies of raw 
materials becomes a matter of central concern to
the state."(43)
This argument applies to democratic states, in particular.
The denial of oil may thus form part of a governments
national security agenda, as it becomes a security issue of
some importance.
Although this is a somewhat generalised view of the 
situation, the denial of oil carries with it integral 
political, economic and military risks. Furthermore given
the nature of economic interdependence, economic impacts in
one region and even in one state, are likely to affect other 
regions and other states. The vulnerability of the EC and 
Western economies (where relevant) also has implications for 
the West’s defence structures and alliances, particularly
NATO.
Therefore, one may suggest that Western Europe and the EC
in particular, are vulnerable to interruptions in their 
supplies of oil. This is mainly because of firstly, the 
substantial role OPEC and the Gulf producers continue to
play in supplying its oil requirements and secondly, because
of the substantial impact oil has on a state’s economy.
OPEC, although it has lost some of its former political 
power, nevertheless, still retains some political power and
once the oil markets begin to tighten in the 1990s (as
62
inevitably they will) so OPEC will possibly regain some of
its economic clout - though never to the extent of the
1970s.
Moreover, added to this, is the fact that the Gulf region is
politically unstable and volatile.(44) It is often assumed
that oil disruptions from the Persian Gulf are the outcome
of manoeuvring on OPEC’s part when this is clearly not the
case as seen in 1979 and 1981 where the oil price rises were
clearly the result of external events (the fall of the Shah
of Iran and the Iran-Iraq war) combined with panic buying on
the spot markets. Despite this, as Carlsnaes points
out(45), a cursory examination of this region will reveal
why it is constantly vulnerable to a whole range of
political disturbances, military adventures or other
mishaps. Over the past three decades, the Persian Gulf has
been subject to a number of wars, revolutions, 
assassinations and territorial disputes.
The high disruption risks of this area can, furthermore, be
classified according to Carlsnaes as follows(46) : firstly,
the instability of the Northern Tier; secondly, internal 
political instab ilities in Saud i Arabi a, the Emi rates and
Qatar; thirdly, the possible downfall of the present Saudi
regime, followed by those of the Emirates and Qatar; 
fourthly, various forms of new embargoes in connection with
the A rab-1s rae1i dispute; f i fth1 y, resou roe management
strategies on the part of the major producers aimed at
slowing down the rapid depletion of existing oil reserves;
,'x.
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sixthly, shipping disruptions due to superpower conflicts or
interventions and finally, technical accidents to major oil
producing facilities, for example as has recently recurred 
in the North Sea. With regard to the above, instability
does not necessarily entail a disruption in supplies. The
Iran- Iraq war is a case in point where both sides continued
to produce oil despite being at war. Although, there did
occur an initial loss in production at the beginning of the
war. As the war progressed so production was increased in
order to generate income to finance ‘the war. All
indications point to the fact that Iran and Iraq will
continue producing oil at high levels, despite a ceasefire
being in force. What is more threatening is the p o t e n t i a l
for disruption which still exists in this area and the
element of uncertainty it introduces into an importer-
exporter relationship. Three disruptions since 1973 serve
to illustrate the potential for a cut in supplies.(47)
Accidents as well as politically motivated incidents may
cause similar crises in the future. The disruption
potential is of course smaller in an over-supply situation
than in a barely balanced market.(48)
Added to the instabilities and security implications
Îinherent in a high level of oil imports are two further I
factors : firstly, dependence on imported oil can only be j
reduced gradually. It is a long term process involving the
exploration and development of new oil reserves and the
bringing of them into production. It can also involve the 
development (and acceptance) of alternative energy sources.
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Whatever the resources available the whole process is a 
costly and prolonged one. Secondly, it is not possible to
reduce the level of energy consumption without retarding or
halting overall economic growth in the long term. As a
rule, as economic growth increases so does overall energy
consumption.
As for the future, lEA projections for the next ten years 
show oil use declining in industry and
residential/commercial sectors but continuing its monopoly
in the transportation sector. One can also conclude that 
for the future, industrialised states will remain dependent 
on oil imports. It is an inevitable result of the structure
of the market, production and available proven reserves. 
Moreover, differences will persist among and between the
industrialised states of the EC over both the level of
imports and the vulnerabilities or sensitivities experienced 
by them. For the 1990s energy demand is thus likely to 
remain at the same level or to grow only at very modest
rates, in the event of an economic revival. The probability
is that imports will remain more or less constant over the
long term. Nevertheless, this view is subject to external 
factors and because of the very unpredictable and volatile 
nature of the energy markets it is nigh impossible to
predict with any degree of certainty any likely future 
scenarios.
In conclusion Western Europe, in general, and the European 
Community, specifically, can be classified under
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vulnerability dependence as defined in the previous chapter.
They are vulnerable because of their high levels of imports
from foreign or unstable sources and because of the
potential costs which could be incurred should a crisis or
shock occur - not only economically (where the greatest
impact would be) but politically and socially thereby 
revealing the emotive aspect of vulnerability.
Vulnerability is a precondition, one may suggest, of the 
West’s high standards of living and a major factor in the
sophisticated nature of their economies. They are
vulnerable in that they are reliant for 25 per cent, or over
of their oil imports from either OPEC members or from the
Gulf, both of which could be described as unstable sources.
However, for that vulnerability "to transform itself into an
actual 'threat’ very sinister political assumptions must be
made, so sinister that we come very close to a situation of
actual warfare or preparations for warfare.“(49) In light
of this, planning for just such contingencies, particularly 
stockpiles and energy policies would appear justified.
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SECTION II
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
CHAPTER 3
EC ENERGY POLICY : ITS EVOLUTION 1945-1975
The concept of an 'energy policy’ is a relatively new 
phenomenon to the European Communities. Prior to 1957 no 
provision was made for it either in the Treaty establishing 
the European Economic Community or the Treaty establishing 
the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), despite the 
treaties being concerned with various aspects of the energy 
sector, and the first Community, the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) being explicitly focused upon a key energy 
resource. It was only with the memorandum of June 1963, 
adopted by a working party on energy, that a move was made 
towards providing the first outline of a real energy policy 
for the Community. From then on the momentum towards
finding, formulating and implementing a coirmon energy policy 
acceptable to all member states gained speed. The two major 
oil shocks of the 1970s were the main external contributing
factor in this process. Moreover, the evolution of an EC
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energy policy has to be seen as a significant means to
ensuring energy security and equally, given the EC’s
vulnerability, to reducing this.
The development of a Community policy on oil has to be seen
against the background of the secular trend of a declining 
use of coal and an increasing use of oil. This trend 
influenced the development of energy policies within the 
Community. Prior to 1945 the European states had always had 
access to abundant energy (and oil), either domestically or 
in the control of overseas sources through their colonies or 
controlling interests. Briefly, after 1945, the situation
with regard to oil altered considerably as demand for oil
increased (along with high economic growth rates) and demand 
for coal declined as it became uncompetitive. Between 1950
and 1970 world wide consumption and production of energy 
grew at an annual rate of 4.2 percent from 31 million bpd in
1950 to 73 million bpd in 1970(1). Of this, oil and natural
gas accounted for the greatest expansion so that by 1970 oil 
consumption stood at some 46 million bpd. The Nine EC 
member states had a combined energy consumption of some 
968.5 mtoe by 1973.(2) Along with the boom in energy went
changes in the pattern of supply. In 1945 the future EC
members’ requirements were met primarily by solid fuels 
(coal and lignite) with oil only forming 10 percent of the
total.(3) By 1973, however, solid fuels only accounted for 
23 percent and oil 59 percent of their total energy
requ i rements.(4)
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The changing patterns of energy (and oil) consumption in the
EC were accompanied by changes in the ratio between energy 
produced domestically and that imported. Between 1960 and 
1970 total imports of oil from sources outside of Europe,
principally the Middle-East and OPEC producers, continued to 
increase each year (See Table 6 - Appendix). The main reason 
behind this was the comparative cheapness of oil as against 
other major energy sources, mainly coal whose overhead and 
production costs, in this decade continued to increase, 
making it, in most instances, an unviable alternative to
oil. Therefore, from an overall perspective, the period up 
to 1970 saw oil becoming not only the most important 
commodity in world trade, but the EC’s principle energy
source.
In 1950, therefore, oil had only played a minor role in the
energy needs of European states, with coal constituting 75 
percent of total energy supply. Against such a background, 
the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty, signed in
Paris in 1951, could have been regarded as making adequate 
provision, as it stood, for the existing energy problems of
the six members. The Euratom Treaty of 1957, dealing as it 
did with atomic energy, made provision for future needs, in
which nuclear energy was expected to gradually take the 
place of existing forms of energy. Under such conditions, 
"the authors of the Community Treaties apparently saw no 
need to provide expressly for the adoption of a common
policy on oil."(5)
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It was only at the 1956 Messina Conference, which was so 
crucial to the formation of the EEC and Euratom, that the
ECSC High Authority was called upon to draw up proposals 
which subsequently led to the introduction of the Protocol 
of 8 October 1957 on a co-ordinated energy policy.(6) This 
was to involve co-operation between the forthcoming 
Commissions of Euratom and the EEC and the existing High
Authority of the ECSC. Prior to this, Europe’s
vulnerability (to interruptions in the supply of the oil 
component of its energy needs) was foreshadowed by the
October 1956 Suez War, when the Suez Canal was temporarily
closed. As a result of this experience the Organisation for 
European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) set up a Petroleum 
Emergency Group which encompassed representatives of West
European Governments, the OEEC and oil companies, who met to 
arrange a reserve pool for oil. This arrangement allowed 
some sharing of oil with those members facing supply
problems. (7) The ECSC Protocol of 1957 resulted in the
establishment of a Joint Committee, comprising
representatives of the six governments and the High 
Authority of the ECSC, which was to examine the prospects,
and conditions required, for economic growth and expansion
in the consumption of the various forms of energy.(8)
Once the EEC and Euratom had been established in Brussels, a 
combined Working Party was established.(9) In April 1962
the Ministers of the Six called for a comprehensive 
examination of the problems posed by oil. This was in line
with the increasing consumption of oil in the Community,
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which had risen from 65 mtoe per annum in 1955 to 142 mtoe
in 1962 (10), reflecting oil’s importance in the total
energy supply.
However, the first Working Party was not a success, mainly 
because a real agreement on long term energy policy was not
reached. Despite this, and in response to the call from the
Six Ministers of the member states, a memorandum was 
produced by the Inter-Executive Group in June' 1962.(11)
This represented the first real steps towards constituting a
common energy poli cy.
The memorandum included provisions on the free circulation 
of energy within the Community; the diversification of 
supplies; aid to Community production(mainly coal); the 
development of nuclear energy, storage, taxation and import 
regulations. The diversification of sources of supply and 
the stockpiling policies were designed to increase security
of supply without distorting the oil market, while the 
development of nuclear energy was regarded as providing an
alternative energy source to oil. The basic objective of
the proposals, contained in the memorandum, was the 
establishment of a common market in energy. This entails 
the free trading of energy in a competitive market. But, at 
that stage, oil imports constituted a significant proportion 
of oil consumption requirements. Therefore, in addition to
the aforementioned proposals, it was proposed that
investments in energy other than oil be encouraged to meet 
growing energy demand. If the proposals had been
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implemented they would possibly have given the Community a 
secure supply of oil at the lowest possible price in the
prevailing ci rcumstances.
The above mentioned proposals were agreed by the ECSC 
Special Council of Ministers in the Protocol of Agreement in 
Luxembourg on 21 April 1964(12). Arguably, a further reason
for the Protocol appearing in 1964 was the insistence of the
Germans, in 1963, upon a draft agreement to create
conditions conducive to a common energy market.(13) The
Protocol was the first energy policy instrument to be agreed 
to by the governments of the member states. It espoused the 
broad objectives of cheap and secure supplies of energy, 
freedom of choice for consumers and fair competition among
energy sources.
Ensconced in the Protocol was the principle that no decision
on the basic options of an energy policy should be taken
before a single Community was established(14). In the
meantime, it was decided that national energy policies
should be harmonised in preparation for the creation of a
common energy market.
Over the twin issues of oil and natural gas, (under the
Protocol), the governments undertook to implement a coimmon
policy under the Treaty of Rome.(15) They hoped to
guarantee highly diversified supplies at the lowest, most 
stable prices possible, while providing, at the same time, 
arrangements capable of adaption to suit the circumstances
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if and when they arose.(16) Similar arrangements were
proposed for coal and nuclear energy.(17) However, these 
vague guidelines for energy policy contained one significant 
contradiction : energy supplies, at that time, could not be 
secure and cheap. "Either security of supply would be given
priority through enhanced support of European coal 
production - at relatively high prices, or cheap foreign
supplies (especially oil) would become increasingly 
dominant, thus leaving Europe vulnerable to interruption(s) 
of supply."(18) The Protocol, on the other hand, did leave 
provision for state subsidies of coal, but it made no room
for a shared Community finance scheme(for coal) nor did it 
provide for specific production targets. In its basic form,
the ECSC opted for a policy of cheap fuel at the expense of
longer term considerations.
As it stood the Protocol only laid the foundations for a
common energy policy. Thereafter it would be left to the 
High Authority and the two Commissions to co-operate with
the member states’ governments in order to work out what 
course of action to take to achieve the objectives for each 
form of energy. (19) This was, therefore, only the first
step in the evolution of a common energy policy.
Second Stage
The second stage in the formulation of an EC energy policy 
dates from 1966 to 1968. On 16 February 1966 the Council of
the European Economic Community was sent its first
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memorandum by the Commission on Community policy for
petroleum and natural gas.(20) The general policy outlines 
contained in this memorandum reaffirmed the 1964 objectives
of cheap and secure supply, freedom of choice and fair 
competition among the various energy sources. However, the
guidelines contained in the 1966 Report went somewhat
further than those of 1964 in that it contained specific and 
detai1ed proposals.
With regard to oil(21) the stated objective was "to 
harmonise progressively the trade policies of the Member 
States so that conditions by the end of the transition
period (1970) will be right for implementing a common
policy."(22) This was to include inter alia : the granting
of tax relief for prospecting by companies; closer working
relations with oil companies(23); continued negotiations 
with non-member states (especially the United States and the 
United Kingdom) in order to consider what measures to take 
in the event of an emergency over supplies; diversification
of resources and; harmonisation of commercial policies (this 
applied specifically to imports). These are the major
points of the memorandum.(24) Additionally, the Commission
sought diversificat ion of oil import sou roes; i mp rovements
in data collection and forecasting; the establishment of a
common market for energy (by removing non-tariff and tax
barriers within the EC) and; the creation of oil stocks. 
However, the main thrust of the 1966 Memorandum was directed
at the French petroleum market which, since 1928,had been
strictly regulated under the law of that period (a
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reflection of the French response to the international oil
markets of the twenties). "The Commission wanted the
discriminatory parts of the law modified, but the French 
refused to do this."(25)
It can be suggested that, in its primary form, this first
memorandum to the Council was an anticipatory move by the
Commission. The Commission recognised that :
”[i]n the future the problem of security of 
supplies will be even more acute than it is today, 
as petroleum comes to take a larger share in the
Community’s energy supply."(26)
It also recognised the main problem facing it would be to
ensure that ;
"...the three factors which make for security
existence of adequate stocks, availability of 
production capacities, and diversification of
sources - are maintained or reinforced in order to
obviate the risks of a supply crisis or of oil
price increases."(27)
However, it overlooked, yet again, the fact that despite the
conditions prevailing at that stage, cheap and secure
supplies could not be guaranteed for the future. It lacked, 
in this regard, sufficient vision or recognition of the long 
term considerations (and problems) inherent in supplying 
safe and adequate energy stocks particularly oil.
In 1967 the EEC, ECSC and Euratom executives were merged and 
by 18 December of that year the new Commission sent its
first communication to the Council of the European 
Communities - entitled "First Guidelines for a Community 
energy policy."(28) The thinking behind this communication
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was influenced by a number of factors : the outbreak of war 
in June 1967 in the Middle-East and the consequent 
disruption of Community oil supplies, and the increasing 
dependence of the Community on oil, particularly oil imports 
from the Middle-East bringing security considerations to the 
fore.
This communication is a seminal document on Community energy 
policy. For the first time the Commission, due to the
merger of the three Community executives, was able to 
formulate a "general concept of energy policy based on an 
overall rather than a sectoral assessment of the Community
energy market."(29) In line with EC objectives, this first |
policy guideline of the merged Community established the jIframework for action, comprising medium term goals; annual i
Ireviews of economic activity; technical proposals and; j
.1
contingency measures for supply problems. It was, in this |
sense, aimed at creating the necessary conditions for !
implementing all the measures proposed and for securing the |
Community’s oil supplies. 1
In the report the Commission provided three main factors as
to why an energy policy was necessary. These were greater 
integration, greater dependence on imports and the economic
importance of the energy sector. With regard to the first 
factor, the Commission stated that : "in contrast to the
situation as regards products of the other industries and of
agriculture, there are still serious obstacles to trade 
within the Community as regards energy products."(30) It
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does not elaborate on what obstacles to this trade still
existed. But it goes on to mention that :
"If this situation does not improve, and if a
common energy market is not achieved in the near 
future, the level of integration already attained
in this field will be endangered."(31 )
With respect to the second factor, the Community at that
stage was reliant for fifty percent of its energy
requirements from imports and thus an energy policy, it was
hoped, would counterbalance the risks arising fran such a
situation. Finally, the energy sector in 1968 accounted for
12 percent of the Community’s industrial production and its
i nvestments represented on average 15 to 20 percent of the
Community’s industrial investments.(32) As it stood, it was
an economically important sector.
The aims as mentioned in the memorandum remained unchanged
from those given in the Protocol of 1964(33) and were not
given in strict order of priority. The Commission, however,
did draw attention to a number of aspects. Firstly, the
level of energy prices, and their relation to the cost of
living. This relationship explained "why the protection of
consumers’ interests must be the basis" of the Community 
energy pol icy(34) and why it was important to adopt a long­
term view of the world energy situation. Secondly, the
Community was to seek security of supply "at prices which
[were] relatively stable and as low as possible."(35) It
was thought that the adoption of a long term view towards
this latter goal would help in its attainment. Finally, the
Commission stressed that the aims of energy policy "cannot
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be attained in isolation. "(36) It was (and is) reliant on
the speed of motivation of social and regional policy.
The main body of the report consisted of three sections.
The first section was concerned with the creation of a
framework of action "to achieve the aims and ensure the 
coherence of the measures required."(37) The following
section dealt with the technical aspects for the 
establishment of a common market in the energy sector. It 
included measures to remove obstacles to trade, freedom of 
establishment and the harmonisation of rules governing 
competition. The final section was aimed at ensuring
security of supply. As such it acknowledged the importance 
of energy in the economic activity of the member states and 
set out measures for an appropriate energy supply policy and 
recommendations on commercial policy, investment, industry 
and research.(38)
According to the Commission, its policy paper was based on
that of the 1964 Protocol and also on the 1967 Council 
Decision.(39) These two policy papers were supplemented by
two additional working papers : “The current situation on
the Community energy market" and "Fundamental problems of a
Community energy policy". The former, a detailed factual 
account of contemporary developments in the overall energy 
market,(40) was aimed at establishing agreement on the main 
features of the energy economy, while the latter, an 
assessment of the problems to be resolved if the objectives
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of a common energy policy are to be realised, was a general 
report on the various energy sectors.
This first policy guideline was presented at a time when the 
energy consumption of the six Community members was 
increasing steadily. Energy consumption had risen from 289
Mtoe in 1950 to 461 Mtoe in 1960 and 636 Mtoe in 1967
representing an annual rate of increase of 4.8% and 4.7% 
respectively(41). Ninety-nine percent of the oil consumed
came from outside of the Community and 79.5 percent of the 
total came from the Middle East and North Africa. (42) This 
was also the period when the percentage shares of energy
sources altered significantly with oil increasing its share 
from 10 percent in 1950 to 51 percent in 1967 and the use of
coal declining from approximately 86 percent of consumption
in 1950 to 25 percent in 1973.(43)
However, this increased dependence had not produced any 
Community policy for oil. The report of 1968 accepted the 
dominant position of oil but it only made very modest
proposals for action in the field. "It wanted to intervene 
only to ensure a free market, to provide for action in the 
event of disruptions of supply, and to promote the 
development of alternative fuels." (44)
The Council of Ministers, furthermore, only accepted these
limited proposals in principle. This was mainly because of 
the complacency that prevailed, namely the belief that the 
oil companies would keep plentiful supplies of cheap oil
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flowing, and because of resistance, on the part of the Dutch
government, (influenced by Shell) to any suggestion of 
interference in the market. Therefore, with the exception
of the recommendation on stockpiling which was implemented, 
national government energy policies continued to remain 
divergent.
Whatever the drawbacks, the Report of 1968 did lay at least
some of the foundations for the Community’s energy 
objectives. At the same time as this the Coinmunity was
proposing to make energy supply and demand forecasts for a 
period of about five years. In addition, the Commission 
also planned to draw up annual reports on the energy 
situation and develop a programme of adjustment measures, 
including suitable procedures for their implementation. A
Directive(68/414/EEC) was also adopted by the Council in
1968 on maintaining stocks of crude oil and oil 
products(45). Petroleum stock levels were set at 65 days’ 
average daily internal consumption(46) and in 1972 this was 
updated to 90 days internal consumption. The main reason
behind this upgrading was the recognition of increased
dependence on supplies from outside of the Canmunity.(47)
By 1970 the European Conmunity’s energy policy only really 
amounted to a 65 day stockpile requirement and a number of 
guidelines. No common market in energy existed and . in
general a policy of low-cost supplies based on huge imports
of cheap oil from the Middle-East and North Africa was 
followed by the member states.
83
ThirdStage
The third stage in EC energy policy formulation dates from
1970 to 1974. The period between these two dates was one
which witnessed the competitive advantage between consumers 
and producers shifting from the former to the latter. By
1970 world demand for energy, especially oil, was rising at
a constant rate. The non-Communist states were reliant on
oil imports for 43 million bpd for consumption, up from 
around 9 million bpd in 1950. This was an average
compounded growth rate in oil usage of over 7 percent per
annum.(48) For the European Community net imports of
petroleum(49) rose from 499.6 million tonnes in 1970 to
547.3 million tonnes in 1973.(50) Total internal
consumption of crude petroleum in the EC in this same period
rose from 534.4 mtoe to 620.3 mtoe. (51) Imports of crude 
petroleum (as a percentage of total internal consumption)
therefore, rose from 97.2 percent in 1970 to 98.9 percent in 
1973.(52) In other words, excess world oil production
capacity had diminished, the buyer’s market had turned into 
a seller’s market and with it came the rise of OPEC as a
relatively effective vehicle for co-ordinating the oil
producer’s policies and aims.
Between 1971 and the end of 1972 OPEC managed to achieve
substantial price rises and by December 1972 crude oil was
selling at 60-70 percent above its mid-1970 price.(53) The 
period up to October 1973 was one which produced little in
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the way of concrete output in terms of energy policy, on the
part of the EC.
At this stage, however, the Community was aware of the
dangers to which Europe was exposed.(54) In October 1972 
the Commission submitted a memorandum on the problems and 
possible solutions for energy policy between 1975 and
1985.(55) It was an attempt, firstly, to anticipate the
energy problems likely to happen up to 1985 and to highlight
the available options(56) and secondly, to stimulate
progress on the implementation of a common energy policy.
On the problem of oil supplies the Commission managed to
convey a sense of urgency and stated in its memorandum that
"the question of security of supply i.e. regularity of
deliveries" will in "the future even more than in the past",
be "threatened by more or less widespread interruptions and
do not......rule out local breakdowns. "(57) The Commission
also argued that long term security (of oil supplies) 
should be given priority over temporary price advantages.
Furthermore, talks with the United States and Japan were
recommended as were the improving of OECD procedures in
order to provide better reciprocal information and to work 
out joint decisions on security and stockbui1ding.(58) With
regard to the oil exporters, the Commission recommended
consultative procedures with them and also agreements to
premote the oil exporters’ economic and social development
in exchange for guarantees, by them, on the export of oil to
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the importing states , in other words to try and attain a
stable relationship between equal partners.(59)
Lieber argues that foreshadowed in this memorandum of 1972 
were two divergent courses of action (60) ; firstly co­
operation with other consumer states, especially the United
States and Japan via the OECD and secondly, special
arrangements between the European Community and the oil
exporters. "The inability to make a choice between these 
courses of action was to prove damaging to the Community 
when the crisis began a year later."(61)
In October 1972, at the first summit meeting of the Nine in 
Paris, support was given to a common energy policy but 
agreement was only given to a 90 day stockpiling policy and 
the encouragement of efforts to guarantee supplies at 
satisfactory prices. It left most of the details (on a
common energy policy) to be worked out by the Commission for 
later submission to the Council of Ministers. The Heads of 
State and/or Government of the member states did recognise, 
however, the underlying problem besetting energy policy was 
to guarantee long term security of supplies under 
satisfactory economic conditions. A point which was to be 
reiterated in the 1973 "Guidelines and Priorities."
In April 1973 the Commission produced its "Guidelines and 
Priorities for a Community Energy Policy."(62) The
communication comprised three main recommendations ; co­
operation between the Community, the United States and Japan
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in order to avoid overbidding for crude oil imports by the
three; and the development of relations between Europe and 
the oil producers. According to the communication :
"The best guarantee of stability....will be a 
climate of mutual trust between the Community and 
its suppliers.(63)
The third recommendation concerned the organisation of the 
Community oil market, the main objective of which was to 
"preserve effective competition and ensure freedom of 
movement within the Commun ity."(64) Apparent1y, the
achievement of this aim, according to the Commission was 
being impeded by, amongst others, technical obstacles which 
were the result of differences in the specification of 
petroleum products. The Guidelines also called for the
implementation of emergency oil import sharing measures in
the event of a crisis and for the establishment of a joint
energy consulting group with the US and Japan.
In this way the Commission set out the criteria which would
influence the Community’s choices and shortcomings in the
October 1973 crisis : avoidance of overbidding; sharing of 
oil stocks among member states; consumer consultation with 
the US and Japan; co-operation with the producer states and; 
emphasis on freedom of movement for petroleum products.
In May 1973 the-Council of Ministers held its first meeting 
on energy policy for three years. It failed, however, to
reach any substantive agreement on consumer collaboration or 
on emergency energy sharing procedures. What did emerge
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from this meeting were sharp political differences between 
the various members over the direction that energy policy 
should assume. The French refused to authorise talks by the
Community with the US and the OECD, giving as their reason 
that the members must first reach agreement on their own
policy and that talks with outside parties should only be
conducted by governments and not by the Commission. George 
goes so far as to suggest that France was the main barrier
to the Commission also being allowed to negotiate with the
oil producers.(65) In assuming such an attitude France
aimed at improving her position v i s - à - v i s  the US and Britain 
and at cementing relations with Libya, Algeria and other
producers while, at the same time, not compromising its
foreign policy stance towards the Third World.
It was only in October 1973 that the extent of the advanced
industrialised economies reliance on the Middle Eastern oil
producers was exposed. As stated, nearly all of their oil
consumption was imported - approximately two-thirds from
Arab states. Thus, an obvious need existed for a more
coherent regional response to the energy situation. But,
because of differing priorities among the members, agreement 
on specific Commission proposals was resisted. Differences 
among members existed not only in the political and economic 
areas but also in a regional context i.e. with regard to
levels of development. Ultimately this resulted in the EC
failing to reach a common energy policy prior to October
1973. It should also be noted that the first enlargement of
the Community had just occurred and the EC member states
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were still adjusting to this. Furthermore, it may be 
suggested that the differences among the members on the eve
of the October war were indicative of the failure of
integration in the energy sector. As Simonet suggests the 
cohesiveness that the Europeans were supposed to display,
after fifteen years of relentless efforts, was sadly lacking 
when cal1ed upon.(66)
Commun i ty response to the 1973 oi1 crisis
Therefore, on the eve of the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War
on 6 October 1973 the European Community lacked coherent
oil or energy policies. Its members were divided in their
policies towards both the United States and the Middle-East,
which ruled out any systematic response towards OPEC. The
member states were divided in their relations to the Arab 
members of OPEC. France and Italy, for example, had
relatively strong links with the Middle-East, while Britain 
and the Netherlands retained their belief in the 
international oil industry and hoped it would work out a
compraTiise between consumers and producers and thereby avoid
any diplomatic confrontation. Other member states, like
West Germany, trod a middle path. Germany at this stage was
involved in a goods-for-oi 1 deal with Iran but was also
encouraging German companies to merge to create a market
counterweight to the non-Germany oil industry.(67)
Consequently, such differing approaches meant that the 
Commission was restricted to preparing guidelines and market
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projections. "It is no wonder that the attempts of the
Council of Ministers to formulate a common energy policy
were doaned to fai 1ure."(68)
The full force of the crisis was felt directly by the
Europeans on 17 October when OAPEC announced its embargo
entailing successive monthly cuts in oil production. Prior
to this announcement, OAPEC had raised the price of oil fron
about $3 per barrel to $5 per barrel. It was on the
following day that OAPEC members decided to reduce oil
production and which would be lifted once Arab objectives,
in the conflict against Israel, had been achieved. 
Consequently, the Western states found themselves divided
into three categories : those which were to receive no oil -
this included the Netherlands, the United States and Canada;
'friendly’ states - including Britain and France who were to
receive normal supplies based on the previous nine months of
1973 delivery levels and; 'other’ states which faced phased
reductions of 5 percent per month.(69)
One immediate response of the European Community to the
situation was the issuing of a "Statement on the Situation
in the Middle-East". This essentially supported the Arab
interpretation of UN Resolution 242, which stressed both the
need for Israeli withdrawals and the formal recognition of
Palestinian rights. This document, which can be seen as an
appeasement of the Arabs did produce an immediate, if only a
minor, payoff for the EC members : on 19 November OAPEC oil
ministers decided not to impose a 5 percent cutback on
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European Community oil scheduled for December. The only
state not exempted was the Netherlands.
Along with the curtailment of oil supplies went a fourfold
increase in oil prices.(70) Initially, OPEC had planned to
increase its prices by 10 percent (in line with the
tightening markets caused by increased US imports), but the
subsequent embargo and cutbacks had an unexpected success
resulting in scarcity and panic buying on the world oil
markets. This in turn, led to prices for the marginal
quantities being driven up to unrealistic levels and allowed
Iran to lead other OPEC states inn a 400 percent oil price
increase over pre-war prices.(See Table 11 - Appendix)
It was only in the initial stages of the 1973 crisis that
the European Community members were able to achieve a
semblance of common policy towards the Middle-East, as well
as to derive some sort of benefit from it, albeit in the
foreign policy arena. However, "as the question of the
Dutch embargo became more overt and the need to choose
between siding with the United States (to grapple with
problems of supply, price, conservation and monetary 
recycling) or OPEC (to seek a modus vivendi with the oil
producers) became more acute, European policies were rapidly 
reduced to di sarray."(71)
In this initial stage of the 1973/74 crisis the Nine member
states were unable or unwilling to present a united front. 
This was primarily because of the Dutch stand towards the
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Arab producers and the Palestinian issue and was complicated
by the subsequent OAPEC embargo. In other words, a position
of European solidarity was jettisoned because the majority 
of member states felt too vulnerable (in their dependence)
to OPEC pressures or preferred to give preference to
maintaining or seeking a modus v iv e n d i with the Arabs. The
energy crisis was thus regarded as a matter of national
survival : oil was crucial for industry, agriculture,
heating, electricity and transportation; and indirectly, for
continued employment, interest rates, economic growth rates,
maintaining inflation at acceptable levels etc and thereby, 
continuing political survival. Therefore, it was not
surprising that national self interests took precedence over
wider Community interests, despite the fact of economic
interdependence and regional integration among the members 
of the Community. In so doing, an overt agreement on EC or
OECD oil sharing was precluded.
The EC held its first surmnit meeting since the start of the 
crisis in Copenhagen in December of 1973. The result of 
this meeting was that all member states reiterated their 
support for UN Resolution 242.(72) The Nine chose to ignore 
both the embargo on the Netherlands and any idea of
presenting a unified front against OPEC. Instead, it was 
decided to give the Commission the task of drafting
proposals for the orderly functioning of the energy market,
increased efficiency in energy use, the development of 
alternate energy sources, measures for research and 
development and, proposals for co-operation among both
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producers and consumers. These proposals were to be
presented to the Council of Ministers before the end of 
January 1974.
Another, but more positive outcome, of the Surtmit was the
decision to create the Energy Committee. It was composed of
representatives of the member states and was responsible for
".....ensuring the coordinated implementation by 
Member States of the measures adopted by the 
Community, providing for the exchange of 
information and consultation between Member States 
and the Commission with regard to supply 
conditions and forseeable developments in the 
supply situation, and also assisting the 
Commission in the formulation of its
proposals."(73)
The Copenhagen summit revealed, once more, the inability of
the European Community to produce a conmon energy policy in
response to the energy crisis, even though most of the
summit was concerned with the crisis. As Ehrhardt aptly put
it, the Copenhagen summit turned out to be "an embarrassing
political debacle" and that its declarations "remained fine
exercises in the grand style".(74)
Not only did the crisis present intractable international
problems involving the Middle-East, the Atlantic Alliance,
and security of supplies etc which served to intensify the
different priorities among the EC members but it also 
presented domestic problems. These appeared in the form of
employment, inflation, energy usage and allocation, fiscal 
and monetary policy and also in the form of political
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disagreements among the various policy-making groups over 
what policy to assume, both external 1 y and internally. In
many ways the internal problems of the Member states 
dominated attempts to institute a common energy policy
within the Community and hampered efforts not only to deal
with OPEC but also growing American attempts to put together
a broad-based front consisting of the developed consumer
states which resulted in the Washington Conference of March
1974.
The Washington Conference on energy was convened on 11
February 1974. It originated from an idea put forward by
Henry Kissinger in December 1973 in which he stressed
cooperation among the industrial states and proposed the
setting up of an energy action group comprising 
representatives from Europe, North America and Japan. Their
aim was to put together a preliminary action programme
covering all sectors of the energy market.
The period up to and after the Washington Conference was
dominated by intra-EEC feuding, not to do with energy p e r  se
but with France’s position in the EEC and with the EC’s
relations with the US. It was a continuation, on France’s
part of its Gaul list, anti-Anglo-Saxon attitudes and
consequently France regarded the conference from the 
beginning as an attempt by America to reassert its hegemony 
over Europe and also to create a confrontation between 
consumer and producer states.
' %
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The other eight member states were not as apprehensive in 
their outlook as France, but they too were not entirely
satisfied with the US objectives in launching the 
conference. All nine member states had issued at the
Copenhagen summit a statement that they were interested in 
(and realised the importance of) consumer-producer 
negotiations. This was backed up later on in January 1974
with a secret agreement to convene an Euro-Arab conference 
later on in the year. The whole logic behind the European 
move was dictated by their extreme dependence or 
vulnerability on oil from the Middle-East producers. This 
attitude, however, ran contrary to that held by America
which was against bilateral deals and in favour of 
multilateral deals.(75)
France’s position aside, the remaining eight member states 
found themselves split between supporting the US, as an ally 
and as part of the Atlantic Alliance, and veering towards 
the Arab producers on whom they were so reliant and ensuring 
their security by closer relations with them. The outcome 
of all of this wavering was that of a compromise between the 
two conflicting positions, which resulted in a mandate in 
February in which it was agreed that at the conference 
energy problems should be analysed and the responses passed 
on to the relevant international body. In other words, the 
conference should not result in a permanent
organisation.(76)
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Once at the Conference in Washington, divergences continued 
between the Eight and France. France adopted the stance 
that it was against "any attempt to organise a common energy 
policy for the industrial nations because this would look 
like an attempt to gang-up on the oil producers. "(77)
Britain sided with Germany, in line with America’s position
at the Conference in opposition to France’s stance. Thus, 
France’s attitude in favour of bilateral deals, brought into 
question, at that stage, the survival of the EEC (as a
political entity) and the future relations between Europe
and Arnerica. As Schmidt pointed out at the Conference :
"the French were trying, and failing, to keep open a gap
between the United States and the European Community."(78)
It was illustrative of the divergences afnong member states.
The major outcome of the Washington Conference was the
establishment of the International Energy Agency, as an
agency of the OECD, in November 1974. Agreement was also
reached by America, Canada, Japan, Norway and the eight EEC 
member states on co-operation on the following 
"conservation of energy and restraint demand; accelerated
development of new energy sources; accelerated research and 
development and a system of sharing oil supplies in
emergencies and severe shortages."(79) However, as a result
of the Conference and bitter differences between the French
and the Germans and other members, France rejected the
principle behind these and refused to sign important parts
of the communique. In so doing, France distanced herself 
from the other EC partners over the issue of continued co-
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operation with the United States and the pursuit of a
largely multi-lateral approach by the major oil consumers
towards the producers. It was a continuation of earlier
behaviour on France’s part towards the European Economic
Community.(80)
In September 1974 the Council of Ministers finally adopted 
the energy guidelines proposed by the Commission.(81) 
These guidelines "Towards a New Energy Policy Strategy for
the European Community" called for a long term strategy in
response to the preceding oil crisis. It involved long term 
objectives for 2000 for nuclear energy, gas and non-
conventional energies. It also stated specific medium term 
objectives for 1985 which included i n t e r  a l i a  on the demand
side, the reduction of growth of energy consumption and
increased consumption of electricity, while on the supply 
side, increased nuclear energy, solid fuels and natural gas
consumption was envisaged. Oil consumption was to be
reduced. Overall, however, these guidelines were marked by
indecisiveness. Subsequent efforts at formulating a common
energy policy proved to be merely a reformulation of these 
guidelines.
Throughout much of 1974 the energy policy differences among
the Nine members remained unresolved. These differences
were still subject to domestic political priorities. For
example, in July 1974 the British Labour government,
following in the footsteps of the previous Conservative 
government blocked a declaration “loosely tying • the Nine to
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a long-sought after common energy strategy.“(82) By its
actions Britain aired the fact that it thought the real 
"ball-game" was to be found in the twelve nation Energy Co­
ordinating Group (ECG) which include America and Japan.(83) 
Britain was against the EC’s ideas concerning energy,
particularly those for fixing common energy targets and 
controlling the oil sector,(84) It thus refused to agree to 
the idea of committing the Nine ræmber states to a common
energy policy, aimed at decreasing dependence on oil 
imports. By September 1974 Britain agreed however to a 
resolution which committed the member states to a common
energy policy.(85)
In the eighteen months of this first energy crisis of the 
1970s, the European Community and its Nine members failed to 
make considerable progress in formulating their own common 
energy policy and also in pursuing a common policy in 
international negotiations and organisations.
Each of the Nine EC members, however, did respond nationally
to the energy crisis in addition to their collective
response within the framework of the EC. But the events of 
winter 1973-74 served only to underline their vulnerability 
and inability to formulate and, probably more importantly,
maintain a coherent regional response. Differing lines
were taken by the various member states towards coping with' 
the problem. Some states, especially Germany and the
Netherlands, believed that national interests would be best 
served by a co-ordinated multilateral policy among the main
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oil consuming states. Others, particularly Italy, Britain,
Belgium and France, put greater emphasis on striking
bilateral deals with the oil producers, initially, to 
guarantee security of supply and subsequently to provide for 
monetary recycling. This was in order to cope with the 400
percent increase in oil import costs. France went so far as
to carry its policies out in isolation from the other
members - a case of sauve q u i  peu t.  (86) France began, for
example, negotiations with Libya, Iraq, Algeria, Syria and
the Iranians, while Britain sought to strengthen its 
relations with Saudi Arabia. The EC, it appeared, seemed
helpless in the face of the situation and its response
amounted to the suggestion that the agreements "which might
be concluded by certain Member States with the oil-producing
countries should at least be subject to previous
consultation at Community level, as the Commission has
suggested."(87)
By mid-1974 once new governments had been sworn in, in
Germany and Britain, the main EC member states moved from
bilateral to multilateral deals involving the United
States.(88) The pursuit of bilateral deals in the crucial 
period of the crisis from October 1973 to March 1974 should 
not be over-estimated. They were a continuation of pre­
crisis dealings. "To the extent that measures of
bilateralism were pursued during the crisis and might again 
be in the future, the causes would lie as much in dcmestic 
political and economic necessities as in the failure of the 
European Community and broader multilateral
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organizations (sic) to offer a (Tore promising means of joint
cooperati on."(89)
The events of the first oil crisis did not, as was initially 
hoped, bring the European member states closer together. 
Instead, it exposed the Community’s inability "to face a 
major challenge in a way commensurate with its claim to be a 
major economic power evolving progressively into a political 
one."(90) In an ideal situation, as Lieber suggests, an
appropriate energy policy would have included complete
harmony within the EC on taxes, conservation, circulation of
supply and policies toward the oil companies and externally, 
it would have entailed a unified approach in dealing with 
the Arabs and the United States.(91)
Why then did the Community fail to present a unified front 
against the oil producers and to formulate a cormion energy 
policy? Briefly, it failed because of a combination of 
factors including fundamental political differences among
the Nine members, asymmetries of power between Europe and
America and problems of domestic politics.(92) The
political differences included whether or not to treat the 
domestic oil companies in a laissez-faire manner, as did 
Britain, Germany and the Netherlands, or whether to pursue
an interventionist policy as the French and Italians did. 
Another political difference was the problem of the attitude
to assume towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. France, Italy
and Britain adopted an increasingly pro-Arab stance while,
particularly, the Netherlands and Germany were inclined to
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adopt an impartial or pro-American approach towards the 
whole issue. Profound differences in orientation toward the 
US also existed with France favouring a more autonomous
relationship while the othe r membe rs favoured closer
American ties.
The asymmetries of power involved in the first oil crisis
lay on a fragile base of (asymmetrical) interdependence, in
that while the EC and the US were interdependent in their 
economic and monetary structures, the European states were 
far more vulnerable to the costs of disruption or change
than were the Americans. European economic activity was
more vulnerable to changes in monetary flows and exchange
rates. Moreover, the EC members remained highly vulnerable
because of their dependence on imports of energy and other 
raw materials. The Europeans also lacked a sufficiently
strong centralised decision-making machinery to deal 
effectively with such issues at hand.
The energy crisis, therefore, brought to the fore 
asymmetries of power which previously had been latent. It
meant that, because of the factors mentioned above, the
European states faced strong pressure from the US to rely on
its leadership in energy and related economic matters as 
well as paying greater heed to American political aims. 
The outcome was increasing strains in the Atlantic 
Alliance.(93)
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During the course of the crisis, therefore, the governments
of the Member states were impeded by both international
forces and by increased domestic demands and problems. All
were the outcome of the worsening situation and pre-existing
constraints. These external impacts manifested themselves
in economic pressures (inflation being the main one caused
by the price rises and which contributed towards the
recession); in political problems and inherent in this were
social implications. The result was that the European
Community appeared hesitant in the face of uncertainty. It
failed to formulate an adequate common energy policy, with
sufficient long term measures to secure its supplies. For
the short to medium term it did attempt to address (and
rectify) the situation at hand. But it failed to set up
adequate machinery to deal with the oil shortfalls at the
time. This was to be left to the International Energy 
Agency to implement once it came into being. Nonetheless,
the member states did come through the storm relatively
effectively, despite the obstacles. It was to be in the
long term that the effectiveness of the EC as an
organisation would be tested in its ability to come up with
and attempt to implement an adequate energy policy which
displayed sufficient vision for the future.
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CHAPTER 4
EC ENERGY POLICY : ITS EVOLUTIOM 1975-1989
Turbulence, uncertainty and volatility characterised the 
period after the first oil shock. It was one which
witnessed not only the increasing power of OPEC but also its
relative demise and a reversal, in the 1980s, of trends set 
in motion in the 1970s.
The European states continued to rely on a high level of
imports to meet their oil consumption requirements. Between 
1973 and 1978 oil imports constituted 70 percent of their 
oil needs. By 1978, Western Europe’s dependence on crude
oil supplies from the Persian Gulf and North Africa had
risen to 14 million bpd or over 80 percent of oil
imports. (1) On the other hand, the US now only obtained 
some 30 percent of its oil from this region. However,
between 1974 to 1986 total crude oil imports for the
Community fell from 560 million tonnes to 328 million 
tonnes with OPEC providing no more than 45 percent of EC 
imports in 1987 compared to 94 percent in 1974.(2) The 
share of oil imported from the QCC member states fell even 
more sharply in this same period from 45 percent in 1974 to 
14 percent in 1987.(3)
108 jIAfter 1974 global oil consumption experienced a temporary ]
ireversal of trends. It declined at an annual rate of 2.5 j
percent between 1974 and 1975. This was a reversal of the 6 !
percent per annum experienced between 1970 and 1973.(4) I
However, from 1975 until 1979/80 oil consumption regained 
its previous rates and grew at an annual average of 5
percent, thereby continuing the trend begun after 1945.
This situation reflected, at a simplified level, the fact
that the oil consuming states had not gained a great deal
from the preceding five years. Instead by 1978 it was being
predicted that the oil crisis was over - an event of the
past.
The period after mid-1974 up to the end of 1978 was one
which saw a temporary respite in the oil situation - the
calm before a further storm. Oil prices in this period
experienced a slight reduction in the real price of crude
oil, while the one major achievement on the external EC
energy scene, was the establishment of the International
Energy Agency as part of the OECD. (5)
The Fourth Stage
Against this background, the European Community implemented 
its fourth stage in policy formulation from 1974 to 1978.
The one major and significant development in this period was 
the December 1974 Council Resolution outlining the
Community’s “Energy Policy Objectives for 1985".(6) In this 
Resolution the Commission revised the targets it had set in
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the study "Towards a new energy policy strategy for the
European Community"(7) to take into account updated
forecasts from member states. The Commission also commented
on the scope and nature of the objectives and suggested a i
general course of action for each individual energy sector. ^
i
Contained within this Resolution was the proposal to reduce |iEurope’s dependence on imported energy to 50 percent and if Î
possible to 40 percent, by 1985 compared to the 63 percent j
!
in 1973, It was also agreed that the rate of growth of |
ienergy consumption in the Community, as a whole, should be .j
reduced in order to achieve a level of 15 percent below the j
IJanuary 1973 estimates. This was to be achieved by 1985. i
Oil imports were to be reduced to 540 mtoe (640 in 1973) 1
while "a percentage of imported oil in total energy
Irequirements would be respectively 38 and 28% (61% in 1973) iI
or 75 to 70% of consumption (98% in 1973)."(8) Moreover, 3}
with regard to patterns of energy use, these were to be 
altered to increase security of supply, particularly to 
increase the contribution of electricity produced by nuclear 
energy.
Several salient points about the 1974 resolution are made 
by Kohl. Firstly, the objectives reflected, a positive 
development in the Community’s energy policy. Secondly, 
acceptance was given to inevitable continued dependence on
external supplies and at the same time attempts were 
implemented to reduce this dependence. However, the
Resolution provided little more than a loose framework for
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nine separate national energy policies.(9) The member
states, in this Resolution, faced up to the fact of their
dependence on imported energy particularly oil and to the 
fact that positive steps would have to be taken to remedy
the situation. However, only a loose structure was provided
in which to achieve this. As the resolution states it 
represented only :
".... guidelines for national policies and |
serv[es] as a significant guide for energy |
producers and consumers in the Community."(10) j
The Resolution had no legal status. It was merely there to j
provide a guide for the member states. !
!I
other general energy principles and programmes which were !
passed between 1974 and 1978 and which are still in force }
Iinclude a Council Resolution on 3 March 1975 on energy and
the Environment(ll); Council Regulation (EEC) No 1729/76 of 
21 June 1976 concerning the communication of information on
the state of the Community’s energy supplies(12); and 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3025/77 of 23 December 1977 
applying Regulation (EEC) No 1056/72 on notifying the 
Commission of investment projects of interest to the 
Community in the petroleum, natural gas and electricity 
sectors(13).
Principles and programmes with respect specifically to oil, 
include the Council Decision of 7 November 1977 on the
setting up of a Community target for a reduction in the
consumption of primary sources of energy in the event of
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difficulties in the supply of crude oil and petroleum
products(14); Council Decision of 14 February 1977
(77/186/EEC) on the exporting of crude oil and petroleum
products from one Member State to another in the event of
supply difficulties; and the subsequent Commission Decision 
on the same topic of 28 September 1978.(15)
This period was also characterised by a concentration on the
domestic energy policies of the European members. Results 
were mixed. Oil imports for the whole of Western Europe
declined during this time from approximately 14.3 mbpd in
1973 to 12mbpd in 1978(16)(See Table 6 - Appendix). Net
imports of petroleum( 17) for the nine EC member states, in
the corresponding period fell from 587.6 million tonnes to
472.1 million tonnes but rose again slightly in 1979 to
475.9 million tonnes.(18) These figures reflected the
outcome of a combination of factors : economic recession,
expanding North Sea production and, but only to a limited 
extent, the result of genuine structural adjustment. 
However, by 1977 gross energy demand had surpassed 1973
levels and was increasing - a result of the growth of German
and French economies and of greater reliance on natural gas.
Despite the aforementioned figures, this period did not see 
a significant reduction in dependence on imported oil. The
EC did attempt to move in this direction and it did succeed
in encouraging modest measures of energy conservation,
promoting efforts to reduce energy import dependence and
subsidising energy research and development projects.
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However, the final result of such efforts were limited and 
their impact was negligible. The results which were
achieved, were done so through member states’ own national
policies. Furthermore, rival differences and interests
among the member states prevented the emergence of an 
effective energy policy. Differences arose over among other
issues : ".....the question of floor-prices for British
North Sea oil, over subsidies for European-produced but 
costly (twice the world price) British and German coal, over
the development of nuclear power and about the balance 
between free market and dirigiste econanic
strategies... "(19)
More specifically, on the eve of 1979, despite Europe
holding oil consumption and demand at or below 1973 levels
compared to the US where oil consumption and imports had
continued to rise dramatically, the European Community had 
failed to provide adequate measures to conserve energy. In
so doing it chose to ignore the direct relationship between
increased economic growth and additional energy consumption.
It had also failed to secure an effective commitment from
the member states to the development of renewable energy
sources. Moreover, the EC failed "to devise ways of
avoiding competitive bidding for oil, of reducing imports,
or of achieving a long term stability in the oil 
market(whether by softening demand, by negotiation, or even
coercion)" (20) In sum, the EC’s accomplishments in this
period were inadequate to meet the challenges which were to
arise out of the Iranian Revolution of December 1978.
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The second oji shock
The period 1978 to 1981 was marked by a further two oil
shocks. The oil crisis of 1979 was precipitated by the 
Iranian Revolution, when between December 1978 and March
1979 5 million barrels per day of Iranian production was
lost to the market. “Overnight 3 million barrels of surplus
oil production was eliminated and world oil reserves were
drawn down at the rate of 2 million barrels [per day]. "(21) 
Saudi Arabia’s response to the events was to raise its 
production. They were unable, however, to compensate fully 
for the loss of Iranian oil on the market. As soon as 
Khomeni came to power, he announced that Iranian oil
production would be 60 percent of what it had been under the
Shah. Concurrent with events in Iran, there was
dissatisfaction among the oil producers over oil prices, 
which had declined in real terms since the 1974 oil price
rises. Oil companies, particularly, were unhappy with
events as they had to make do not only with substantially
reduced profit margins but also with the loss of control 
over the oil markets, as a result of OPEC’s increased power.
In mid-1979, in response to pressure from the oil majors, 
the United States government provided US oil importers with
a $5 per barrel adjustment for certain petroleum 
imports.(22) This resulted in increased pressure being
exerted on already tight oil markets and combined with
events in Iran, resulted in panic buying on the markets , as
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large independent oil companies, small refiners and the
Japanese rushed to buy oil in anticipation of further price 
increases. Between 1978 and the end of 1979 oil prices rose
by some 140 percent. (23)
Panic buying on the spot markets was further exacerbated
when OPEC realised it could make increased profits by 
unilaterally raising official (long term) contract prices
and diverting additional supplies on to the spot markets.
This resulted in new upward pressures on oil prices, while
increased stockpiling of oil, in anticipation of further
rises, only served to boost demand further.
As such the impact of the second price rise was as much a
result of consumer and distributor action as it was of
producer behaviour. Stocks, at that stage were high
companies in the European Community states held about 650 
million barrels of usable oil (i.e. in excess of minimum 
operating requirements), which was the requirement for 
fulfilling mandatory stockholding obiigâtions.(24)
Reaction
The oil shock of early 1979 had not been anticipated by
international companies, governments or the lEA and EC. 
Despite the presence of the lEA and its policies designed to 
handle a crisis, the response to the shortfall was similar
to that of 1973 : oil users scrambled to ensure supplies for
themselves at whatever price could be had without due regard
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to the consequences of their actions on the markets. In 
many respects, the situation of 1979 was worse than that of 
1973-74 because the oil companies only controlled about 50 
percent of the international trade in oil compared to
approximately 90 percent before 1973-74. Therefore, it was 
more difficult for international companies to allocate 
supplies as they had done in 1973-74 i.e. less control could 
be exerted over the markets. The markets instead were
characterised by greater fragmentation, uncertainty and 
volatility.
In the intervening period, between the fall of the Shah and 
the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, additional pressures were 
placed on markets by the Iranian hostage crisis, and by the 
industrialised states continuing to build up oil stocks, so 
as to decrease their vulnerability to an oil cut.
EC’s
With the loss of Iranian oil exports in 1978 and as a 
consequence of events in Iran, Western Europe experienced a
significant reduction in its oil imports, particularly as
Iran was the second largest oil exporter to the European
Community, accounting for 16 percent of total Community oil
imports in 1978.(25) The global shortfall, however, was
quite small since oil stocks were at high levels and
production shortfalls were consequently made up by the other
OPEC states.
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Despite these measures, some European states did experience
serious supply disruptions especially the United Kingdom and
outside of the EC, Sweden. At this stage of the crisis the
governments of the various EC members were mainly concerned 
with crisis management to contain oil demand and distribute
suffi ci ent suppli es to i ndustry.(26)
Western Europe’s management, technically, of the crisis was
less than satisfactory, especially with regard to the
management of the spot market where fundamental differences
emerged between France and Germany. Germany, which depended
heavily on the Rotterdam spot market, was against any
attempt to interfere in the operation of the market, while
France was in favour of increased supervision and 
regulation. At the EC summit in Strasbourg in June 1979, 
French proposals for tighter control on the Rotterdam spot
market were rejected by Germany, the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands. Similar differences also surfaced at the Tokyo 
summit in June 1979.
Similar problems were encountered on the political front by
the EC. Europe had been left vulnerable and confused with
events in the Gulf region (27). These were to prove
indicative of the limits of Europe’s influence. IR) this was 
added the ill-equipped nature of EC decision-making 
procedures for handling emergency situations.
As Maull indicates crisis management techniques were in 
this instance of limited importance, for the difficulties
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which arose from this crisis were the result not so much of 
the actual impact of the supply interruptions or price jIincreases, as the uncertainties and risks implicit in the j
• I
new energy situation.(28) Most important "was the European |
•Iresponse to the underlying problems of the world oil market jJ
"I: the demand-driven upward pressures on prices, the IIvulnerability to supply reductions, and the lack of a sound ]1poli ti cal superstructure."(29) j
j
The demand side of the crisis received the most decisive j‘ ■ I
reaction to the Iranian situation. Since France is not an J
lEA member, but is an EC member, lEA commitments have to be
paralleled by EC decisions. Thus, the lEA decision of March
1979 to reduce the group’s oil imports by 5 percent of
projected levels for 1979, was followed by a similar EC
decision taken at the Paris Summit in mid-March 1979. At
the summit it was confirmed that the 5 percent oil import
reduction target for the Nine would be implemented and an
overall import dependence target of 50 percent for 1985 was
set.
In May 1979 the second meeting of the lEA did no more than
confirm the 5 percent target and the initiative was passed
to preparations for the Tokyo summit and the Strasbourg
Council of the European Community in June 1979. At the
Strasbourg European Council the EC members agreed on an oil-
import ceiling for the Community as a whole of 9.4mbpd (at
1978 levels) for 1980-85 providing the US and Japan would
follow suite.(30)
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At the lEA summit in Tokyo, in June 1979, a similar decision
was taken, although targets were set on a national basis.
Germany, Italy, UK and France committed their states and 
those of the EC to an oil import ceiling of 9.4mbpd for
1980-85, while the United States set a goal of 8.5mbpd for
1985.(31) These national targets were an innovation and, as
suggested by Cowhey, "a response to both American pressures
and American promises of lower targets for the United
States."(32)
On closer examination, however, the supply constraints
adopted by the members were not particularly far reaching.
"The difficulties in translating group targets into national
targets reflect the reluctance of governments to take
stringent measures to reduce oil demand."(33) In a detailed
analysis by the lEA, it was revealed that of prices charged
to final consumers only in industry did a substantial and
widespread increase in real prices take place : the
transport and housing sectors often enjoyed lower real
prices until, at least, 1978.(34)
Obj.®ct i yes for 1990
One of the more positive outcanes of 1979 was the 
Commission’s communication to the Council entitled "Energy 
objectives of the Community for 1990 and convergence of
policies of the Member States."(35) These objectives were
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specified in an "Energy programme of the European 
Communities" drawn up in October 1979.(36)
The objectives for 1990 included(37) firstly, the reduction
of the ratio between economic growth and growth in energy
demand from 1.0 to 0.8 in 1985 and 0.7 in 1990. Secondly, 
the reduction of the Community’s dependence on energy 
imports from 50 percent. Thirdly, the restriction of oil 
imports to the 1978 level of 470 million tonnes. The
increased use of solid fuels and nuclear energy in power
stations was given as the fourth objective. It was hoped to
increase their use by 70 to 75 percent of electricity 
generation. Fifthly, to restore EC coal production to the
1973 level of 250 million tonnes, while concurrently raising
coal imports and the capacity for consuming solid fuels.
The sixth objective pertained to nuclear power stations and
the provision of assistance for their construction 
programmes, while the seventh aim was expressed as "the
establishment and application of rational and transparent
price policies."(38) Finally, the EC member states were to
search for, develop and demonstrate new energy sources.
According to the Commission these recommendations formed
part of the EC’s three basic aims, notably :
" ( i ) d i ssoci ati on of economi c g rowth and
growth in energy consumption 
(ii) levelling out of oil imports [and]
(iii) preparation of a more satisfactory
energy supply for the more 
d i stant future."(39)
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These objectives were a redrafting of the earlier 1974 for
1985 objectives. According to the Commission they were in
keeping with the prevailing situation which was 
characterised by the impending enlargement of the Community 
to include Portugal, Spain and Greece; by the increasing
spot market prices; by the prospect of increased oil imports
by 1985 (despite a reduction of 20 percent between 1973 and
1978); and by the general oil market situation which was
still volatile and unpredictable after the first oil shock.
In effect the Commission saw these new objectives as being 
far more effective and carrying more weight than their
predecessors. As the Conmission remarked : "the measures
forced upon the governments of the Member States by the
threatening situation of late 1973 and early 1974 were
conceived and adopted haphazardly and without much co­
ordination or solidarity which reduced their effectiveness 
and endangered the process of building Europe."(40) In a 
sense, then, the new objectives were designed to counter
this and provide a more effective energy policy.
The members of the EC also in this period recognised the
importance of closer producer-consumer relations. In 1974 
at the suggestion of France, producer-consumer relations 
were taken one step further with the development of the
Conference on International Economic Co-operation(ClEC)
negotiations of 1975-77, thereby instituting the first of 
the Euro-Arab dialogues. In October 1978, at an OPEC
seminar in Vienna, twice yearly meetings were suggested
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between OPEC and the EC to explore the possibilities of co­
operation. Further calls were also made for increased
consumer-producer co-operation between OPEC and the other
i ndustrialised countries.
The Euro-Arab dialogues ran into trouble almost 
immediately.(41) In response to the EC aiming at closer
relations with the producers, the Euro-Arab dialogues, at 
that time, were an inappropriate vehicle for this sort of
co-operation. The main issues of the international oil
markets, at that time, namely the future supply levels and
prices, could only be dealt with on a multi-lateral level
mainly because of the nature of the market. It should have
involved all the states concerned and not just the EC member
states and the Arab oil producers.
Overall the response of the European states to the 1978-79
oil crisis revealed a fragmented response to a 
disintegrating order. The United States appeared
reluctant(in its role as a major power) to devise a new
international system for oil. This left the Europeans
exposed and unable to devise alternatives. They were also 
unwilling to assume the lead in reconstructing patterns of
co-operation with other consumer states and the producers.
The Atlantic disagreements in this crisis were, by contrast, 
less serious than those of the 1974 crisis, with possibly
the greatest irritant being the US’s decision to subsidize
imports of fuel oil.(42)
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Among the nine member states of the European Communities,
co-operation was hampered by differences in national energy
positions which made it nearly impossible to co-ordinate
energy supply policies with regard to domestic production.
Each member insisted on maximising its own national interest 
: the UK and the Netherlands made their intentions clear
about keeping their oil and gas resources under their own 
control (43); France placed increasing importance on its
nuclear programme; and the Italians refused to burn more 
coal if those plans did not include increased assistance for 
the Italian refining industry.(44) EC energy policies,
therefore, were largely confined to the demand side.
Fifth Stage
The formulation of an EC energy policy continued after the
second oil shock, with increasing emphasis being placed on
the security of supplies and the reduction in demand for
oil. Numerous principles and programmes were adopted by the
Council and Commission of the EC after 1979 and up to
1985/86. These form the fifth stage in the evolution of the 
EC ’ s energy poli cy.
The EC’s general energy policies in this period were
formulated against yet more changes in the international 
energy environment. The two major changes being the start
of the Iran-Iraq war and the oil oversupply situation which
developed after 1983. The Iran-Iraq war erupted in
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September 1980, It led to the halt of oil exports from both 
sides and a reduction in world supplies (as a result of 
production cuts) by some 3.5 million bpd - approximately 10 
percent of world oil exports. With the war came renewed 
pressure on oil prices and the spot markets. This continued 
as the war progressed. (45)
A number of general EC principles, which are still in force,
stand out with respect to this period. In June 1980 the 
Council passed a Resolution concerning Community energy 
policy objectives for 1990 and the convergence of the
policies of the Member States(46). Five sectoral objectives
were set by the Council - three quantitative and two 
qualitative ones. Of the former, one concerned primary
energy demand and two related to energy supplies, 
particularly dependence cr. oil and electricity production, 
while the latter objectives related to the setting of energy 
prices and the increase of the share of alternative and 
renewable energies.
A1tered markets
From 1981 the oil markets began to alter. The proportion of
spot and short term deals increased comparative to long term
contracts at official OPEC prices. Increasingly exporters 
had to compete for a declining market share of oil. At the
same time numerous OPEC producers in order to stem falling
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revenues(47), constantly exceeded their allocated production
quotas.
In addition to increasing OPEC production, other factors
which contributed towards the oil price fall of 1985/86
included the price increases of the 1970s which had provided
an incentive for conservation and the use of alternate
fuels, resulting in decreased demand; an increase in non-
OPEC production largely as a result of North Sea oil and
Mexican developments; the loss of control over the oil
markets by the vertically integrated oil companies, with the
establishment of OPEC and, in response to this, downstream
integration by the oil producers which began to characterise
the markets. In other words, the markets were increasingly
characterised by a huge imbalance between potential supplies
and actual demand for oi 1.
Economic effects of the oil crises
The economic and political consequences of the two oil 
crises were profound and extensive. The full impact of them
was only felt some time after the crises had passed. In
fact one could add that the present oversupply situation is
the result of events in the 1970s and early 1980s. The
large price increases posed the greatest threat to 
industrialised states, while the other aspect of these 
crises, the shortage of supplies, did have an impact but it
was a limited and short term one. The oil price increases
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of over 400 percent between 1973 and 1978 and 170 percent 
between 1980 and 1981, caused major disruptions to the EC’s
member states’ economies. A worldwide recession followed 
from the first crisis. It broke postwar records in the rise 
of inflation and unemployment, and in the substantial 
decline in gross national product. The results of the
second oil crisis were apparent in the double digit
inflation rates after 1980, the negative or negligible
growth rates, external imbalances and in terms of 
unemployment which was substantially higher than after the
1973-74 crisis.
For the OECD as a whole the costs in 1980 and 1981 have been
conservatively put at $1000 billion or a 5 percent loss in
real incofTie in 1980 and an 8 percent loss in 1981.(48)
Unemployment rose from 19 to 29 million between 1979 and
1982 while the recession heralded by the oil price rises led
to an unparalleled and economically destructive level of 
interest rates. The disruption at the end of the 1970s came
at a bad time for the OECD states, and hit them before their
j
adjustment processes to the first oil shock had been ;
1complete and the structures of their economies were still :Iweakened. Thus, increases were imposed on already high i
I
levels of oil prices and this goes partly to explain why the j
economic consequences were out of all proportion to the size 
and duration of the shortfall. These factors in turn,
created pressure on most states to pursue a combination of 
contraction and expansion policies - the former aimed at 
countering inflation, the latter at stimulating output and
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reducing unemployrirent. The result of such policies was a
decade of "stagflation" - a combined reaction of low growth
and high unemployment. In addition, "the impact of the
first and second oil price explosions on the political
fabric of the OECD countries, on the ability of governments 
to govern and on international economic and political co- Ij
operation cannot be readily quantified but has also no doubt j
/I
been extremely damaging. "(49)
ÎI
1983-1986
In March 1983 a Council Regulation was adopted(50) which
established specific measures of Community interest relating
to energy strategy. In April 1983 the Council was asked to
report on the progress made towards achieving the EC energy
objectives, for 1990. The Commission realised that the 
existing policies were insufficient for attaining the 
objectives particularly in view of the declining oil prices
which had removed soir^  of the impetus for formulating new
energy strategies. The reaction of the Commission to this
development was to issue two communications in June and July
of 1984.(51) The first was on energy strategy and the
second was concerned with a review of the member states
energy policies for the achievement of the 1990 objectives.
The Resolution encapsulated the pre-1985 energy proposals,
while the Regulation was concerned with financial assistance
in relation to energy projects, schemes or measures. Of
these two communications the Resolution is more important in
view of its review of the objectives for 1990 and the
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subsequent decision taken in 1985 to implement new 
objectives for 1995. However, under Article 189 of the EEC
Treaty of 1957 it has no legal basis. This means that it is
left up to the member states to decide on whether or not to
implement the new objectives. The Resolution did seek to
reaffirm the basic energy objectives of the EC; to put
coal’s case as an alternative source of energy more
forcefully and; welcomed the Commission’s intention to put
forward new guidelines for 1995. The two communications were
consistent with the overall strategies that were adopted in
1979 of a more efficient use of energy and the promotion of
security of supplies.
With regard to specific measures relating to oil only one of
major consequence was adopted, that of Council Regulation
(EEC) No1893/79 of 28 August 1979 introducing registration
for crude oil and/or petroleum product imports in the
Community and subsequently amended by Council Regulation
(EEC) No 2592/79 of November 1979.(52)
Sixth Stage,
The sixth stage in the European Communities formulation of a 
common energy policy dates from 1986, the year of the
collapse of oil prices, until the present. In the summer
of 1985 Saudi Arabia abandoned its policy of restricting
production which had largely contributed to the stability of
international markets. The result was a collapse in oil
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prices, as oil fell below $10 per barrel. This decision was
to set the tone of the market for the next five to eight
years. The price of oil, until the mid-1990s will revolve 
around the export volume levels decided by the Gulf states,
in particular, and OPEC in general.(53) The oil oversupply
situation will thus remain for some time to come. As Mabro
states as long as the imbalance between supply and demand
prevails then a serious risk exists that oil prices will
fall once more to low levels and they will fluctuate
erratically around a declining trend in both spot and future
market prices.(54) The outcome of this situation, in the 
short term, will be that demand will rise only marginally.
It is in the medium to long term that there will be more
significant growth in demand if econcmic forces are allowed
to continue unchecked by political or fiscal intervention.
The most significant proposals of this final period have
been the Council Resolution of 16 September 1986 concerning
the new Community energy policy objectives for 1995; the 
convergence of the policies of the Member states(55) and;
the moves towards implementing a single energy market for 
1992.
By 1986 the EC’s objectives as laid out in the 1975 for 1985 
and 1980 for 1990 objectives had been fulfilled or 
superceded. Thus, in September of 1986 new policy aims were 
defined for the period up to 1995. These aims are
interdependent and are dominated largely by one concern
"the desire to avoid increased dependency on oil and
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especi ally i mported oil."(56) The reason1ng beh1nd the
EC’s current policy is based on the fact that the Community 
remains particularly vulnerable in the energy field, despite 
the considerable progress made in recent years. This is 
taken further by suggesting that in the near future, the 
vulnerability of the Community could be deepened i n t e r  a l i a  
by increasing consumption due to rising economic growth; a 
stabilization of European hydrocarbon (oil or gas) 
production; a possible reduction in efforts to conserve 
energy; and the increasing use of alternative sources 
because of the more advantageous prices of imported oil.(57) 
As affirmed by the Council :
"...efforts must be maintained and, if necessary,
reinforced between now and 1995 and beyond that 
date in order to reduce to a minimum the risk of 
tension at a later date on the energy market and 
in particular on the oil market."(58)
Of all of the aforementioned factors it is likely that in 
the short term, the lower price of imported oil will be the
most important. For the long term however, it is more
probable that a combination of all the above mentioned
factors will contribute towards increasing consumption and
hence deepened vulnerability.
Despite this the EC as an organisation has put forward the
idea that a common energy policy will give the EC a better
chance of success because Community vulnerability (to 
imported oil) is a matter of common concern and interest.
Additionally, the Community’s economic growth prospects
are, to some extent, dependent on the energy supplies of its
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partners, which in itself is influenced by their respective 
situations. This though is a contentious proposition.
Furthermore, unified action involves increased effectiveness
to avoid the dispersal and duplication of effort, 
particularly in research. By presenting a common and
unified position to the oil producers, the Community is 
likely to be heeded by them. But a unified stance is
reliant on economic and political factors being conducive to
this.
Sectoral Obj ect i yes
There are a number of sectoral objectives in the new energy
policy include (59). They include firstly increased
efficiency of energy usage for all sectors. Between 1987 
and 1995 the efficiency of final energy demand has to be
improved by at least 20 percent. This is not a difficult
target to reach since energy efficiency improved by more
than 20 percent between 1973 and 1983. However, it may be
possible that a peak has been reached in the level of energy
saving and that the percentage for efficiency, in energy,
over the next ten years will be considerably less than that
of the previous ten years(1973-1983). It may become
increasingly difficult to reach the targets proposed by the 
EC. A situation then arises whereby it is necessary to make 
substantial efforts to maintain efficiency because lower oil
prices have made future investments less attractive while 
the less onerous energy savings have already been achieved.
131
The second objective is to decrease the share of imported 
oil in gross energy consumption through substitution. 
Between 1973 and 1985 the EC succeeded in decreasing the 
share of imported oil in gross energy consumption from 
nearly 62 per cent to 31 percent. (60) In order to maintain
these levels a policy of economy, substitution and of
encouragement of internal exploration and production must be 
pursued. "Efforts to substitute should be aimed in
particular at the transport sector and at electricity 
generation." Similar measures have also been put forward 
for gas, solid fuels and electricity generation.(61)
The final objective is internal exploration and the greater
use of new and renewable sources of energy. The EC
advocates that up to and beyond the year 2000 these should
play a greater role in replacing traditional fuels.
Favoured new and renewable sources include the use of
biomass and waste, solar, geothermal, hydro and wind energy 
etc. The principle advantages of using such alternatives is 
that over the long term they will result in supply 
diversification and lessened energy dependence, besides the
more positive environmental effects and greater application 
of their technology for developing countries.
Hprizontal Objectives
The horizontal objectives put forward by the EC, which
accompany and compliment the sectoral objectives, include
firstly, greater integration of the European internal oil
1«
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market. This is necessary in order "to reduce costs,
encourage competition and strengthen the economic efficiency
of energy-consuming industries."(62) Furthermore, greater
integration would also improve security of supply “by
ensuring improved distribution of resources in the event of
a crisis." Implicit in this objective is the Single Energy 
Market of 1992 which will be dealt with in the next chapter.
Secondly, common pricing principles for energy consumption
which are to be transparent and realistic. The key to any
efficient supply structure lies in having realistic prices 
as they guarantee the competitiveness of industry "by 
ensuring effective competition between different fuels, 
preventing waste, and encouraging the development of
i ndi genous sources."(63)
The third horizontal objective is improved security of 
supply which is to be achieved by the development of
competitive European production (in the various energy 
related areas), diversification of imports, greater
flexibility of consumption and effective contingency
measures.(64) This measure also takes into account the
stockpiling of fuel at electricity plants (30 days 
consumption) and measures specific to the oil sector (stocks 
equivalent to 90 days of consumption).
The development and increased co-ordination of external 
relations constitutes the fourth objective. The aim behind
this is to strengthen the position of the Community and its
133
member states in the world energy market. This reflects the 
high degree of interdependence in world oil markets which is 
indicative of the need for greater and increased co­
operation among states. As a result, the EC Commission does
maintain close ties with OAPEC, OPEC and other oil
producers.
Two further objectives include regional development and the 
promotion of technological innovation. The first objective 
relates to the impact of EC policy on less favoured regions, 
which means the readaption of regions affected by the 
decline in energy production. These regions should be
supported and development encouraged through investments in
energy.(65) The second objective relates to the development
of new technologies and involves the EC in research,
development and demonstration programmes. Community
research in this aspect focuses on nuclear safety, 
controlled nuclear fusion, solid fuels, new energy sources
and the efficient use of energy.
The final objective is that of protection of the environment
and deals with the environmental aspect of energy policy.
This is increasingly an important aspect as more attention
is focused on the environmental side effects of energy.
Most of the measures evolved by the EC are, as such,
designed to increase security of supply - directly or
indirectly. Despite the apparent positive aspects of a
common energy policy, it does have its drawbacks. These
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include the fact that the EEC Treaty only provides for the
harmonisation of economic policy. The development of a 
common energy policy is not specifically stipulated. As a
result finance is a stumbling block; member states still
cling to their national interests while the EC cannot afford 
to establish another policy based on the lines of the Common
Agricultural Policy, in the energy sector, to finance energy
projects.(66)
These latest objectives are distinguished from the previous 
ones, i.e. the 1975 for 1985 and 1980 for 1990, by the fact 
that they contain far greater detail on the achievement and
requirement of the objectives. In this regard they are more
specific; they contain greater recognition of the 
complexities of the energy situation and of energy markets
and increased recognition is given to differences among the
various member states and to the role of market forces in
dete rmining potent i a1 outcomes.
The new energy policy objectives for 1995 were adopted in
September 1986 in an unanimous resolution.(67) However,
since the objectives are not legally binding, some of the
impetus is lost. Added to this is the fact that the EC
lacks a common energy policy. More importantly, though, is
whether these latest proposals will ensure an adequate 
supply of energy, decrease demand, diversify sources etc.
The answer to this will only become apparent should a crisis
occur and as 1995 draws closer.
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Therefore, from the 1950s the formulation of an energy
policy within the framework of the European Community has
been on the one hand, a slow and arduous process 
characterised by inconsistency and a lack of cohesiveness, 
clarity and purpose on the part of the member states. On
the other hand, it has seen the establishment of common 
guidelines, increasing emphasis on security, particularly 
those measures designed to increase security of supply and 
an awareness of the situation and events surrounding and
encompassing the Community. In the end, however, what has 
to be asked is not whether the EC possesses a single energy
policy, for it never will until provision is made for it
either in the Treaties or under Article 235, but have the 
EC energy policies, as they stand, secured supplies and
reduced vulnerability. In other words, have they fulfilled
the function of providing adequate security for Europe’s 
economies should an interruption in supplies occur.
Chapters 6 and 7 will attempt to provide an answer to this. 
In the meantime, the establishment of the Internal Energy 
Market for 1992 will form the seventh phase in the EC’s 
development of an energy policy.
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CHAPTER 5
THE INTERNAL ENERGY MARKET
In the Council’s stated objectives for 1995 one of the 
horizontal objectives is given as "the greater integration, 
free from the barriers to trade, of the internal energy market
with a view to improving security of supply, reducing costs
and improving economic competitiveness."(1) From this
originated most of the momentum behind the formation of the
internal energy market for 1992.(2) It, however, remains but 
one of the stated objectives of the Commission’s 1985 for 1995
guidelines, despite the attention it has received. It is
precisely because of the stated objectives that it has been
decided to deal with it separately from the other 1995
objectives and, hopefully, to place it within perspective. It 
should be mentioned that the establishment of the Internal 
Energy Market is but one part of the more general movement
towards the Single Market envisaged for the European Community
in 1992. The Single Market "has become a key objective and
the focal point of the revival of the European Community."(3)
In drawing up the White Paper for the establishment of the
Internal Market in Europe in 1992, energy, initially, was 
deemed as being politically too difficult to pursue in this
regard and it was seen, according to McGowan as being "a
minefield of monopolistic industrial structures with a high
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degree of public participation, too intractable for the
Commission to tackle."(4) However, as the general momentum
towards 1992 increased, so the Commission realised that energy
could not be left outside of the Internal Market.
The Internal Energy Market had its initial origins in the
communication sent out by the Commission to the Council in
1968 outlining the guidelines for a Community energy policy.
In it, it argued that there ;
"..are still considerable barriers to trade within
the Community as regards energy products. If this
situation does not improve and if a common energy
market is not achieved in the near future, the level 
of integration already attained in this sector may
well be endangered."(5)
This view was further reiterated in the energy objectives
adopted by the Council in September 1986(6)
The way was opened up for making the European internal market
a reality once the Single European Act of December 1985 had
been ratified and once the European Counci 1(7) had taken a
decision to assign the resources needed for implementing the
Single Act. Therefore, as recent events in the Community
testify, the key objective of the Community has become the
completion of the internal market by 1992. This has, to some
extent, overshadowed other EC objectives, with the path 
towards this goal being marked by the 1985 White Paper, the
Single European Act and the Council decision of February 1988.
Objectives
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More specifically, the main reason behind the creation of the
Internal Energy Market (lEM) is to remove the barriers to
trade in this area in accordance with the objectives stated
for 1995 and the overall ones contained in the various
treaties of the Community. It is hoped that by removing these 
barriers, it will bolster Europe’s energy sector enterprises 
and improve the Community’s security of supply. A major 
result of this will be increased competition which the 
Commission believes will enhance the competitiveness of the
whole EEC economy, particularly as energy accounts for 7 
percent of the wealth generated each year in the Community.
This is compared to 2.9 percent for agriculture and 1.5 
percent for steel.(8) A further by-product of this increased
competition will include positive effects on employment,
balance of payments, increased choice for consumers etc.
Another aim of the I EM is to improve the structure of the
Community’s energy industry. It "will make it possible to 
derive greater advantage from the complementarities, improve 
the cost structure and rationalise energy production,
transmission and distribution activities,“(9) thereby
encouraging the development and maintenance of energy
industries which will, it is hoped, be better able to compete
on the international energy markets.
With regard to security of supply, it is envisaged that a more
integrated energy market will seek to improve this for all
member states. "Greater interconnection of equipment would 
make it possible to increase both the solidarity between
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Member States and the flexibility of the industry."(10) This 
would, therefore, increase the availability of emergency 
resources (in the event of a crisis) and open up increased
possibilities for additional trading.
The Commission claims that through the establishment of the 
I EM the Community could save 0.5 - 1 percent of its GDP. (11)
Thus two potential benefits of 'more Europe’ are identified by
the Commission : a reduction in costs as a result of greater
competition and a reduction in certain unit costs as a result
of the effect of scale and the optimization of investment or
management.(12) The I EM, therefore, aims to create an
integrated and liberalised energy sector in the Community. It
is a means of further cementing the economic integration of
the Community.
The Commission will seek to achieve the aims and objectives of
the Internal Energy Market through the legal instruments
currently available in attaining the overall internal ■ market. 
This means that energy products and services fall into the
same categories as other products and services. However,
energy is distinguished by further additional constraints
namely security of supply and the strategic position of
energy products.(13) Although these do not imply the
necessity for a different legal basis, additional provision
could be made for them under the Single European Act, or
failing that, under the EEC Treaty.
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The advent of the single market, moreover, will not alter 
certain basic approaches to the strategic aspect of energy,
particularly for oil. According to the Commission the single
energy market must continue to be seen as one of the aims of 
the Community’s energy policy objectives laid down for 1935 
and must contribute towards the attainment of these. This
will mean that the I EM "must not result in a watering-down of 
the diversification objectives and in particular, even in the 
present circumstances, the objective of limiting to
approximately one-third net imports of oil and petroleum
products relative to total energy consumption."(14)
Framework of Acti on by the Cqnrmun i ty
The Commission lists four types of action to complete the
internal energy market(15) : the implementation of the White
Paper(16); enforcement of Commun ity legislation; acti on to
protect the environment; and specific energy policy measures
which include costs, prices, tariffs and infrastructure. With 
regard to the first priority, the implementation of the White 
Paper of 1985, the aim of this is to realise the provisions 
found in the 1985 White Book on the Single Market with regard 
to energy. It will involve action in three areas ; the 
harmonisation of technical rules and standards; the extension
of public procurement rules to the energy industries and; the 
app rox i mat i on of taxat i on.
The second type of action is the enforcement of Community
legislation. Previously, the energy sector has enjoyed
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considerable leeway because of its strategic nature. In
future those laws concerning the provisions of free movement 
of goods and services; monopolies, undertakings and state aid
will be more stringently applied.
Thirdly, action to protect the environment will include a 
better balance between energy and the environment. This will
involve the harmonisation of safety standards and their
application to the cost of producing and using energy,
especially in the oil refining industry.
The final type of action will entail specific energy issues
which will include costs, prices, tariffs and i nf rastructure.
This will involve a fuller examination of these areas in
preparation for 1992 and improvement if necessary. The
Commission argues that adequate infrastructure is a s in e  qua
non for flexibility, security of supply and ultimately a more 
i nteg rated Commun i ty ene rgy market,(17)
In working towards an internal energy market the Community
also has to keep in mind the external relations dimension.
The development of the I EM and the cohesion of the energy
sector will demand new initiatives in its external relations
policy.
A final major consideration of the Commission is the 
guaranteeing of long term security of supply. Because of the
dependence of the Community on imported energy it will be
necessary for the Community to keep energy consumption under
i
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control, on the demand side, and on the supply side, to ensure 
the diversification of supplies and to maintain or increase 
indigenous energy production. Furthermore, with regard to
oil and natural gas, the Commission stresses that close 
cooperation must be maintained with the other industrialised 
states, particularly the United States and Japan, "so that all 
eventualities can be coped with," while guarantees of long­
term supplies could be sought from the main producers, 
especially the Middle-Eastern ones.
The specific proposals relevant to oil include the following : 
the removal of price obstacles and increased competition on 
oil markets, brought about by the realignment of pre-tax
prices and of prices inclusive of tax owing; oil products to
be possibly still subject to higher taxation than competing
energy products after 1992 - this is in line with the energy
objectives for 1995 of enhanced security of supply and
diversification. Finally, the increased coordination and
harmonisation of measures to limit oil consumption by member 
states.(18)
Cpnyentipnal Oi 1 Supply
However, the IEM proposals centre mainly on the conventional
oil supply industries according to Stern et al(19). In so 
doing they fail to look at renewable energy sources or energy 
conservation and efficiency. Nonetheless, the oil sector will 
remain relatively unaffected by the emergence of the I EM 
unlike the other energy sectors since it is the most
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competitive of the energy industries. However, the higher
environmental standards will affect the oil industry, 
especially refining. Despite this two main obstacles to the
oil sector will remain. Firstly, the envisaged tax 
harmonisation will be a problem because of the economic and
financial differences among the member states and it would
also cause significant budget problems. The second obstacle
appears to be the idea of open procurement (markets), which
could result in higher costs and increased bureaucracy.
Supporters of this would argue that greater openness and
competition should reduce prices and costs. With these in
mind, and despite whatever decision the Council takes, 
Leblond(20) sounds a warning that what is at stake for oil,
specifically, and energy, generally, is "the very concept of
an open European market, not only among its members but to the
outside world as well since energy has a particularly
intemational base. '
Achievement of I EM
Progress on moving towards the internal energy market by the
Commission has just begun and will be some time before it is
completed. Already problems are being encountered, which
could possibly herald even greater difficulties in
implementing such an ambitious programme for energy, given its
international nature and the differences between member 
states. According to Brewin and McAllister, even in 1988
problems were being encountered(21) with the Council only
being able to agree on the right of private producers to be
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attached to the electricity grid. On the issue of oil
refining no agreement was reached because Germany, the
Netherlands and Denmark have stricter environmental standards 
in force than the other member states. The decision on
whether national grids should be be common carriers of
electricity had to be referred to a working party because of
"fears that surplus French capacity would undercut her 1i
neighbours’ prices."(22) I
In general the achievement of the I EM will probably result in
conflicts between the Directorates within the Commission, as
well as between the Commission and the member states. 
"Enforcing and policing new initiatives may require 
considerable additional resources at the Commission, and 
prompt fear over sovereignty."(23)
Stern et al also further suggest that the Commission will be
presented with a conflict in maintaining security of supply at
the same time as promoting market forces. This will bring in
to question the issue of dependence on non-EC energy supplies
and vulnerability to supply disruptions. This could mean that
security, in all probability, will decline as an issue of
importance as promoting system economies and obtaining lower
prices for consumers become the overriding objectives.
Another area of potential conflict which Stern identifies is
that of the growth in importance of energy-related
environmental issues which could coincide with the other
objectives of the I EM resulting in additional political
tensions between member states.
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Benefits.
At present it is doubtful whether any tangible benefits will
result from the setting up of the lEM. The energy intensive
industries, so far, appear to be the most likely 
beneficiaries, while the domestic consumer, who in theory 
would appear to greatly benefit from the lEM, appear in
practice not to. Moreover, it is unlikely, apart from the
German coal industry, that the changes promised by the 
emergence of the I EM for the European energy industries will
materialise because of the unrealistic starting date of 
1992.(24) The Commission, contrary to this, believes that
once the I EM is established, tangible benefits will flow from
it. Under the I EM member governments will find it
increasingly difficult to protect uncompetitive fuel and 
energy equipment industries. Yet, conversely, the advantage
of this will be that consumers will benefit from lower fuel 
prices.(25) "For commercial companies, the focus on European
integration created by the 1992 campaign will increasingly
cause decisions to be taken in European, rather than a
nati onal, context."(26)
Conclusion
It is probably still too early to say what the final benefit 
will be of the Internal Energy Market. One can only provide 
conjecture at this stage. It will, it is hoped by the
Commission, ensure continued security of supply, specifically
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for oil, within the context of an enlarged market. However,
this is subject to debate. Ultimately, one may argue that 
perhaps the Commission should at this stage be looking more 
towards influencing the external dimension of the energy 
market and policy rather than the regulation of the internal 
side of it by increasing co-operation and dialogue with its 
oil producers especially in the Gulf region and OPEC in 
general. Furthermore, the Community should be aiming to
provide a way of formulating canmon initiatives to influence 
other international institutions. With the temporary oil
oversupply situation currently prevailing on world oil 
markets, the decline in United States influence in the
international economy, it is not surprising that the 
international aspects of energy policy are being neglected in
favour of dealing with the internal aspects. In other words,
the current situation is conducive to dealing with internal
regulation. However, for the long term future for oil the
international aspect has to be kept alive by the European
Community. This does not mean that one cannot see the current
moves towards greater integration within the Community as a
negative influence on energy policy. It will provide greater
cohesion in the energy markets and it is, indicative of
renewed moves towards greater integration within the EC.
However, caution must be expressed at the current proposals as
they stand, particularly in regard to security of supply.
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EC ENERGY POLICY SUCCESS OR FAILURE?
Various methods exist for measuring and analysing the 
success of an institution’s policies. For example,
Chapman(l) groups the elements of public policy under four
headings : objectives, strategies, programmes and
administration, with the first defining the direction policy
will assume and the last three dealing with the 
implementation of policy.
Chapman’s objectives can be divided briefly into three 
sections : firstly, those governing the production which
include, aiwng others the establishment of "sovereignty over
resouroes and jurisdiction over ... production" ; the
determination of size and quality and the expansion of the 
market.(2) The second section consists of those factors
determining the supply side objectives, which entail the
determination and mobilization of indigenous resources;
diversification of supply; protection against supply
interruptions and environmental considerations. The final
sector is identified as the demand side objectives, which
include switching from one fuel to another, and energy 
efficiency, both overal1 and sectoral.(3)
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In order to realise the specific objectives, certain 
strategies are needed. This in turn requires programmes and 
organisations. Strategic considerations identified by
Chapman include the relative importance of the energy sector
in relation to other economic sectors, the role of 
interventionist and free-market forces, the time scale for
policies and the degree of flexibility needed to cope with
unforseen circumstances.(4) Because of the political factor
inherent in choosing appropriate policies to suit particular
political and economic needs, policies can frequently alter
with governments. This may result in governments aiming for
reactionary or short term policies rather than the
anticipatory or longer term strategies.(5)
The programmes used to achieve the policy objectives can,
moreover, be divided into three categories ; regulatory
to control exploration, production, safety, trade etc; 
fiscal - to shape the supply side of the energy economy,
distribution and consumption and, finally, participatory 
which entails, among others, government participation in the
energy sector.
The final section includes the administration of the 
objectives. According to Chapman this is necessary for the
formulation and implementation of policy and involves 
ministries, governmental departments, regulatory and
advisory bodies and organisations. From these four
objectives. Chapman argues that the effectiveness of
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policies can be ascertained i.e. the success of the policies 
lies in the framework behind them.
In contrast to Chapman, Kohl, in his functional analysis of 
institutional arrangements(6), uses the framework of
functions provided by international organisations and which 
he identifies as informational, normative, rule-creating, 
rule-supervi sory and operati onal.(7) The i nformati onal
function, involves "the gathering and dissemination, analysis
and interpretation of data and/or the exchange of 
information.“(8) The normative function involves
recommending guidelines of action, setting standards of 
behaviour etc. In many respects this is similar to
Chapman’s category of strategies. The categories of rule-
creating and rule-supervisory are self explanatory in that 
they set the standards of behaviour of member states and are 
legally binding with instruments made available to ensure
compliance. This category complies with Chapman’s objective 
of admi n i strat i on.
The final category which Kohl identifies for analysing the
effectiveness of policies is the operational function which
includes the "allocation of resources or values available to
an organisation and the sending of technical experts
into the field."(9) Within these categories, rule-creating 
and rule-supervisory are more important and demanding than
the informational or normative functions because of the
effect they have on key areas of national sovereignty.
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On the other side of the spectrum to Kohl and Chapman, one
finds the futuristic and econo-statistical approaches
respectively employed by Denton(10) and Weyman-Jones(11), 
among others. Weyman-Jones, in looking at policies that
ensure security of supply, employs an economic approach 
which relies on mathematical formulae to test his 
propositions and derive his assumptions. It is essentially
an approach, while falling outside of the field of
international relations, still retains its relevance to the 
field because of its econo-statistical approach and because
of the overlap of International Relations with other
disciplines.
Denton, unlike Weyman-Jones, prefers to adopt an economic
approach to analysing the development of short and long term
energy policies within the EC. He identifies the objectives 
of EC member states in this area as being on the supply side
"to reduce dependence on imports; to diversify types of
energy and to diversify sources of energy."(12) The demand
side objectives he identifies as the conservation of energy
and the diversification of energy to less-energy intensive
areas. These objectives are in line with those advocated by 
the EC. Denton then examines proposals for a short and long
term energy policy for the EC within the context of an
economic framework. He also, in the course of his
discussion, touches on prices, distortions and taxes within
the Community. His view, as it stands, is essentially a 
long term one and therefore futuristic in approach. In this
context it diverges fran those given by Weyman-Jones,
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Chapman and Kohl all of which are concerned with present
proposals facing the European Communities. One could
dismiss Denton’s view as irrelevant but for the fact that it 
addresses the future considerations of the Conmunity which 
are pivotal to the EC’s continued success.
The examples given above essentially concern the formulating
and implementation of energy policy and from these one may
ascertain the success of an institutions policies. 
Therefore, since the objectives, strategies and programmes 
p e r  se (to borrow Chapman’s framework) have already been 
dealt with in the previous chapter, this chapter will serve 
to examine the effectiveness of the European
Communities’(13) energy policies.
Despite the relevance of the above mentioned ræthods for
analysing the effectiveness of an institutions policies, for 
the purposes of this thesis, the effectiveness of the
European Communities’ energy policies will be gauged 
primarily by the use of statistical evidence. This method
has been chosen because the specific objectives, as 
formulated in the EC’s programmes, are calculated in 
statistical terms. It would, therefore, appear to be the 
most obvious method. However, it has to be kept in mind
that apart from the specific goals laid down by the EC, the 
more generalised aims of the EC’s energy programmes are
difficult to accurately determine because of their 
unspecified nature and the fact that their implementation is
left to the member states’ discretion.
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It is hoped, firstly, that by employing such an approach
that one can gauge the results (or lack of them) and hence, 
the overall success (or lack of it) of EC energy policies.
Secondly, and more specifically, it is hoped that the 
objectives will reveal whether the level of imports have
declined in line with current policy aims and if indigenous
production has increased; whether member states have 
diversified to other forms of energy, thereby reducing oil’s 
percentage of total energy consumption and whether
diversification to other sources of supply (of both energy 
and suppliers) has taken place. This involves primarily
consumption. ( 14) In sum, whether or not the criteria for
ensuring security of supply and demand, between 1973 to 1986 
and beyond, have been met.
EC Objectives
Three sets of objectives have been issued by the Commission
; 1975 for 1985, 1980 for 1990 and 1985 for 1995.(15) All
three sets of objectives according to the EC represent 
"guidelines for national policies" and serve as "a 
significant guide for energy producers and consumers in the 
Community"(16) In other words, the objectives, which are
handed down as Council Resolutions, have no legal status
within the terms of the Treaties and are not legally
enforceable. Decision-making in the Community is based upon 
the Treaties. If no clause exists in the Treaty then the 
Council is powerless to act. However, the Member States can
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agree, under Article 235, to take joint action on an issue
or situationC17). Therefore, since no provision has been
made in the EEC Treaty for Resolutions they are not legally
binding on the member states. Instead, they serve as a
series of guidelines and common goals for member states to
attain. Since the Resolutions are unenforceable, there
exists no legal machinery within the Community to ensure
this. Once the Council has discussed and passed a
Resolution, the Commission can only continue to persuade 
member states to adopt and implement the energy objectives
in keeping with the overall aims of the Community.
From these three sets of objectives one can identify several
goals which are ccmmon to all and which include i n t e r  a l i a
the overriding priority of the Community : namely the secure 
and adequate availability of energy on a satisfactory
economic basis; reducing dependence on imported energy
particularly oil; the development of secure and competitive
alternative resources to oil; the containment of energy 
consumption and the restriction of the share of oil in total
energy consumption.
The specific goals with respect to each set of objectives
have already been covered in some detail in previous 
chapters, but common to all are the reduction of the growth
rate of energy consumption and oil consumption in
particular; the increased use of renewable and alternative
energy sources; the diversification of supplies . and; the 
decrease in oil imports.
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( i ) The 1975 for 1985 .objecti ves
As discussed in the previous chapter these objectives, given
in "Towards a New Energy Policy Strategy for the Community", 
which subsequently formed the blueprint upon which later
initiatives were based and upon which the Council adopted a 
ResolutionC18), covered both demand and supply.
The demand objectives were, firstly, to reduce the growth of
energy consumption without reducing the growth of GNP. The
internal energy consumption for 1985 was placed at 10 
percent below the pre-crisis estimates.(19) The second
objective was to increase electricity's share to 35 percent 
of total energy consumption. This was compared to the
(then) current figure of 25 percent.(20) From oil’s
viewpoint, the main supply objective was that of reducing
imports from third countries to account for 38 percent (61 
percent in 1973) of total energy requirements or 70 percent 
of consumption (98 percent in 1973).(21 ) The overall aim of
these objectives, specifically for oil, was to reduce 
dependence on imported supplies, and thereby ensure greater
security and stability of supply through the development of
secure resources; improved relations with producer 
countries; adequate Community machinery to make it possible 
to take appropriate measures to deal with difficulties and;
the organisation of the proper functioning of the market at 
an EC level.(22)
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According to Weyman-Jones, the demand objectives were
forecast in terms of improving consumption and were
consequently based on the proposition that no energy policy
changes would occur in the intervening period.(23) The
drawback with such forecasts (used in this period), however,
was that they were usually in error by considerable amounts,
thereby rendering the objective unmeasurable.
However, these demand objectives, as seen in table 6a, were
rather easily met, mainly because the initial demand
forecast were so much in error. In the case of indigenous
production, the 1975 for 1985 objective was given as 800
mtoe. This was based on a 1973 forecast of 640 mtoe. As it
turned out in 1985, with the realisation of the 1985
objectives, this figure was considerably below that 
projected, standing at 589 mtoe and representing a
difference of some 211 mtoe or 73.62 percent of capacity.
By contrast, imports were considerably out on earlier 
predictions in 1985, standing at 724 mtoe compared to a
forecast of 1160 mtoe in 1973 and an objective for 1985
(given in 1975) of 675 mtoe. This was up on the 1975 figure
by some 49 mtoe or 107.25 percent of capacity. Therefore,
the overall demand objectives were significantly in error
with the total standing at 1313 mtoe in 1985. This was 162
mtoe (or 89.01 percent of capacity) out on the figure given 
in 1975. In sum, the demand objectives were met at levels
below those predicted with the exception of imports which
were above the levels given in 1975. Briefly, this higher 
figure of 724 mtoe can be accounted for by the increase in
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demand due to the lower price of oil from about 1983 onwards
and the increase in economic activity in the European states
at this time combined with increased production on the part
of the oil producers and a decline in production by the
consumers.
By comparison to the demand objectives, the supply
objectives were set with specific targets in mind. They
were aimed at increasing the use of nuclear energy, solid
fuels and natural gas while reducing oil consumption.
Table 6b shows the result of the supply objectives which
varied greatly between the objective set and the actual
obtained. In the case of coal, natural gas and oil
production actual figures for 1985 were below those forecast
figures given for 1985. Only lignite and peat production 
was above the initial objective. By ccmparison, actual
import figures for 1985 were above those set for 1985 with
coal significantly above the original 40 mtoe, at 78 mtoe in
1985. Oil imports were only marginally above the figure of
540 mtoe by some 8 mtoe.
Therefore, one may conclude that on the supply side the EG
did achieve its initial objectives of increasing the use of
solid fuels. It failed, however, in this connection, with 
regard to natural gas where production and imports for 1985
were significantly below those figures set in 1975. The
objectives did succeed, although only partially, in reducing
oil consumption. Oil production declined but oil imports
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rose slightly in response to this. Hence, the objectives
set for 1985 did not fulfill significantly the aim of
reducing dependence on imported oil nor did they succeed in 
greatly increasing security of supply. Oil, in 1985 still 
remained a significant component of overall energy 
consumption despite measures to reduce its share.
Table 6a :EEC Policy objectives on energy 
1985 (million of tonnes of oil equivalent)
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demand 1975 for
1973 fore­
cast for 1985
1975
tive1985*
objec-
for
1985
actual
turnout
indigenous p red­
uction 
net imports 
total
640
1160
1800
8006751475
589
724
1313
*assuming 50% import dependence
Sources : WEYMAN-JCNES T G (1986) : 
Issues and Policies : p81 and 
Statistical Yearbook : 1987 : p46
Energy
B j m s w
in Europe : : "Energy.
Table 6b : EEC Policy objectives on energy 
1985 (million tonnes of oil equivalent)
supply 1975 for
objective 
for 1985
1985
(EUR
actual
12)
co a l
production
imports*
180
40
13478
l i g n i t e  and p e a t  
production 30 36
n a tu r a 1 gas 
production 
i mports
175-225
95-115
12790
o i 7**production
imports
180
540
151548
* Includes hard coal, patent fuel and coke
** Includes crude oil and primary petroleum products
Sources :
Issues and
Stati sti cal
WEYMAN-JONES T G (1986) : Energy
 Policies  : p81 and EUF^TAT
Yearbpqk : 1987 : p46
in Europe : Energy
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(il) The 1980 for 1990 set of objectives
The objectives for this period were laid out in terms of
improvements on past actual performance, rather than on
hypothetical forecasts. This meant that the objectives were
based on more realistic and accurate data than had been the
case for the initial set of objectives, and were thus easier
to attain, in real terms. Briefly, the objectives
included(24) i n t e r  a l i a , firstly, to reduce the degree of
Community dependence on imported energy to a level of 50
percent. Secondly, to restrict oil imports to that level
attained in 1978 i.e. 470 million tonnes. Thirdly, to
increase the use of solid fuels and nuclear energy in power
stations so that they would account for 70-75 percent of
electricity generation. Fourthly, to restore Community coal
production to the 1973 level of 250 million tonnes.
Fifthly, to reduce the ratio between economic growth and
growth in energy demand from 1 to 0.8 in 1985 to 0.7 in 1990
and finally, to establish and apply rational and transparent
price policies.(25)
Of the above objectives, the first two were fulfilled by
1985 : net imports of petroleum (crude oil and petroleum
products) fell from 496,3 mtoe in 1980 to 331,2 mtoe in
1985.(26) Oil imports attained the 1978 level of 470
million tonnes between 1980 and 1981 and subsequently
declined further to 377,8 mtoe in 1982.(27) These figures
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have to be seen against a background of a continuing decline 
in Community dependence on imported energy from 591,8 mtoe 
in 1980 to 456,8 mtoe in 1985(28) i.e. energy imports as a 
percentage of energy consumption declined from roughly 60
percent to 47 percent in the intervening period, thereby 
fulfilling one of the main objectives of the 1980 programme.
The objective for coal production was reached in about
1981/82 when production stood at approximately 245,8 million
tonnes for the 10 member states. (29) The reason why the
member states were able to attain these goals was due to
continuing conservation and demand restriction which had
remained in place after the 1970-80 crises. Therefore, by 
1985 the objectives had largely been reached - some five
years ahead of schedule and this was one of the main reasons
behind the decision to formulate new policy objectives for
1995, in 1985.
(iii) The 1985 for 1995 ppl icy objectives
The Community once again adopted the approach of comparing
past performance in order to set future objectives. 
Specific sectoral objectives were set, besides those of the 
horizontal objectives(30), and included(31) : firstly, an
improvement in the efficiency of final energy demand(32) by 
at least 20 percent by 1995. Secondly, oil consumption is 
to be maintained at approximately 40 percent of energy
consumption while net imports are to be kept at less than 33 
percent of total energy consumption in the Community by 
1995.(33) Thirdly, the market share of natural gas is to be
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maintained æid, if need be, increased natural gas 
exploration and production in the Community will be 
implemented. Fourthly, the market share of solid fuels is
to be increased and the competitiveness of their production 
capacities in the Community is to be improved(34). Fifthly, 
hydrocarbons are to constitute less than 15 percent of
electricity generated by 1995. Finally, the development of
new and renewable sources of energy is to be maintained and
furthermore, their use in place of more conventional sources
of energy is to be substantially increased.
With regard to the above objectives and given available 
statistics, the extent to which the targets, to date, for 
1995 have been fulfilled can be assessed. However, it
should be mentioned that it is possibly too early to assess
the full extent of the 1995 objectives, particularly as the
'half-way mark’ i.e. 1990 has yet to be reached. But, in
looking at the statistics available to date one may be able
to identify a trend in the direction that the 1995
obj ect i ves will take.
The first objective, nairely the efficiency of energy use,
has, according to Brewin and McAllister, made insufficient 
progress, yet again, in 1988 towards fulfilling the target
of 20 percent.(35) The second objective : oil consumption 
as a percentage of energy consumption in 1988, for the EC,
was 46.6 percent(36). This figure is above the 40 percent
guideline laid down in the original objectives for 1995.
But, for the future, this figure is not expected to increase
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substantially and is expected to decline in the long term.
Net imports, as a percentage of total energy consumption,
stood at 45.9 percent of gross domestic energy consumption
in 1988, thereby exceeding the 1995 objective of 33 percent
by some 13 percent. (37) All indications point to the fact
that oil imports will increase in response to a gradual
decrease in oil production in Europe(38) particularly in
view of the fact that no commercially viable energy source
has been discovered as an alternative to oil.
With regard to the other sectorial objectives, Brewin and
McAllister state that insufficient progress has also been
made on these, particularly in emphasising solid fuels and
renewable energy to lessen dependence on oil from Middle-
Eastern producers.(39) This reflects the increasing
influence of low priced oil imports on the policies of the
Community and on the individual member states. It also
reflects the continuing preoccupation with implementing and
formulating the detailed measures for the Single Energy
Market in 1992. Understandably, the issue of 1992 has come 
to dominate the energy sector in the Community, but it is
only one of the objectives laid down in 1985 for 1995,
although, at present, it seems to have assumed a
significance beyond that intended at its conception.
In general, the 1995 objectives portray a more realistic
picture of the expected energy situation, while utilising,
according to Weyman-Jones, further stable and meaningful
energy rati os(40).
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Success or Failure?
Therefore, the energy objectives and guidelines set between
1975 and 1995 reveal the following : that the issue of
security of supply continues to be an on-going priority of
the Community. It is enhanced by the continuing emphasis
placed on reducing the level of imports; the percentage of
oil consumption to energy consumption; the reduction in 
demand for energy, especially oil, and by implication of all
three of these, the continued diversification of sources of
supply. All of these, it is hoped will simultaneously
increase security of supply while reducing the vulnerability
of the EC member states to interruptions in the supply of
oil.
In the light of this, have the EC’s policies and programmes
as defined by the aforementioned objectives generally been a
success? For the short to medium term the policies have
mainly achieved their set aims. Overall, with regard to
oil, the level of oil imports has continued to decline.
From the early 1980s this was an ongoing trend in the
Community. However, this trend at present is being reversed
because of the availability of cheap oil supplies, the 
concommitant decline in indigenous production and an upswing
in nominal economic growth in member states. To this extent
one can argue that in regard to oil inports, EC polices have
failed. However, this is a short sighted view to take. Oil
import levels, over the long term, have continued on a
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downward trend and one which could continue despite the 
temporary upswing being experienced at present.(41) What
has to be asked is whether this trend is as a result of EC 
policies, or whether it is the result of the member states’
own individual actions taken outside of the Community or 
whether, in fact, it is a result of market forces being
brought to bear on a state’s demand and supply patterns. No 
one factor can be easily singled out as being the main 
contributory force in this long term downward trend in oil
imports. It would appear that it is a combination of 
concerted efforts by the member states to increase oil(use)
efficiency and decrease demand over the long term; aided by 
EC aims and impetus from the Commission to do so and by the 
fact that the industrialised states’ oil consumption 
patterns are changing towards increased efficiency and 
conservation of energy usage. This implies, over the long
term, a decline in imports while the decline in oil
consumption is being matched by an increase in oil
consumption in the developing states.(42)
With regard to increased indigenous production, as being 
part of increasing security of supply, it would appear that 
this too has not been the success it was hoped it would be.
The 1975 for 1985 programme failed to achieve its production 
aims for oil. The 1980 for 1990 prog ramifie was more 
successful because of the coming on line of North Sea oil
and gas production which boosted overall production in the
Community considerably. As mentioned previously, it is
unlikely that the 1985 for 1995 production aims for oil will
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be fulfilled mainly because of the continuing low price of 
oi 1.
Have member states managed to diversify to other forms of
energy? Overall, oil still retains its position as the main
energy source within the Community, although variations do
occur as in the case of the Netherlands. (43) The share of
oil to primary energy consumption thus, for member states,
has remained significant. This is in spite of the existence 
of policies designed to ensure a reduction in oil and an 
increase in the consumption of other energy resources. This
masks, nevertheless, the fact that the total share of oil(to
energy consumption), at a Community level, has continued to
decline since 1973 as the following figures illustrate :
Table 6c : The percentage share of oil to primary energy
consumption in the European Community
1973 62.1
1979 55.71982 50.1
1986 47.0
1987 46.31988 46.7
Source : BP Statistical Review of World Energy : JulyÏ989
J
17;
From the above one can ascertain that oil’s share of primary !
energy consumption has levelled off since 1986/87 primarily 
as a result of lower growth rates in EC member states. i
Table 5c does not reveal, however, the heavy dependence of .
certain member states, namely Denmark, Greece and Italy, on "J
imported oil.(44) Therefore, overall for the EC, there has ii
been a reduction in dependence on oil but this has not been i
reflected on a national level for some member states. {
1
Yet again, one has to ask whether this is a direct result of
EC programmes or whether it can be attributed to other i
factors outside of the Community such as market forces. It j
is difficult to say with accuracy what has been the main ;1
influence but one can suggest that the presence of
intentions among member states (to reducing oil’s percentage ;
of total energy consumption) has provided some impetus |
towards attaining a reduction in this. The main factors, iIhowever, have been continuing conservation and an overall j
reduction in demand.
With regard to diversifying to other suppliers, OPEC still i
!
remains the EC’s main source of supply.(45) The percentage i
of oil originating from this region has, overall, declined |
over the years, but OPEC will continue to remain the EC’s :
main supplier principally because of two factors, already i
touched upon : the sheer size of its proven reserves and its {
continued over-production which is above current demand. J
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Therefore, for the short term it is debatable whether or not
the EC’s policies have succeeded in ensuring a measure of
security of supply and demand and with it a reduction in
dependence on imported supplies, thereby diminishing overall
vulnerability. In certain areas, such as reductions in
demand and imports, success has been achieved but it is only
apparent from a long term view.
Furthermore, this conclusion for the short to medium term
reflects the existence of certain constraints on EC energy
policy formulation. These constraints contribute
significantly to explaining why the European Communities 
have failed to develop a successful common energy policy.
(i) Lack of a Mandate
Numerous writers(46) have provided explanations of the
constraints on EC energy policies. Drawing upon these, from
past experiences and further analysis, one can identify the
following reasons : firstly, the lack of an adequate
mandate on the part of the Community, combined with
institutional inadequacies. This is probably the most
obvious reason. Energy policy has no legal status based on
the EEC Treaty. In fact, none of the Community Treaties 
specifically provides for a common energy policy. Their 
nature, instead militates against the centralisation and co­
ordination of policy by dividing responsibility, for energy, 
in to different sectors. Coal falls under the ESCS Treaty,
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atomic or nuclear energy falls under the Euratom Treaty i
iwhile everything else (oil, natural gas, electricity and i
!hydro-electric) comes under the EEC Treaty. In general, |t
crude oil and petroleum products are covered by the EEC J
Treaty and classified as a market in "goods".(47) As such, 1Ithis denotes that the general rules of the customs union are |
applicable to trade in petroleum products between states, as j
i
well as the common external tariff.(48) "This means that i"i
the central organs of the Communities are left with the task i
Îof harmonising or co-ordinating national policies, and Î
attempting to influence directly the direction of these i
policies, except where the member states agree to take ;
i
stronger action.(49)" j
Î
A way out of the lack of legal status for energy would be to
refer to Article 235 of the EEC Treaty which states that : I
"If action by the Community should prove necessary 
to attain, in the course of the operation of the i
common market, one of the objectives of the I
Community and this Treaty has not provided the j
necessary powers, the Council shall, acting j
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and I
after consulting the European Parliament, take the i
appropriate measures."(50) j
!However, implementation of Article 235 requires unanimity I
among the member states in the Council of Ministers. This j
in turn is reliant on consensus being reached among the !1
member states over a particular issue but this is lacking |
(for energy) because of the differing national views. |
Îi
(ii) ppmesti c Constraints '
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Domestic constraints among member states can be divided 
into the following sections : energy resources and reserves; 
economic strength; the sensitivity of the energy sector; 
political constraints and finally, differing national 
policies or philosophies in respect of energy.
(a) Energy Resources
Differences exist among and between the member states in
connection with energy resources and they can, according to
Kohl(51), be divided into three groups ; the energy rich
states which include the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands.(52) These states, on the whole, are not in
favour of sharing their resources via the EC energy
policies. Then there are the so-called energy poor states
which include Denmark, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Greece 
and Portugal. They are generally reliant on imports for
over 50 percent of their requirements. These states have
few domestic energy resources, particularly Denmark and
Ireland, and consequently are dependent on such measures as
conservation and diversification policies to reduce energy
imports.
In between these two groups is a middle group of states
France, West Germany and Belgium. These states tend to
favour certain proposals to strengthen EC energy policies 
but not others, depending on the source of the proposal
involved. For example. West Germany has considerable
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reserves of cheap brown coal and of the expensive hard
coal.(53) This has meant that Germany’s nuclear programme
has been delayed at the expense of high level protection for
its domestic coal mining industry.
( b ) Degrees of Dependence
In addition to the above, and constituting another factor,
is the different degrees of dependence among the member 
states. As shown in Chapter 2(54), this has serious
implications for crisis management as witnessed by the
events of the 1970s and early 1980s. Chief characteristics
included the adoption of go-it-alone or sauve q u i  p e u t
policies on the part of some member states, particularly
France; the establishment and maintenance of bilateral 
relations with oil producers at the expense of presenting a 
united front as an organisation or in maintaining
multilateral relations; and, as a direct consequence of 
this, the assumption of differing foreign polices towards
the oil producers i.e. not presenting a consistent foreign
policy stance in dealings with the major oil producers.
(c) EconomieStrength
A further factor in domestic constraints is differing
economic strengths. This is primarily revealed in the
energy sector of an economy on a national level. The energy 
sector consists of numerous major industries - all of which 
contribute differing but significant percentages to the GNP.
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Within each primary energy industry (coal, oil, nuclear, 
gas, solar, wind, wave and biomass) particular 
characteristics and problems are encountered. A similar
situation prevails for the secondary industries involved in 
energy, such as electricity generation and distribution and 
oil refining.
In addition, the energy industries consist of diverse kinds 
of institutions, ranging from small private companies 
through to national and multinational corporations. Each of 
these has its own requirements and drawbacks. This means
that various contradictory pressures, both internal and 
external, are exerted by a whole range of groups from
producers, consumers through to trade unions and, 
increasingly, environmental groups on the member states’ 
governments. In other words, energy policy is not arrived
at in isolation. According to Commissioner Cardosa e Cunha, 
the Commission consults as widely as possible when 
formulating energy proposals and these consultation can 
embrace Member States, industry, local government, research
and academic institutions and third states. "Only after 
extensive consultation can the Commission produce balanced
and rational policy proposals."(55) These external
pressures, can in certain circumstances, result in a 
government taking up a different line of policy to that 
initially adopted, for example, the pressures exerted by
certain environmental groups on governments over nuclear 
programmes specifically following the 1986 Chernobyl 
incident. This again, provides an example of the political
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factor influencing the outcotæ of econonic orientated 
policies.
Moreover, in conjunction with the above mentioned, there is
the effect of exogenous shocks on prices and supply as seen
in the 1970s. This can hamper the maintenance of long term 
prices and raises the contradiction, that exists in the
European Community, between security of price and the 
security of physical supply. Within the Community emphasis 
is repeatedly placed on reducing dependence on OPEC oil and 
particularly from the Gulf states. This, thereby, offers a
defence (of sorts) against embargoes and extortionate (and 
unanticipated) prices. However, a clear distinction exists 
between the two issues in that a policy which is designed to 
substitute cheaper imported fuel for a relatively more
secure but expensive indigenous sources can, in the end,
increase the real price of energy for the consumer. This 
situation applies similarly when a policy relies on large
investments to curtail demand for imported fuel. The 
converse of this is that a policy which allows relatively
expensive fuel to be imported, while withholding a cheaper 
indigenous source may have the same result. In either case, 
the only real benefit may be to partially insulate the state
concerned against the immediate effect of a future price
increase, should a foreign supplier impose one or if one is
stimulated by a constriction in international supply. In
the meantime, the additional cost will have to be borne 'by 
the energy consumers in the state affected, either through 
higher prices or through subsidies from fiscal revenue.
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(d) Domestic Politica1 CpDstraiots
This leads to a consideration of domestic political
constraints. Chief among these are the political-economic 
structure of a state, with a particularly prevalent factor
being attitudes towards government intervention in markets.
A state’s approach to energy policy is conditioned not only
by its national resources but also, according to Ray, by the 
historical factors which have shaped consumer behaviour.(56)
This has led to the emergence of diverse national approaches 
to the role of the state in the economy - or differing
philosophies towards energy policy. In the United Kingdom a 
free market approach is now generally assumed towards the 
energy sector although the government, through various
public entities, continues to play a fairly substantial 
role. West Germany follows a similar line to that of 
Britain but one which is characterised by two major factors 
: that of a large and expensive domestic coal industry and 
a heavy dependence on imported hydrocarbons to meet its 
requirements. France, alternatively, has assumed a
d i r i g i s t e  approach which entails a centralised state role 
with numerous instruments to intervene in the market and
many public enterprises involved in energy. This enables a 
more coherent implementation of policy. France also places 
greater emphasis on its nuclear programmes.
States like Italy are located in between the dirigiste and 
free-market approach models. In Italy’s case it has several
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public energy enterprises but the formulation of a stable
energy policy has been inhibited by frequent changes in its 
government. In Italy’s case, one can argue, that it is the
political factor i.e. the frequent changes of government,
which has influenced the formulation and implementation of 
its energy policies. For example, in 1987, the nuclear
programme was hampered by national referenda in November of
that year. The referenda saw the abolishment of laws which 
allowed a governmental committee to “intervene in the siting 
procedure of new power stations and concerning financial 
incentives for communes and regions agreeing to site and
operate powerplants based on other fuels than
hydrocarbons. ■'(57) Moreover, basic progress in improving
the structure of the Italian energy economy has also been 
hampered by difficulties in carrying out the national energy 
programmes - this was particularly evident in 1986(58) when, 
for example, the National Energy Plan update of 1986(NEP) 
was not implemented after the Chernobyl nuclear accident.
Furthermore, among member states there appears to be 
differing degrees of consensus on the directions that energy 
policy should assume. This relates to the notion of
differing levels of politicization of energy issues. For
example, the ideology of the government in power is as 
important as that which the opposition groups have adopted. 
Britain provides an example of this, in that since 1979, 
under the Thatcher government, energy policy has adjusted to 
assume a more free-market approach. Visible shifts in this 
direction include the elimination of the British National
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Oil Corporation and the British Gas Corporation majority
equity interests in North Sea oil and gas production. More 
recent and on going approaches include the proposed 
privatisation of electricity, and coal and the privatisation 
of British Petroleum and British Gas. In the early 1980s
the Labour Party appeared to frustrate the government’s
intentions of closing down unproductive coal mines. Yet, 
subsequent actions by the Thatcher government, in closing
down further coals mines, especially in recent years, have 
not been altered by Labour’s opposition to such moves. In 
this instance, therefore, it would appear that the 
opposition group does not have a profound influence on 
government energy policy formulation. Therefore, the
formulation of energy policy is determined largely by the 
political structure of a system. This, in turn, determines
the ability of a state to formulate effective energy
policies.
Arguably, these different domestic approaches on the part of 
the member states go some of the way to explaining why the
Community’s Commission has failed, in many respects, to come
up with a common energy policy and to successfully implement
its objectives. Additional reasons, previously touched
upon, are as follows: differences in foreign policy
attitudes among EC member states which serve to undermine
their solidarity, particularly in a crisis. This includes 
an attitude of sauve q u i  p e u t in a crisis (primarily 
noticeable in the 1970s). It also includes differences in 
relations with the oil majors which can condition foreign
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policy attitudes especially if a state is heavily dependent
on imported oil. In line with this is, are the disparities
in relations among the Twelve with the United States and the 
Arab oil producers. The establishment of bilateral
relations at the expense of the more secure multilateral
relations in a crisis is often the easiest but not the most
beneficial route for a state to take in seeking a way out of 
a predicament. The establishment of the Euro-Arab dialogue 
it was hoped would eliminate a reoccurrence of such events
as witnessed in the 1973-74 crisis.
Therefore, to paraphrase Chapman(59), prevailing socio­
economic values, the political ideology of the government in
power and the nature and extent of regional differences
between Member States constitute some of the components and 
constraints in which the context of energy policy is set and
which determine policy. “Values and ideologies determine to 
a considerable extent the way in which the structure and
performance of the energy system is interpreted, the issues 
that are perceived and the strategies and programmes that 
are implemented.“(60) Because of these circumstantial
variables, energy policy (and for that matter any public
policy) may be subject to frequent and at times extreme
changes.
Maul 1(61) adds weight to this argument that a political
analysis of the European energy policy machinery reveals
both internal and external reasons for the failure of it.
Although these reasons apply to individual states in the
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1970s they are, in many respects, indicative of the European
Community. Internally, the energy systems failed because 
they could no longer function effectively. This was the
result of an overburdening of them "by their subordination 
to wider societal and political objectives and
preferences."(62) In other words, in the 1970s energy
policies failed to bridge the gap between the changed
international oil situation and new constraints on it and 
the unwillingness of states and their political systems to
alter accordingly. (63) However, this is not the whole
explanation, which can go further to the core of the
political system of a state - that of a lack of legitimacy 
in formulating energy policy i.e. "the ability of a
government to retain public acceptance whilst implementing
"sacrifice" measures."(64)
In dealing with the varying levels of intervention et a7, it 
is worth noting that extreme differences of view exist among
member states as to how much power central EC institutions 
should have in making policy. Mrs Thatcher in her October
1988 Bruges speech reiterated this point and implied that
there are people who want a European 'conglonrBrate’ or
'superstate’ exercising 'a new dominance’ from Brussels with
decisions being taken by an appointed bureaucracy. It is a 
view which is essentially gaullist in its outlook and
conveys the notion of unification by stealth, the 
centralisation of power, and the erosion of sovereignty,
although in reality this is unlikely to occur because of the
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consenting ratification required from member states to pass 
such legislation.
LONG TERM
For the longer term, the success of the EC’s goals, as set
out in the programmes, will only become apparent should 
another crisis, in whatever form, occur. Only then will it
be seen whether or not EC policies have succeeded in 
securing Europe’s oil supplies sufficiently against 
interruptions in supply and unexpected price increases and 
whether dependence on unstable sources of supply has been 
reduced, thereby diminishing at least in some measure, the 
overall vulnerability of the West European economies to a
disruption in supplies of petroleum.
Therefore, the EC’s general goals, as set out in its three
sets of objectives, have, in oil’s case, largely been unable 
to fulfill the main objective : that of a secure and
adequate availability of oil. This, it will be argued, is 
because the EC’s policies are reactive rather than
anticipatory and which will be elaborated upon in the next 
chapter. It, therefore, means that the European Community,
as a whole, remains vulnerable to threats and that its 
dependence on oil imports is still substantial despite 
measures taken to alleviate this.
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CHAPTER 7
CRITICISM OF EC ENERGY POLICY
This chapter represents an overall analysis of the attitudes
prevalent in the European Community(l) member states towards 
formulating and implementing energy policies. Unlike the
previous chapter which looked at the EC’s objectives 
specifically, this chapter takes a more general view and 
offers a possible solution to some of the dilemmas facing the 
EC in its energy policy choices. The issue of whether or not 
the EC’s present energy policies are representative of a 
'common’ policy will be analysed and secondly, in line with 
this, whether these policies are reactive or anticipatory in 
their implementation. This approach is based on the idea that
the EC’s energy policies have been the outcome of past events, 
in the 1970s and early 1980s.
Three Criticisms
Three basic criticisms may be levelled at the attitude that
the West European states have assumed towards the issue of 
energy policy(2) and these apply equally to the EC.
Firstly, EC energy policies arguably reflect too narrow an 
analysis of the threats facing them. Secondly, they
concentrate on too narrow a range of options and finally, they
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display an inadequate sense of how total costs and benefits
need to be assessed when addressing the future.
Two concerns arise when considering security : that of the
probability that an alteration in the situation will occur and 
that when it does occur, that significant costs will be 
imposed on a state or person. For energy security this
entails substantial reductions in physical supply, usually
accompanied with upward pressures on prices, hence reflecting
the linkage between supply and price, i.e. a reduction in
supply may result in increased upward pressure on prices. In
turn, a price increase tends to mobilise additional supplies
and then depress demand. This is a basic law of supply and
demand and one that applies to all raw commodities. However,
in practice and for the implementation and formulation of
policy, there is a distinction between price and supply. A
price increase, in some instances, may have to be absorbed for
some period before supply can expand sufficiently to respond
to it. Despite this, "neither analysis nor policy can safely
ignore the obvious link between the two. Nor is it generally
prudent to ignore the links between the probability and the 
cost of an undesired change."(3)
This means that in responding to threats to energy security,
the probability of the changes that are feared, as well as
their potential costs, should be weighed up, while keeping in 
mind adjustments in prices. Moreover, probability, change
and cost are all relative, in that a substantial increase in 
the price of oil can be as damaging as its abruptness.
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However, it is particularly difficult to analyse the costs and
benefits of security in relation to probability factors and
different time horizons, because of the imprecise nature of
security. Therefore, a state faces a dual problem of current
pressure of security factors on energy and of apprehension of
future changes in that pressure over an indefinite or extended
period of time. This means states have to plan energy policy
in an atmosphere of multidimensional uncertainty - one which
can result in inadequate policies.
At this level, therefore, serious doubts exist about the
current perception of Europe’s energy security problems and
the appropriate responses to it. Many of the policies are the
result of intuitive reactions to the previous oil crises of
the 1970s.
Therefore, in the event of another crisis, new dangers and
ulterior costs could be overlooked with parallel effects on
analysis and policy instead of planning in anticipation of a
future crisis. As such they are one-dimensional and focus too
intently on one particular scenario at the expense of 
neglecting other potential ones. In other words, European
energy policies have failed to react to the domestic and
international changes in the energy situation and especially
in oil which have occurred since 1973.
A result of such reactive planning is an excessive 
preoccupation with oil supply at the expense of security
threats to other energy forms and sources. (4) One may add
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that European energy policies also appear to need "crises as a 
means to take serious action towards energy adjustment."(5) 
This is a case of reactive policy making but one which relies
on a dangerous strategy : that of allowing two modes of
functioning for democratic systems : normal and crisis modes. 
Maull states that a crisis allows qualitatively different 
steps to be taken which can mesmerise the political system and
the decision-making process, and can increase the authority 
and legitimacy of governments.(6)
In connection with oil imports, current security policies give 
rise to some uncertainties. In this context, for example,
they are primarily orientated to a major interruption in
supply. However, as past experience and possible future
scenarios stand, it would seem that the most serious costs are 
likely to be those incurred by large and rapid changes in oil 
prices and not those incurred by a reduction in supply. As 
seen in the two crises of the early 1970s and early 1980, it
was the price increases which caused the most damage and not
the shortfall in oil volumes, which only had a marginal 
impact.(7) Yet, there was a notable lack of short-term
arrangements or guidelines for dealing with shortfalls and 
concurrent price rises.(8)
Another criticism which can be levelled at the Europeans, in
their attitude towards energy security, is that they give only
limited attention to the outcome of energy policies in
minimizing the impact of one contingency v i s - à - v i s  the
possibility that other dangers will occur. In other words.
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like causes do not necessarily produce like effects. Instead
a state should concentrate on weighing up the ulterior as well 
as the proximate effects of an eventual crisis. A good
example of this is that of the Community’s oil supplies from 
the Gulf. The main aim of EC’s energy policies has been to
reduce dependence on supplies from this source. However, in 
achieving this, two dangers have begun to emerge. The first
one is the dependence of the Gulf states on the oil income
they receive from Europe member states. "In the absence of 
alternative markets, there is some level of oil income below 
which the probability of social and political conflict within 
Gulf states may rise quite rapidly. "(9) This can result in 
international conflict between the different exporters if the
income loss appears to be unevenly or inequitably distributed
among them. In the eventuality of such an outcome, would it
not seem prudent for Europe to reduce oil imports from the 
Gulf area especially in view of the large excess value of Gulf
oil supplies to Europe and of the strategic costs involved in 
a conflict there? Alternatively, and contrary to Smart’s 
argument, why should Europe reduce its imports from this area
if it could ensure a stable and secure supply by the
establishment of, for example, special provisions between 
importer and exporter? In today’s market, in a situation of 
over-supply, a shortfall from one producer could be easily
made up by another thereby rendering, for the short to medium
term, such an argument invalid. (10) It is in the long term
that Smart’s argument has validity in view of the reserves 
found in the Gulf and the increasing non-availability in other 
producing regions.
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The second related danger arises from a decline in America’s
dependence on oil supplies from the Gulf. Previously,
American dependence on oil supplies from the Gulf region was a
considerable factor in the oil market. However, American, 
dependence on oil from this region now stands at a 
substantially reduced level(11) whereas that of Western 
Europe’s and the EC’s is still considerable. This could mean
that with the US no longer an importer of some significance 
for the Gulf states, they could tentatively be encouraged to 
exploit their remaining market power for political gains.(12) 
This may be extended further by suggesting that with almost 
three quarters of the world’s proved oil reserves in OPEC’s
possession that, at some time, this advantage over other
producers is bound to give OPEC considerable power in the 
market place. However, the oil over-supply situation, for the 
moment, yet again, renders the possibility of this happening, 
highly unlikely. Instead, it appears that it is the importers 
who have the upper hand over the exporters. Nonetheless, such 
a scenario should not be ruled out.
These two dangers do serve, however, to remind the European
member states that their actions, to reduce the potential 
costs of energy security contingencies, can have implications 
for both the producers and the consumers of oil, as was seen 
in the 1970s, with disunity prevailing among the industrial 
states over the correct course of action to assume towards 
OPEC. As discussed previously, attempts by states to go it
alone in securing supplies during a crisis may reduce the
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security of the other importers by undermining the flexibility
of the international market. This would further exacerbate
the security problem already created by the loss of
flexibility on world markets - a result of structural changes
in the world oil market since the beginning of the 1970s
"the loss of control over production by vertically integrated
companies to host governments, the fragmentation of the oil 
trading system, and the rest."(13) An example of the changed
oil situation is the downstream integration by Kuwait into
West European markets which began in 1983 as a response to the
shrinking of its oil-export revenues.(14)
The EC and the lEA
While in the actual formulation and implementation of a common 
energy policy the EC has encountered numerous and often
serious setbacks, it is in the institutional area that it has
advantages over such an institution as the lEA, although Van
Der Linde and Lefeber would disagree with this. (15) The EC is
equipped with legislative powers and can take decisions which
are binding on member states. This is borne out by the number 
of regulations, directives and decisions in force.(16)
A reason for the lack of agreement on specific measures is to
be found in the provisions of the Treaties governing the
European Communities. As mentioned previously in Chapter 4,'
energy policy is not provided for under the Treaties and this
hampers the formulation and implementation of legislation. A
further factor in this counter argument is that the Council of
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Ministers is further constrained by the variations among '
member states in regard to vulnerability, capability and j 
interests. This has resulted in the almost non-achievement of |ia conmon policy. The lack of provision in the Treaties can be j
overcome using Article 235 but this, in turn, relies on |
unanimity or more increasingly a majority decision on the part i
of the member states. |
This situation, therefore, means that even though in principle '
the Commission and the Court of Justice are equipped to settle ,
disputes and enforce legislation, there are few energy related i
1rules to enforce. In turn, the enforcement of energy rules j
relies on the will of the member states implementing them at a I
national level. This brings into question the uniformity |
I
among member states in transposing EC law into national^  law. 1
In reality, therefore, a fine line exists in EC decision- i
making between the decisions taken by the Council to which j
the member states have agreed and the actual implementation of j}
these decisions at a national level. i
i
Furthermore, the EC has a considerably larger budget at its ; 
disposal than the lEA and grants considerable amounts of money :
for research and development e.g. in December 1988 ECU 5.6 i
million was granted to technological development projects in i
the oil and gas sector. (17) In 1989 the Commission launched a !
new five year energy technology programme called "Thermie". i
It will cover the areas of energy efficiency, renewable |
Ienergies, hydrocarbon development and the clean use of j
icoal.(18) Yet, overall it appears that the Commission’s j
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multi-annual budget for total research reveals how little it
has at its disposal for expanding the number of programmes 
with which it hopes to stimulate co-operation among the member 
states.(19)
In many respects these benefits are offset by two factors :
firstly, the slow pace of decision-making due partly to the
reluctance of member states to relinquish their sovereignty 
and partly due to the decision-making machinery in place; and
secondly, reluctance on the part of member states to support
projects from which they do not directly benefit. An example 
of this is support (by members) of the Community’s regional 
policy. Some discord exists among the wealthier states at
having to support the relatively lower income group of states
such as Greece and Portugal. This is reflected not only in
regional energy policy but also in other EC policies.(20)
This argument may be taken a step further by arguing that
whilst, as does Kohl(21), the basic components for effective
Western energy co-operation appear to be in place including 
the European Communities, what is still needed (particularly 
in the EC’s case) is the adaption and extension of existing 
arrangements to strengthen and broaden the scope of its
present functions. The more successful arrangements of an 
institution usually rely upon carefully defined objectives but
with some flexibility to adapt to changes in the international 
energy context. The EC has attained this but doubts persist
over the definition of its objectives, particularly if one 
regards EC energy policy as reactive rather than anticipatory.
199
A çgrrnpn energy pol i cy?
Therefore one has to ask, in view of the above, whether the
Community has a cannon energy policy. El Agraa and Hu (22)
have raised this question and they argue that the answer
depends on what is meant by 'policy’ and what constitutes a
'conmon’ policy. "If, by a policy, one means a combination of
a clear vision of the future, a coherent set of principles, a
range of policy instruments adequate to the objectives that
are set, and the existence of sufficient legitimacy and
authority to carry the measures through, it follows by
definition that Europe does not have an energy policy."(23)
Alternatively, policy according to Hilsman is "...what is to
be done about the situation. "(24) This is a simplistic
definition and begs the question of whether such a concept as
policy exists. As Vital remarks : " there are a great
many policies on a great many matters, co-existing, often
uncomfortably and uncertainly, at various levels of 
definition, priority and recognition."(25) Moreover, it
becomes increasingly difficult to precisely define policy as
one moves from the specific to the general because of the
inconsistency and incoherency implicit in formulating 
decisions. This means that 'policy’ should be seen merely as
the outcome of a number of decisions relating to a particular
sector or issue and placed within a general framework relating
to the desired objective. Since this is continually changing, 
it makes it difficult, and at times nearly impossible, to
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define 'policy’ accurately. If this is the case, then the
Eu ropean Commun ity’s energy policy is difficult to def i ne
adequately because of the continually changing context in
which is is formulated. However, for the purposes of this
thesis, El Agraa and Hu’s definition of policy is more
pertinent, precisely because it provides a clearer definition
of the factors making up 'policy’.
In defining what is meant by a 'common’ policy, El Agraa and
Hu have based theirs on the supranational or integrationist
view of what constitutes a common policy and that, therefore,
no such policy exists "since much of the conception and
implementation of energy policy remains with the member
states."(26) In other words, as Hilsman suggests, "[p]olicy 
is often the sum of congeries of only vaguely related or even
entirely separate actions."(27) It is more a result of
bureaucratic momentum and politics than of conscious decision
making. In a similar vein, the 'common’ element of policy
lies with the actions (or lack of them) of the member states.
Should they, at a simplified level, all decide to implement
all Community decisions, regulations and directives then
arguably a 'conmon’ energy policy would exist. However, with 
the exception of regulations, the implementation of decisions,
directives and recommendations (depending on the
circumstances) is left very much up to the member state
concerned. Resolutions have no legal basis in EEC Treaty.
The EC’s energy policy, therefore, has to be seen as 
essentially a convergence of national policies towards a
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common goal. As Weyman-Jones states "...Community energy 
policy remains simply a collection of individual
policies..."(28) It is one which presupposes a convergence of 
national interests on the member states’ part. This is 
dependent on their perceptions, material resources, mutual 
trust and arrangement of "package" deals. Thus, no single 
common energy policy exists for EC member states to comply
with. Its policy essentially remains a series of guidelines
and recommendations, subject to implementation by the
variations in vulnerability, capability and interests which
exist among the member states.
The need for a common pol icy
In view of the aforementioned, does the European Community
need a common energy policy? Would it not be sufficient for
it to co-ordinate the individual member state’s energy 
policies? However, this would not be sufficient since, as
Denton states, the answer has to be sought in the long term,
in economies of scale, increased bargaining strength, 
decreased vulnerability, or the need to maintain certain other
common policies particularly those aimed at common or 
harmonised pricing and fiscal policies. The latter could
avoid a number of problems created by separate fiscal
jurisdictions.(29) As El Agraa remarks :
"  the justification for a common energy
policy depends on the vision that one has of the
Community and of what it should become. If one
believes in the ever closer working together of the
peoples of Europe, the question becomes : why should
the Community not work together in this vital area?
It becomes a question, not of strict separation of
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powers but of combining national and Community
initiatives towards common goals."(30)
The above, therefore, allows one to suggest that, as briefly
mentioned, the European Cormiunity’s policies are essentially 
reactive and not anticipatory. One could suggest that the
established European view towards energy security takes the
following line of reasoning (and as observed from stated
objectives) : firstly, that consumption of energy is to be
reduced either by improved efficiency of conversion or through
the use of the lowest level of energy economically possible.
Secondly, the production of indigenous energy is to take 
precedence in order to ensure greater security of supply but
not at the expense of excluding comparatively secure and
cheaper imports of energy. Thirdly, if it is impossible to 
meet the first two criteria or if demand is greater than
supply then the following have, to some extent, been observed
by member states : that oil imports are to be reduced
particularly from OPEC states and the Gulf and, if possible, 
eventually to be eliminated and that these imports,
particularly those from the Middle-East and North Africa, are
to be replaced by alternative fossil fuel imports.
The final criterion is that emergency stocks are to be
established and maintained at specific levels and to be used
in the event of a crisis. A predetermined formula, for the 
allocation of oil and other sources of energy, will apply for 
stocks should supply fall below a stated threshold level.
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The above view however, is superficial and one dimensional.
It is more applicable to a theoretical energy situation than 
to those which prevail in reality. In other words, it fails
to take into account the volatility and increased flexibility
of the international oil scene.
If one combines the above view with that of the established {
iEuropean view towards energy security, then the outcome is a j
!Community attitude towards energy security which is based on JIpast convictions and notions which still influence the |
formulation of energy policy. According to Smart(31) these i
1views have been shaped by the experiences of the 1970s. "Only »Ithis can explain the patterns of assumptions underlying |
Icurrent policies and statistical projections."(32) Until the j
beginning of the 1980s it was thought, by member states, that !Î
to meet energy demand by any other form of energy was ii
preferable to relying on imported OPEC oil. This signifies j
that importation of coal and gas from any sources within, as |
well as without, of the OECD was preferable. However this j 
involved an undesirable outcome for the member states. As |
Smart explains : "...governments were singularly i11-prepared, j
as a result, for the discovery that a non-oil import from a 1
non-OPEC source might arouse fears about energy security, or 1
that their respective views of the risks involved might then ;l
prove sharply divergent."(33) From this belief and also the i■I
divergence over the Soviet gas pipeline issue, arose the j
I
simple assumption that certain non-OECD imports (in this t
instance gas imports from the USSR) are less secure than |Iothers. In order to secure them sufficiently, at the very i
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least, quantitative (or even proportional) limits on the 
quantity imported from a particular non-OECD exporter were 
requi red.
This assumption brings to light a new element in discussions
about oil imports from OPEC : the fact that for the European 
member states, previous experience of turbulence in the supply 
and price of oil has been compounded by OPEC members holding .
vast reserves of oil. As indicated in previous chapters, 60
percent of Western Europe’s primary energy in 1973 came from 
oil of which the Middle East alone supplied 66 percent and
Africa another 22 percent. In 1978 oil provided 48 percent of
primary energy requirements of which Africa and the Middle- 
East continued to provide 75 percent of the oil required.(34)
By 1983, these figures had shifted considerably : the Middle-
East and Africa only provided 48 percent of oil consumed of 
which oil accounted for 48 percent of overall primary energy 
consumption. Thus, between 1973 and 1983 imports from the
Middle East fell from 40 percent to 13 percent of total energy 
demand and those from Africa fron 13 percent to 10 
percent.(35) Despi te this decli ne, however, the percentage
of oil imported to other energy forms remained higher than 
other major elements of primary energy supply.
It is, therefore, not surprising that this preponderance
underlies European fears about the security of their oil 
imports. Consequently, this situation has resulted in
increasing emphasis being placed on the need for a balance
between available energy sources and the inherent dangers
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resulting from overdependence. But, as mentioned previously,
are the dangers resulting from such a situation so high that
they warrant extreme measures? Given the present situation on
the international oil markets, and as stated earlier on in 
this chapter, perhaps the EC member states are being unduly
cautious in certain aspects? However, despite the
aforementioned, the final criteria by which EC member states 
governments assess energy security and the means at their
disposal to contain it are : the kinds of fuel imports and
sources which are insecure, and the amounts involved.(36)
For the longer term perhaps this view is too optimistic. The 
EC in a future crisis is unlikely to be able to sustain a
concerted attack upon its members because of a major flaw in 
its policies - they are reactive rather than anticipatory
having been borne out of their respective member governments
reactions to the crises of the 1970s and 1980s rather than the
present situation. The objectives : security of supply,
reducing unreliable sources of supply; reducing dependence on
oil in overall energy consumption etc, are ajmed at the 
situation which prevailed in the international oil markets in 
the 1970s and early 1980s and which no longer is present in
its previous fornn.
The latest objectives for 1995, with the exception of those
for the Single Energy Market, fail to take into account
sufficiently the changes which have occurred on the oil
markets since 1983 : namely the oil over-supply situation or
excess oil production. In essence the 1995 objectives are
.J
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î
jlargely an up-date of earlier statements. They contain no new i
features. Security of supply always will and should remain a j
prime consideration for any state particularly given the j
primacy of economic growth/security over most other aspects of I
security within the modern advanced industrial state. It is |
I
the other objectives concerning oil, specifically reducing ;
dependence on Middle-Eastern suppliers and the reduction of j
oil in overall energy consumption which do not corroborate i
i
with present day circumstances. The Middle-East is likely for !
Ithe forseeable future to remain, politically and militarily, ;
an unstable supplier with a number of factors mitigating in :i
its favour. These include the fact that this region of the ;
world contains some of the largest reserves of crude oil; it ;
has lower production costs per barrel of oil than most other •
producers and downstream integration by the oil producers as !
seen by Kuwait in recent years means that the oil producers :
I
now have a far greater stake in the oil markets than that of I
just producer. They now have a more direct outlet for their j
product and thereby a greater interest in ensuring continuing ;
Ïmarkets for it. I
Furthermore, the oil over-supply situation or oil 'glut' ;
means that for the West European states it is far more I
!
feasible to purchase cheap, although 'insecure', oil supplies |
than to rely on more expensive alternative energy forms. All \
Ithis denotes that the European states for the future are |
likely to remain dependent on the Middle-East and the Gulf i
I
region in particular for the majority of their oil supplies. j
This realisation is in one sense not apparent in their energy i
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policies. In another sense the EC member states have
reconciled themselves to the idea that their consumers will 
become increasingly reliant on foreign oil. This is expressed 
in their on-going concern with reducing oil as a percentage of
total energy consumption.
With regard to the objective of reducing oil’s percentage in 
overall energy consumption, should the member states pursue 
such an active policy when no readily acceptable alternative 
is available? Would it not be better to continue using oil as
an energy form instead of switching back to coal which entails 
not only technological problems but poses environmental ones
as well? In answer to this, one can argue that liquid fuels
still hold considerable attractions for consumers,
particularly in regard to transportation (easy to handle, ship 
etc in relation to coal).
The above reasons and the facts that the Middle-East is and
will remain the main supplier of oil, and that the EC member
states for the future(37) will remain reliant on oil as their 
main energy source, all point to the conclusion that energy
policy should be set in a wider context than it is. OPEC,
despite its activities in the 1970s and early 1980s can no
longer be seen as a threat to the Western consumers. It is
now plagued with internal rivalries and the question of 
persuading members to comply with quota allocations in an
attempt to stop the flooding of the international oil markets. 
Instead, what the European Community should be concerned 
with (38) is the fact that the Community and the main oil
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exporters are natural trading partners. Both are reliant on 
each other, either for oil or for the income that is generated 
from such trade. The EC’s tentative relations with the OPEC, 
GAPEC and GCC states is insufficient at the moment and further 
positive steps need to be taken towards consolidating and 
improving relations between them. For it is on such relations
that the Community’s oil supplies will mainly depend until a
compatible, acceptable and relatively cheap alternative is 
found to oil.
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CONCLUSION
The purpose of this thesis was, briefly, to analyse the 
concept of energy security with particular emphasis on oil
imports, in relation to the European Community. This
incorporated two aspects : that of the potential
vulnerability of the Community and the measures taken to
insure against such a situation and decrease vulnerability,
and the fact that EC energy policies are a result of
reactive elements at the expense of anticipatory ones.
In view of the initial aims and the evidence presented
herein, the following conclusions have emerged : in general,
that the issue of security of supply, in relation to oil,
still retains its relevance, for now and the future, despite
the continued oil oversupply situation prevailing on the
markets. Secondly, that the European Community member
states’, as a whole, are vulnerable. This is because, as
indicated in Chapter 1, they have a high level of imports
from foreign sources, these sources, being particularly 
unstable ones, having a past history of using oil supplies
as a political weapon. Furthermore, because of the level of
usage in the economies concerned, a high cost would be
incurred if a crisis or shock situation happened. In
vulnerability’s case (as opposed to that of a 'sensitive’
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economy), the costs would potentially be much greater
because of the higher level of reliance on imports for a 
greater section of the economy. The degree of vulnerability 
in the EC is determined not only by history and economic
circumstances but also by policy instruments and measures 
available. The latter are important in reducing the overall 
degree of vulnerability.
The thesis has shown that the issue of security of supply
has been a central theme of the European Community’s energy 
policy since 1973. Only one member state, the United
Kingdom, is a net exporter of oil. As demonstrated, for the 
forseeable future, the Community will remain (energy and 
particularly oil) dependent. Throughout the 1970s and the
first half of the 1980s, the EC was able to reduce its 
dependence on imported oil so that by 1985 net oil imports
were below 32 percent of total energy consumption. However,
the EC continues to import over 70 percent of its oil 
requi rements and since 1985-86 these percentages have 
started to rise, accompanied by another increase in the 
Community’s import dependence. By the mid-1990s, on the
European Community’s own estimates, it could be importing
over 50 percent of its energy needs, and around 80 percent 
of its oil needs.
Therefore, the Community’s major vulnerability is its 
dependence on oil imports to meet its requi rements. ( 1 ) 
Unlike imports of gas, coal and uranium, oil imports cannot 
be extensively diversified. Instead, its imports are
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becoming increasingly concentrated on sources within the 
Persian Gulf region as extra or non-OPEC sources are
depleted or prove uneconomical to continue producing.
However,it is difficult to generalise about energy security
in relation to the European Community because of the 
multitude of differences which exist among member states,
including differences in resources; in economic philosophy 
over market systems; in relations between the oil producers 
and themselves and the existence of competing commercial
interests. All of these factors, and more, as outlined in 
Chapter 6 have resulted in divergences over energy policies, 
which have impacted on the EC’s policy instruments with an 
often negative result and, which are reflected in the EC’s
energy policies.
The result of the EC’s energy policies, particularly those
relating to oil, have been mixed depending on whether one is
looking at them in the short term or in the longer term. 
In the short term EC energy policies have succeeded in 
improving the efficiency of energy use; in opening up
further the internal market; in limiting, to an extent, the
level of imports and; in increasing the use of other energy 
forms, specifically natural gas and coal. In the long term, 
however, EC energy policies reflect that it [the EC] has not 
succeeded in agreeing on a common energy policy, in general,
and a common external energy policy, in particular. The 
latter is important for the future, continued supply of oil
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and the lack of it is seen in the decrease in momentum, in j
Ithe EC, in on-going supply diversification.(2) 1
, I I1This situation is compounded by the nature of the decision- i1making institutions and processes. The preparation of ;
!policy is a laborious process and progress is often slow. j
Long delays are often encountered between the submission of |
Ia proposal by the Commission and the acceptance of it by the |
Council. But the main reason behind the lack of a common j
energy policy is that of an inadequate mandate in the EC |
Treaties specifically providing for energy as a whole I
entity, and oil in particular. None of the Community I
Treaties provides for a common energy policy. Instead
responsibility for the various energy forms is divided up
between the Euratom, ECSC and EEC Treaties, with oil falling
under the EEC Treaty in which no provision is made for a
common or even a general policy. Instead oil is classified
as a product and falls under the articles governing these.
Decisions, which are legally binding, are reliant upon the
respective clauses or articles in the Treaties and if there
is no clause in the Treaty, then the Council has not the
power to act. However, the member states, under the EEC
Treaty of 1957, do have recourse to Article 235 which allows
the Council to take the appropriate measures as necessary.
Despite this measure, the EC’s energy policy, as it now
stands, apart from directives governing stockholding and
emergency measures, remains essentially a series of 
guidelines and recommendations for the member states to
conform to at will. In other words, there are few energy
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related rules to enforce since few rules has actually been 
created in the energy sector.
This raises, for further consideration, the question of 
whether, within the Community, one has to resort to law to
achieve a desired goal. It also brings into question
whether the EC has a 'common’ energy policy, as there is a 
'common’ agricultural policy or a 'common’ market p e r  se.
The answer to this appears to be no, because of the lack of 
a legally enforceable mandate, as discussed. It would
require the implementation of new articles within one of the 
Treaties. This in turn raises the following consideration 
of whether one should talk of a 'common’ energy market. A 
' common ’ market in energy could only exist if it were all 
the same to the member states. But, since each member state
is different - different needs, interests, vulnerabilities,
sources of supply etc - how can there exist a 'common’
energy market? The implementation of the Internal Energy 
Market (I EM) in 1992 is a response to the integrative motive 
at the heart of the whole EC, which has always been a 
significant consideration of the Community though, in some 
periods, it has remained submerged. However, the
implementation of the I EM across the broad range of
variations which exist among and between the member states 
could prove to be a lengthy process.
However, as they stand, the EC’s energy policies would 
appear to be a collection of essentially reactive (and in
this sense, negative) policies. This means that the energy
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policies are directed to short term considerations. For
long term energy policy to remain effective, it should be
separated from short term considerations and directed
towards policies which retain and increase energy efficiency
and diversification.
It would increasingly appear, therefore, that an alternative
course of action, on the part of the member states, is 
called for. Whatever measures are taken domestically they 
will remain fundamentally short term in nature. It is only
at the international level that the energy problem can be
resolved. Each state’s own priorities, interests and
political considerations, as mentioned, have resulted in a 
limited degree of co-operation. In order to widen or
increase co-operation, to ensure greater stability and 
reliability of supply, the EC will have to conrnit itself to
greater co-operation with the Arab oil producers. This
response is conditioned by one principal factor : the
realisation that the EC’s future energy security is highly
dependent on the actions of the Persian Gulf oil producers.
This attitude would entail increased bilateral and 
multilateral relations, both economically and politically 
between the consumers and the producers. At the
international level, therefore, the EC could prove to be a 
valuable forum. However, this response is dependent on the 
member states.
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In the end, however, complete security of supply will never
be achieved because insecurity is in the nature of oil. As
Gasteyger observes :
always
autonomous
"[a]part from the security aspect
costs, risks of accident, industrial 
envi ronmental prohi bi ti on
indigenous supply - however
may become over the years,
search for complete energy 
vain as that for complete 
may even be counter productive, 
will be, forms of insecurity
of economi c 
conflict and 
hang over 
such supply
In other words, the
security will remain as 
mi 1i tary securi ty. It
There are, and
and challenges to
security that are either not forseeable or simply 
not control 1able....[W]hat matters is to
understand the general trends of change and 
challenge, and to strike the best possible balance
between 
on the 
on the
the risks 
one hand, 
other."(3)
of
and
traditional 
the costs
sources of supply 
of a 1 te mat i ve ways
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A P P E N D I X
TABLE 1 CRUDE OIL IMPORTS* 1988 Mtoe^
Total
Imports
Total
OPEC
%OPEC:
Total
Imports
Total 
Gulf 2
%Gulf:
OPEC
%Gulf:
Total
Imports
Total 
EUR 12 421 223 52.9 127 56.9 30.1
FDR 71 35 49.2 9 26.1 12.8
UK 45 15 34.4 11 68.2 23.4
Italy 76 50 65.6 27 54.4 35.7
France 74 30 40.5 20 65.4 26.5
Netherlands 48 31 65.2 23 73.0 47.6
USA 290 155 53.7 78 50.2 26.9
Japan 165 119 72.2 96 80.9 58.4
Total OECD 965 542 56.2 333 62.0 34.5
Total OECD 
Europe 478 254 53.1 150 59.2 31.4
Figures 
2 Includes
rounded off 
Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar and
Neutral 
* Includes
Zone 
NGL(Natural Gas Liquids) and Refi nery Feedstocks
Source INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY : Quarterly Oil
Stati StiOS and Energy Balances  : 1st Quarter 1989
lEA/OECD, Paris, 1989 : ppl66-333
TABLE 2 : TOTAL PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IMPORTS 1988 : Mtoe^
Total Total %OPEC Total %Gulf: %Gulf:
Imports OPEC Total Gulf 2 OPEC Total
Imports Imports
Total
EUR 12 161 27 16.5 14 50.9 8.4
FDR 46 2 5.1 1 27.2 1.4
UK 8 1 5.0 (1.5) 3.7 0.2
Italy 19 9 47.5 5 58.0 27.5
France 22 4 20.5 2 51.4 10.5
Netherlands 34 6 18.6 3 50.0 9.3
USA 70 26 36.8 3 12.8 4.7
Japan 62 35 56.6 27 76.2 43.1
Total OECD 332 91 27.5 46 49.9 13.7
Total OECD
Europe 189 28 14.6 14 51.8 7.6
1 Figures rounded off
2 Includes Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and other
i
OPEC.
Source INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY : Quar t e r l y O il
Statistics and Energy Balances : 1st Quarter 
: ÏËÂ/ÔËCD, Paris, 1989 : ppï66-333
1989
TABLE 3 OIL SECURITY PC3I J &  QF_JTIE, INDUSTRIALISED
COUNTRIES 1987 (Mtoe)
WEurope
Total
EC
Total
FDR
1. Energy Consumption 1075.3 1053.03 271.1
2. Oil Consumption 470.4 465.8 114.6
3. Oil Consumption as
a % of Energy
Consumption 43.7 44.2 42.2
4. Net Oil Imports 296.3 352.94 113.7
5. Oil Imports as a %
of Oil Consumption 63.0 75.7 99.2
6. Oil Imports as a
% of Energy Con-
sumption 27.5 33.5 41.8
Oil Consumption Patterns :*
Sectoral Industry"* 26.7 11.7 12.1
Distribution Resi/Comnrf 25.7 23.5 19.3
of Oi 1 Con­ T ransport 47.5 42.7 23.6
sumption (%)
Oil as % of Industry 38.8 23.9 34.9
Sector Con­ Resi/Comm 35.1 36.5 46.5
sumption of T ransport 98.4 98.3 99.0
Energy
Fi gures rounded off 
Ino1udes non-energy
Includes public and 
Inland consumption 
Crude oil and petroleum
use
agricultural sectors
products imports '■J
TABLE 3 CONTINUED
UK ITALY NETHERLANDS
1. Energy Consumption 208.7 148.9 65.9
2. Oil Consumption 75.6 88.2 23.6
3. Oil Consumption as
a % of Energy
Consumption 36.2 59.2 35.8
4. Net Oil Imports -49.7 89.9 26.6
5. Oil Imports as a %
of Oil Consumption — 1005
6. Oil Imports as a %
of Energy Consum­
ption ““ 60.4 40.4
Oil Consumption Patterns :*
Sectoral Industry"* 11.3 15.2 17.2
Distribution Resi/Comnf 5.1 14.6 3.2
of Oi 1 Con­ T ransport 27.9 27.6 17.7
sumption (%)
Oil as % of Industry 35.7 39.0 40.4
Sector Con­ Resi/Comm 12.5 43.4 8.2
sumption of T ransport 99.0 99.0 99.0
Energy
5 Approximate
TABLE 3 CONTINUED
\
USA JAPAN
1. Energy Consumption 1865.7 371.7
2. Oil Consumpt i on 766.4 207.7
3. Oil Consumption as a
% of Energy Consump-
tion 41.1 55.8
4. Net Oil Imports 309,5 216.1
5. Oil Imports as a %
of Oil Consumption 40.4 100
6. Oil Imports as a %
of Energy Consump­
tion 16.6 58.1
Oil Consumption Patterns :*
Sectoral Industry! 11.7 23.2
Distribution Resi/Corrrn2 5.9 15.1
of Oi 1 Con­ T ransport 35.0 23.6
sumption
Oil as % of Industry 34.0 46.8
Sector Con­ Resi/Comm 19.0 56.3
sumption of T ransport 99.0 99.0
Energy
Sources : INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY (1989) :
Energy Policies and Programmes qf IEA_
Countries   : ï988 Review : ÏËÂ/ÔËCD, Paris
BP Statistical Review of World Energy :
July 1989..... ................ ..... ... .
EUROSTAT : Energy Statistical Yearbook 1987
------  : Rapid Report : Energy and Industry
No 8 Ï989
TABLE 4 CRUDE OIL IMPORTS BY SOURCE 19872 Mtoe
EUR 12 USA* JAPAN* FDR UK ITAL
Total 347 273 158 43 37 78
OPEC 213 143 118 30 13 54
Near and
Middle-East 135 2 15 10 8 33
Africa 106 17 1 19 6 30
Eastern Europe 42 - 5 4 12
Algeria 18 7 — 6 1 4
Libya 36 —, 7 1 15
Nigeria 22 27 — 5 1 2
Iraq 33 4 9 2 4 8
Iran 29 13 9 1 2 7
Saudi Arabia 39 35 24 3 1 8
Kuwait 14 4 7 1 4
Qatar 2 9 - — 1
UAE 9 4 32 1 “ 5
Norway 32 4 — 4 15 —
Western
Hemisphere! 26 — — — — -
* Crude Oil + NGL 4- Refinery Feedstocks Imports
! Approximate 1988 figure 
2 Figures rounded off
Sources : EUROSTAT : Energy Statistical Yearbook 1987 :
p95
-------  ; Energy.Monthly  Statistics, No 8 1989
: p60
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY : Quarterly O H
Statistics and Energy Balances : 1st Quarter 1989 
: ■ ÔËCD/ÏËA; Paris :""p^6-333
TABLE 5 CWJDE OIL EXTRA-COMMUNITY INPORTS
1 9 8 0 - 1 9 8 7 Mtoe
I -
t
1980
Total 
8 5  8 6 87 1 9 8 0
OPEC 
8 5  8 6 87
% OPEC 
:Total
80 87
■'1
j E L R 1 2 4 8 8 3 2 8 3 5 6 3 4 7 4 2 0 2 3 4 2 4 6 213 8 6 61
îi ;
i Belgium 31 1 4 21 24 28 8 14 13 90 5 3Denmark 4 2 3 4 2 1 1 2 5 4 5 8r WGermany 8 4 4 7 4 8 4 3 7 5 3 5 3 7 30 90 711 Greece 1 8 11 17 1 6 14 8 13 13 8 2 8 2
k- Spain 4 8 42 44 4 3 41 2 5 2 9 26 8 5 6 0i France 111 59 6 1 5 5 9 9 40 4 2 27 8 9 5 0I Ireland 2 — — 1 2 — - 1 99 100
Italy 9 2 6 9 80 7 8 6 8 50 6 1 5 4 74 70
Netherlands 46 29 3 8 41 4 3 21 2 9 3 0 9 3 7 2
Portugal 8 7 8 8 8 6 6 5 9 0 63f UK 44 32 36 37 4 0 14 1 5 13 90 3 5 1
* figures rounded off
Source EUROSTAT : Energy Statistical Yearbook1987 : P94-95
T A B L E  6 ;  N E T I M P O R T S  O F P E T R O L E U M S  : 1 9 6 0 - 1 9 8 8
(Million tonnes)*
YEAR EUR 12 BELGIUM DENMARK FDR GREECE
1 9 6 Q 1 156.5
1961 177.6 - - - -
1962 1 9 9 . 2 ~ - - “
1963 2 2 5 . 5 - - - -
1964 263.3 — - - -
1965 301.3 - - ~ -
1966 338.2 - - “ _
1967 363.4 _ - ~
1968 4 0 8 . 4 — - - -
1969 463.0 — — - -
1970 5 3 8 . 3 2 6 . 9 19.3 1 2 2 . 5 6.0
1971 5 6 5 . 0 2 8 . 3 18.7 1 2 7 . 1 7 . 2
1972 695.8 29.1 19.6 134.0 8 . 8
1973 644.9 3 0 . 8 18.5 144.9 11.0
1974 621.0 2 8 . 7 1 7 . 6 1 3 2 . 1 1 0 . 4
1 9 7 5 5 4 0 . 4 25.5 1 6 . 5 1 2 2 . 6 7.9
1976 5 8 6 . 2 25.9 16.1 136.1 11.6
1977 544.8 2 6 ^ 16.9 133.9 10.4
1 9 7 8 538.1 27.1 1 5 . 8 138.3 1 2 . 0
1979 545.0 29.0 15.5 144.1 1 3 . 0
1980 4 9 6 . 3 25.9 1 3 . 2 130.4 1 3 . 2  -
1981 414.3 2 1 . 2 1 0 . 6 1 0 8 . 7 12.1
1982 3 7 7 . 9 22.0 9 . 5 103.2 10.3
1983 340.8 20.0 8 . 5 101.7 9 . 8
1984 3 4 8 . 1 18.7 8.4 103.7 9 . 9
1985 331.2 19.2 8 . 3 1 0 5 . 6 10.5
1 9 8 6 354.1 2 2 . 9 7 . 5 1 1 4 . 8 12.2
1987 3 5 3 . 6 22.1 6.3 1 0 9 . 9 11.6
1988 365.3 22.8 5.0 1 0 9 . 8 1 2 . 3
2 Crude 
* Figures
oi 1 and 
rounded
petroleum
off
products 1 Crude petroleum 1960-69
I
- f
:5’
!
i
'5
• I s'1
TABLE 6 CONTINUED
YEAR SPAIN FRANCE IRELAND ITALY
1960
1961 - - - -
1962 - - -
1963 - - -
1964 - - - -
1965 - - -
1966 - - - -
1967 - - - -
1 9 6 8 - - - -
1969 — — — —
1970 28.1 9 7 . 0 4 . 2 8 8 . 6
1971 3 3 . 2 103.9 5.1 9 1 . 9
1972 34.0 1 1 4 . 4 5.1 9 6 . 6
1973 40.3 128.8 5 . 6 1 0 3 . 8
1974 4 2 . 0 1 2 6 . 4 5 . 8 102.9
1975 41.6 1 0 2 . 6 5.1 9 0 . 3
1976 4 8 , 2 1 1 7 . 7 5.2 9 7 . 8
1977 46.7 110.9 5 . 7 96.4
1978 4 6 . 2 110.8 6 . 0 9 5 . 4
1979 4 8 . 8 1 2 1 . 3 6 . 3 99.7
1980 49.1 112.6 5 . 8 9 6 . 7
1981 48.1 93.7 4.9 9 2 . 5
1982 42.4 8 7 ^ 4.4 8 7 . 8
1983 42.2 8 1 . 5 4 . 0 8 0 . 8
1984 40.4 8 4 . 3 3 . 9 8 1 . 2
1985 Z # . 9 8 1 . 0 3 . 8 79.9
1986 3 8 . 4 82.1 4.7 81.9
1987 39.8 84.9 3.9 8 5 . 8
1988 4 3 . 4 8 4 . 0 3 . 7 79.1
-«.S':
I
I:
.W
TABLE 6 CONTINUED
YEAR NETHERLANDS LUXEMBOURG PORTUGAL UK
1960
1961 - - ~ -
1962 - - “ -
1 9 6 3 — - - -
1964 - - - -
1965 - - - -
1966 - - ~ -
1967 — - - -
1 9 6 8 - - - -
1969 — — — —
1970 36.0 1 . 3 4 . 7 103.7
1971 34.8 1.4 5 . 3 1 0 8 . 3
1972 38.4 1.5 5.7 108.9
1973 40.2 1.7 6 . 1 1 1 3 . 4
1974 35.8 1.6 6 . 7 111.6
1975 31.7 1 . 3 6.7 8 8 . 8
1976 3 8 . 0 1.4 7.3 8 0 . 9
1977 35.9 1.4 7.4 5 2 . 8
1978 3 6 . 3 1.4 7.3 41.3
1979 3 8 . 2 1 . 3 9 . 0 1 8 . 9
1980 37.5 1.1 9 . 3 1.7
1981 31.3 1.0 8 . 5 - 1 8 . 7
1 9 8 2 27.8 1.0 9 . 5 - 2 7 . 8
1 9 8 3 2 5 . 6 1.0 9.5 - 4 3 . 0
1 9 8 4 24.9 1.0 9 . 2 - 3 7 , 5
1 9 8 5 2 4 . 5 1.1 8.0 - 4 8 . 5
1986 2 9 . 3 1.1 9 . 0 -50.0
1 9 8 7 26.0 1 . 3 9 . 7 - 4 7 . 7
1 9 8 8 30.6 1.3 9 . 5 - 3 6 . 5
Source EUROSTAT 
Community ppï98-199
(1989)
: 26th
Basic Statistics of
ed. : OOPËC, Luxembourg
the
(1989)
OECD (1975)
; Rapid Reports No 6 _ _  ^
Statistics of
OECD, Paris
p8Energy:p84 1960-1974
TABLE 7 : PRIMARY ENERGY CONSUMPTION - BY FUEL* :
1987-1988 (Mtoe)
USA JAPAN FDR FRANCE ITALY
Oil : 1987 763 208 115 86 90
1988 789 222 115 86 92
Natural : 1987 432 36 44 25 32
Gas 1988 460 39 43 24 33
Coal 1987 453 69 73 18 15
1988 480 76 73 17 15
Hydro- : 1987 77 19 5 15 11
electric 1988 67 19 4 16 11
Nuclear : 1987 124 46 29 53 +
energy 1988 145 43 32 55 +*
TOTAL : 1987 1849 378 266 197 148
1988 1941 400 267 197 151
% Oil of : 1987 41.27 55.03 43.23 43.65 60.81
energy
consumption
1988 40.64 55.6 43.07 43.65 60.92
* figures rounded off 
+ less than 0.05
2.
TABLE 7 CONTINUED
UK Nether­
lands
Total
WEurope
Total
OECD
Total
EC
Oi 1 : 1987 75 32 585 1659 505
1988 80 34 594 1715 511
Natural : 1987 50 34 207 734 187
Gas 1988 48 30 199 763 191
Coal : 1987 67 7 259 856 230
1988 66 a 264 899 228
Hydro- : 1987 1 — 106 281 39
electric 1988 1 — 108 279 43
Nuclear : 1987 12 1 140 326 112
energy 1988 14 1 147 355 122
TOTAL : 1987 205 74 1296 3855 1074
1988 208 73 1311 4011 1096
% Oi 1 of : 1987 36.59 43.84 45.13 43.03 47.05
energy 
consumpti on
1988 38.46 46.93 45.30 42.75 46.62
Source : BP Statistical Review of World Ener :July 1989 p34
' / . ' r
TABLE 8 : OIL PRODUCTION (Mtoe)
1978 1981 1986 1988 1988
share
Total
Total EC 62.2 101.3 152.0 138.6 23.6
UK
Norway
53.317.2 89.424.9 128.644.1 114.256.0 3.81.8
TotalEurope Western 85.5 129.6 198.0 198.0 6.5
USA
Japan
488.1
0.5
482.8
0.4
486.70.7 462.50.7 15.3*
TotalEast Middle 1058.8 789.2 641.5 739.3 24.3
Saudi Arabia
Iraq
Iran
Abu Dhabi 
Kuwait
409.8
125.7
262.3
69.7
97.0
491.344.0
65.8
54.548.2
251.2
85.5
94.5 50.4
62.3
257.1 
127.7
113.2 61.8 
66.8
8.54.2 3.7 2.02.2
Total NCW 2391.1 2171.8 2163.3 2249.5 74.2
China
USSR
104.1
572.5
101 .0 609.0 130.7615.0 136.1624.0 4.520.6
Total World Of which OPEC 3092.9 1494.7 2903.71150.4 2932.0950.7 3030.81030.5 100.034.0
* less than 0.05
Source : BP Statistical..Review of World..Energy. : July 1989
HJF^fÀT : Energy.Statistical... ......... : 1987
TABLE 9._  OIL - PROVED RESERVES AT END 1988
(thousand M i11i on tonnes)
1988 Share of 
Total (%)
R/P
Ratio*
USA 4.4 3.8 9.5
Mexico 7.5 5.9 53.5
Venezuela 8.3 6.3 86.6
Total Latin America 17.1 13.4 50.5
Norway 1.4 1.1 24.4
UK 0.6 0.5 6.0
Total Western Europe 2.4 1.9 11.8
Eur12 1.2 10.0
Abu Dhabi 12.1 10.1 **
Dubai 0.5 0.4 28.0
Iran 12.7 10.1 **
Iraq 13.4 10.9 **
Kuwait 12.7 10.0 **
Saudi Arabia 23.1 18.6 89.9
Total Mi ddl e-East 77.3 62.3 **
Libya 2.9 2.4 57.4
Total Africa 7.5 6.1 28.6
Total Asia & Australasia 2.7 2.3 17.5
Total NCW 112.5 90.8 50.2
China 3.1 2.6 22.8
USSR 8.0 6.4 12.8
Total Wdrld 123.8 100.0 41.0
Of which OPEC 91.8 73.8 89.2
* Years of production 
production 
** Over 100 years
remaining at 1988 rate of
Proved Reserves of oil are those quantities which geological 
and engineering information indicate with reasonable certainty
can be recovered in the future from known reservoirs under
existing economic and operating conditions.
Source BP Statistical Review of World Energy
July Ï989 : p2
TABLE 10 CLOSING PETROLEUM* STOCK LEVELS
(lOOOt)
f
-5:
1980 1985 1987
E U R 1 2 1 7 9 052 1 2 6 4 6 0 131 108
Belgium 7 817 3 7 1 2 4 3 2 2
Denmark 6 9 5 0 5 706 5 9 0 9
FDR 46 4 6 4 13 7 6 9 37 916
France 3 4 745 19 4 9 2 17 534
Greece 4 495 7 744 4 607
Ireland 1 517 738 9 7 3
Italy 2 2 8 9 1 19 730 21 229
Luxembourg 1 1 5 1 1 8 152
Netherlands 16 960 10 574 10 8 7 4
Portugal 3 551 2 482 2 831
Spai n 9 035 10 147 8 3 4 0
UK 25 117 1 6 7 4 5 16 2 1 3
1
* Crude oil and petroleum products
Source ; EUROSTAT : Energy..Statistical Yearbook .1987
OOPEC, Luxembourg : pp78~83
   \ — •— »'• ' - •■I
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TABLE 11 : OFFICIAL CRUDE OIL PRICES
(US Dollars per barrel)
Saudi Arabian Iran UK Spot Market
34° API (Light) (Forties) Refined Pro­
duct Pri ce 
($ per bl )
1948 2.06
1950 1.71 - - -
1955 1.93 - - “
1960 1.87 - _ -
1970 1.80 - - -1972 2.29 - -
1973 2.59 - - “
1974 10.84 11.16 - -
1975 10.40 10.67 - -
1976 11.51 11.62 12.60 -
1977 12.09 12.81 14.00 13.391978 12.70 12.81 13.70 14.66
1979 13.34 13.45 15.45 31.29
19802 26.00 30.37 29.75 33.7319812 32.00 37.00 39.25 34.0519822 34.00 34.20 36.50 31.59
19832 34.00 31.20 33.50 28.2919842 29.00 28.00 29.90 27.6819852 29.00 28.00 28.56 30.13
1986 - - - 17.87
1987 18.00 - 20.13
1988 17.52 17.50 16.553
2 Saudi 
2 Third
Arabian Light as 
Quarter 1988
at 1 January
Source : BP Statistical Review of World Energy : July 1989
p14MAULL H W (1980) : 
Butterworths, London
Europe and World
: p208
Energy :
OECD (1988) : 
No 44 December
OECD 
1988 :
Economi c Out1ook p152 : i
s
